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In this dissertation, I test a framework of corporate environmental compliance put 
forth by Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton in their 2003 book called Shades of Green.  
However, this dissertation moves beyond a mere test of theory by integrating the 
corporate-level license framework with the individual-level Rational Choice Theory.  In 
doing so, this integration portrays how individuals within corporations decide to comply 
or overcomply with environmental regulations while accounting for the organizational 
context.  
Specifically, external pressures from the legal, social, and economic domains as 
well as corporation-wide policies and culture impact individual-level cost-benefit 
analyses.  In turn, these cost-benefit calculations impact the decisions made by corporate 
managers.  I propose five hypotheses based on this integration and test them using an 
environmental vignette survey of individuals as well as meta-analytical data.   
The vignette survey provides a randomly-generated hypothetical scenario and 
asks respondents (here, environmentally-minded business people) to predict their 
likelihood of offending or overcomplying as the depicted manager in the scenario did.  
Results provide mixed support for the impact of the external license pressures and more 
 
 
support for the rational choice theory measures.  I also compare similarities and 
differences between the offending and overcompliance models.   
I conducted a test of the robustness of hypothesis 1 results using meta-analysis of 
studies collected through 2006.  These studies use actual firm-level behaviors as their 
outcomes and therefore overcame some of the limitations of the vignette study.  I found 
additional support for the relationship between external pressures and offending, although 
more analysis is needed to assess how effects differ by study methodologies and samples. 
Overall, this integrated theory is worthy of further empirical testing and has 
important implications for both theories of corporate crime as well as prevention and 
control policies.  Future research should examine the interactions between factors 
affecting the corporation, those affecting the individuals in charge of the corporation, and 
interactions between these factors and levels.  The theory proffered here provides a clear, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
"Only after the last tree has been cut down… the last river has been poisoned… the last 
fish caught, only then will you find that money cannot be eaten." - Cree Indian Prophesy 
 
Noncompliance with environmental laws can have a devastating impact on human 
life and wildlife.  As just one example, cost-cutting efforts by Transocean and British 
Petroleum led to an oil spill that was “unprecedented in size, location, and duration.” 
(National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 
2011, p. 182)  The National Commission report on the BP oil spill documented how 
management failures at British Petroleum, Transocean, and Halliburton led to inadequate 
understanding of the issues and disregard for the potential risks involved in the oil 
drilling operation of the Deepwater Horizon.  The resulting blowout and oil spill, lasting 
for 152 days, left over 650 miles of the ecologically rich and diverse Gulf coast affected.  
The damage to birds, fish, oysters, plants, mammals, as well as the consequences for 
human and economic health, will be unknown for years and may even be incalculable.   
As of the time of this writing, federal agencies have begun pursuing civil and criminal 
charges against the parties involved, including manslaughter charges against executives 
(US Department of Justice, 2012).  Sadly, this is only one of many examples of corporate 
negligence and oversight leading to harm.   
To prevent future harm, it is imperative that policymakers and scholars 
understand how corporate managers react to environmental regulations—that is, how 
they make decisions to be in noncompliance, to comply, or even to overcomply with the 
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rules put forth by regulatory bodies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  
Prior research intimates that regulations themselves have an impact on corporate 
behaviors, but most scholars note that the law by itself is insufficient to explain 
compliance.  Instead, we need to consider the impact of other extra-legal factors (social 
controls, economic constraints, and characteristics of top-level managers) when 
determining how corporations react to environmental policies. 
Since the 1970s, the EPA has been the key regulatory agency creating 
environmental policy and enforcing environmental laws.  Most scholars acknowledge 
that environmental outcomes such as air pollution have been markedly reduced since this 
time period, but little is known about how much of this reduction is due to fear of legal 
consequences, normative considerations (i.e., corporate managers see environmentalism 
as a moral obligation), or community pressures.  Debates even exist about the appropriate 
method by which to regulate—e.g., whether regulators should take a more strict 
“command and control” approach when dealing with environmental offenders, or 
whether a more cooperative “self-regulation” approach (in which companies are assumed 
to be acting responsibly until otherwise proven) is more appropriate.  By gaining a more 
complete understanding of what motivates corporations to be in compliance with 
environmental regulations, we can better inform policy to create more effective and 
efficient solutions.  
Prior research identifies many different factors that predict noncompliance with 
environmental regulations and/or other environmentally-relevant outcomes (e.g., oil 
spills).  Most of the research lacks structure, and to this point few scholars have 
attempted to tie the identified factors together into a cohesive framework from which we 
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can work to create theories of corporate environmental behavior
1
.  Furthermore, many 
prior studies focus on only one factor (e.g., the impact of a specific law) without 
including, or examining interactions with, other factors (e.g., pressures from 
environmental non-government organizations).  An exception to this scattering of 
research findings is the “license framework” put forth by Gunningham, Kagan and 
Thornton (2002, 2003, 2004; Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; Thornton et 
al. 2007, 2008, 2009) which describes three domains external to corporations that guide 
firm decisions.  Specifically, they argue that corporate behavior is constrained by external 
domains they refer to as the legal license, the social license, and the economic license.  
The legal license is the impact of regulations and enforcement.  The social license 
includes pressures from community groups as well as from the public.  The economic 
license includes, for example, constraints on corporate environmental advances because 
of the expense of new technology or a lack of demand for environmentally-friendly 
products. 
In addition to these external licenses, Gunningham et al. (2003) argue that perhaps 
the most salient factor, and the one by which all of the external domains are ultimately 
filtered to culminate in corporate environmental performance, is the attitude of the 
corporate manager (and of the corporation itself) towards environmentalism.  In their 
research, they note that companies facing the same external constraints often respond in 
different ways.  Specific responses are driven by whether top management perceived 
environmental compliance to be important, whether top management seeks out new 
                                                          
1
 Although this specific study looks at environmental behavior, I expect that the theory developed here will 
apply to other forms of corporate compliance (e.g., antitrust, fraud, etc.). 
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information about environmental practices and the potential benefits of such practices, 
and other attitudes or practices.   
While the “license framework” is a huge leap forward in conceptualizing 
corporate environmental behavior, it has not been subjected to much empirical testing.  
Gunningham et al. (2003) and Kagan et al. (2003) offer limited empirical evidence 
(namely correlations and difference testing) that support their hypotheses, but researchers 
have yet to test this framework using a large-scale database and controlling for various 
confounders in tests.  Given the substantive, moral, and practical appeal of developing 
and testing theories of corporate environmental behavior, a strong empirical test of the 
license framework is long overdue.   
In addition to the last of statistical rigor in prior tests, the framework is limited in 
three other ways.  First, the framework is presented as a general approach to explaining 
corporate environmental behavior; the authors do not state their expectations in terms of 
formal propositions, which may be why empirical testing of the framework is limited.  In 
this study, I take the basic ideas of the framework but state them more formally.   Second, 
it does not clearly explain how factors predicting offending versus overcompliance may 
differ.  Those companies who engage in environmental behavior above what is required 
by law may have different internal mechanisms in place, or face unique external 
pressures.  The vignette data used in the first part of this study allows me to examine 
environmental offending as well as overcompliance to determine whether the predictors 
of each behavior differ.  Third, the license framework emphasizes factors acting on the 
corporation itself and doesn’t clarify how the individual characteristics of managers 
(aside from environmental attitudes) may impact managerial decisions and thus corporate 
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behavior.  For example, social pressures are conceptualized as community or NGO 
pressures on the corporation, but it may be that managers within the corporation are 
informally socially controlled by their friends, family, and social status.  The vignette 
data allows me to assess the influence of factors at both the individual and firm levels.  
Similarly, the framework discusses the concept of “managerial attitudes” but groups the 
attitudes of the CEO/top management together with corporate policies.  In the following 
study, I create a clearer (and broader) theory by integrating the license framework’s 
emphasis on corporate-level factors (the legal license, economic license, social license, 
and corporate culture) with a rational choice framework that models how individual 
perceptions and attitudes mediate or moderate corporate-level concerns.  In this 
integration, corporate-level pressures/incentives impact individual-level cost/benefit 
considerations.  These individual-level considerations ultimately influence the 
individual’s decision to comply or overcomply. 
The Gunningham et al. (2003) “license framework” is an important step in 
creating a cohesive theory of corporate environmental behavior.  Yet, the approach must 
be subjected to more empirical and quantitative testing in order to determine whether key 
concepts and research hypotheses accurately depict corporate behavior.  Furthermore, 
empirical testing can help us determine which factors are more or less important in 
guiding behavior and may illuminate under what circumstances various factors become 
salient.  Using individual-level data will also provide a test of the importance of 
managerial attitudes and individual characteristics in moderating or mediating the impact 
of external social, economic, and legal factors.  A second data source will allow me to 
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assess whether the results of a survey utilizing a hypothetical situation are similar to 
studies that use actual firm-level behavior as outcomes.   
This study will contribute to knowledge about corporate decision-making, an 
important venture in society’s attempts to mitigate the amount of future noncompliance 
and consequent impact on wildlife and human life.  Only through creating a 
comprehensive (but clear) theoretical framework that looks beyond the legal domain can 
we hope to make changes in organizational behavior that reduce harms resulting from 
noncompliance with environmental regulations.  In the next chapter, I present 
background information about environmental offending and overcompliance, what has 
been shown empirically to predict such behaviors, and review prior research on the 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
I. Introduction 
Research on corporate and individual environmental behavior has proliferated 
since the 1960s and 1970s when the environmental movement of that time spread 
awareness of corporate environmental crimes and negligence (Burns et al., 2008; 
Friedrichs, 2010; Hagan, 2011; Ruckelshaus, 1985).   However, this research investigated 
a multitude of factors without organizing them into a systematic framework until 
Gunningham and colleagues developed the idea of the “license framework” 
(Gunningham et al. 2002, 2003, 2004; Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; 
Thornton et al. 2007, 2008, 2009)
2
.  The “license framework” describes various domains 
external to the corporation (legal, economic, and social) that constrain or allow 
corporations to behave in a particular way.  It also describes how internal management 
affects the corporate response to such licenses and ultimately predicts the environmental 
outcome.  Despite making a major contribution to the literature on corporate 
environmental behavior by clarifying how factors work individually as well as with each 
other, the license framework concept has received little quantitative attention.  The 
framework also does not clearly distinguish the mechanism by which corporate-level 
concerns are filtered through individual-level attitudes and perceptions.   
This study addresses these deficiencies in the literature by integrating the license 
framework with an individual-level rational choice approach and quantitatively testing 
the entire model.  However, before quantitative tests can be performed I will situate the 
                                                          
2
 Although I argue that Gunningham and his colleagues developed the first holistic approach to corporate 
environmentalism, it is important to note that Huisman (2001) puts forth a similar conceptualization of 
corporate behavior (both in the environmental and occupational safety domains) in his dissertation, which 
was written in Dutch and not widely disseminated to American audiences. 
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license framework and rational choice theory in the context of what is known about 
environmental behavior by companies and their managers.  To this end, this chapter will 
define environmental compliance and introduce a relatively new concept—
“overcompliance”—to this discussion.  The chapter continues by describing the theories 
in more detail and use previous empirical research to support the various components of 
the framework as well as the cohesive model.  This chapter concludes by identifying five 
hypotheses that will be tested in the remainder of this dissertation.  
 
 
II. Defining the Outcomes of Interest 
 
a. Definition of Environmental Crime 
There are two outcomes of interest in this paper: 1) corporate crime and 2) 
corporate overcompliance, both under the domain of environmental regulation.  
Corporate crime is a specific type of white-collar crime committed by a representatives of 
the corporation, on behalf of the corporation
3
.  It occurs “in the context of complex 
relationships and expectations among boards of directors, executives, and managers on 
the one hand, and among parent corporations, corporate divisions and subsidiaries on the 
other” (Clinard and Yeager, 1980, p. 17).  The majority of corporate offenses are handled 
by regulatory agencies, like the U.S.’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), rather 
than by criminal or civil justice agencies.  Thus, a focus on strictly criminal behaviors 
                                                          
3
 It is important to note that a corporation is considered a “juridical person” (d’Errico, 1997, p. 99) that acts 
independently of its members.  I do not discount the corporation as an independent actor.  In the integrated 
theory described below, I predict the behavior of the corporation and/or its agents who act “for its sake, to 
achieve its objectives and according to its constraints.” (Finney and Lesieur, p. 264)  The corporation and 
its agents are subject to unique but interrelated influences that need to be delineated clearly.   
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would be too limiting and would miss a great deal of corporate misconduct.  According to 
Clinard and Yeager (1980), corporate crime is “any act committed by corporations that is 
punished by the state, regardless of whether it is punished under administrative, civil, or 
criminal law” (p. 16).  Since the current study focuses specifically on environmental 




“… cases that involve negligent, knowing or willful violations of federal 
environmental law. Generally speaking, knowing violations are those that 
are deliberate and not the product of accident or mistake. Knowledge of 
the specific statutes or regulations that prohibit the wrongful conduct is 
not required. When a violator is aware that the wrongful conduct is 
prohibited by law, the violation is said to be ‘willful.’" (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2011, 1
st
 paragraph)  
 
Note that this offense-based definition includes cases that can fall under criminal, 
civil, or administrative law.  All of the noncompliance behaviors examined in the vignette 
surveys and in the meta-analysis conform to this definition. 
 
b. Definition of Environmental Overcompliance 
Corporate environmental behavior can be thought of as a behavioral continuum—
on one end is environmentally harmful behavior (environmental crime) and the other is 
environmentally protective behavior.  Corporate overcompliance (also called “extreme 
                                                          
4
 Note that the EPA definition only allows for federal violations.  The present study’s outcome 
encompasses violations of environmental law regardless of jurisdiction or nationality.  
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volunteerism”) with environmental laws can be thought of as lying on the protective end 
of the continuum, on the opposite side from environmental offending. Scholars note that 
some companies and managers take actions that safeguard the environment in the absence 
of regulatory requirements or that some corporations’ environmental records far exceed 
what is required by regulations (Gunningham et al., 2003; Magat and Viscusi, 1990).  For 
example, some companies reduce pollution discharges to levels far lower than the legal 
limit.
5
  Others voluntarily reduce non-regulated pollution sources by enrolling in 
programs sponsored by the EPA such as Green Lights (which later partnered with Energy 
Star Buildings Program), Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) 33/50, and Wastewise.  
Relatively little is known about why corporations and managers adopt these types of 
behaviors.   
Bringing these kinds of behaviors into focus, especially in contrast to 
noncompliance, has implications for both theory and practice.  Going back to Hirschi’s 
(1969) theory of informal social control, it may be more useful to ask “why don’t people 
offend” as opposed to why they offend.  That is, given the low likelihood of formal 
sanctions and the fact that committing crime is often the most efficient method to get 
what we want, one might expect more offending than is generally observed.  This is 
particularly applicable to corporate crime, which traditionally has not been subjected to 
formal law enforcement efforts and sanctions.  Despite the small likelihood of detection 
and punishment and the lack of resources available to the EPA and other regulatory 
agencies, many companies not only comply but go above and beyond what they have to 
do.    
                                                          
5
 In a sample of mostly water treatment plants, Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) found that plants 
pollute, on average, only 60 percent of their permitted levels. 
11 
 
It is also important to realize that, unlike street crime, corporate compliance is not 
merely a “yes/no” question, particularly in the environmental realm.  Offending is often 
decided based on where the firm’s behavior falls on a continuum (e.g., pollution levels); 
furthermore, the point at which a firm is labeled as “noncompliant” is subject to 
negotiations between the firm and regulators.  Relatedly, there is literature that suggests a 
temporal aspect to overcompliance—larger companies may overcomply with regulations 
and then lobby for more stringent regulations that their less-profitable competitors will be 
unable to meet (Bernauer and Caduff, 2004).  Therefore, in a sense, overcompliance is 
compliance. 
That said, the discussion thus far makes it sound like overcompliance occurs only 
due to instrumental considerations—increasing competitiveness, negotiating regulatory 
stringency, etc.  There is evidence, however, that companies overcomply due to a sense 
of social responsibility and environmental attitudes of managers (Gunningham et al., 
2003).  Teasing out the motivations for overcompliance is important for both theory and 
policy.  For example, if extreme volunteerism is motivated by corporate culture or 
managerial normative values while offending is predicted by instrumental considerations, 
then programs that attempt to incentivize overcompliance may be ineffective because 
such companies would already be behaving in pro-environmental ways.  To the extent 
that “extreme volunteers” look quite different from noncompliant firms, we can learn 
more about the mechanisms that produce different behavioral outcomes and leverage that 





III. Theoretical Background 
 
 
a. Gunningham et al.’s License Framework 
Theories of environmental corporate behavior often contradict each other 
regarding the influence of various parties on corporate environmental behavior.  For 
example, the green consumer theory of overcompliance and rational choice theory of 
compliance both emphasize profit motives.  In the first case, corporations overcomply 
because of consumer preference for environmentally-sound products, while rational 
choice theory argues that offending will occur when an illegal behavior will generate 
profit with a low likelihood of sanctions (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Paternoster 
and Simpson, 1993, 1996; Wu, 2009).  In contrast, the strategic behavior theory of 
overcompliance argues that companies overcomply in anticipation of stricter regulations 
or even to leverage stricter controls that would disadvantage competitors (Arora and 
Gangopadhyay, 1995; Wu, 2009).  In yet another model, corporate behavior is driven by 
internal company resources (e.g., return on assets) as well as opportunities in the external 
environment (e.g., industry characteristics; Russo and Fouts, 1997).  Yet another 
approach argues that overcompliance occurs for normative reasons, attributable to the 
environmental attitudes of top management (Gunningham et al., 2003; Kagan et al., 
2003).  The contradictions among these theories are due to what is or is not 
specified/emphasized or because the theories do not examine the interactions between 
various domains and levels of analysis.  The review of the literature that follows 
demonstrates that there are numerous predictors of environmental compliance and 
overcompliance.  This implies that theories of corporate behavior should account for the 
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role of various influences such as: formal sanctions and procedures, informal sanctions 
and rewards, economic factors, and managerial styles/attitudes (Gunningham et al., 1998; 
Paternoster and Simpson, 1993, 1996).   
The best framework that accomplishes this task is one put forth by Gunningham, 
Kagan, and Thornton (2002, 2003, 2004; Gunningham et al. 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; 
Thornton et al. 2007, 2008, 2009), which explains both environmental compliance and 
overcompliance.  Neil Gunningham first emphasized the role of third parties in regulation 
since 1997 when he studied biodiversity conservation in Australia (Gunningham and 
Young, 1997) but developed a more structured framework in his work with Robert Kagan 
and Dorothy Thornton. This more structured framework (which included informal 
regulatory actions by third parties) was based on interviews with environmental and mill 
managers at 14 pulp and paper mills in Canada, the United States, and Australia/New 
Zealand (Gunningham et al., 2002, 2003; Kagan et al., 2003).  In these studies as well as 
in other projects, the authors emphasized that multiple stakeholders are relevant in 
developing regulatory strategies.  Specifically, they described three external “licenses” 
that allow or restrict a corporation’s operations—legal, social, and economic.  They also 
described an internal “license” affecting corporate behavior—the style and attitudes of 
corporate management.  Each of these licenses will be explained in turn. 
The legal license is predominantly composed of regulatory regimes, but includes 
formal criminal justice sanctions as well.  Regulatory agencies and criminal justice 
agencies are often perceived as taking a “command and control” approach to corporate 
crime, meaning that they seek to deter misbehavior through surveillance and harsh 
sanctions.  However, there is much evidence that regulatory agencies (the predominant 
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method by which environmental crime is addressed) take a more conciliatory approach 
and attempt to induce compliance through cooperative means (Gunningham et al., 1998; 
Gunningham et al., 2003; Kagan et al., 2003).   
The social license involves the influence of the media, politics, and the public 
(e.g., organized non-government environmental groups) on environmental actors.  The 
authors argued that public pressure on corporations can affect behavior in three ways: it 
directly punishes or rewards the firm by allocating/withdrawing its reputational capital, it 
indirectly affects it by giving extra weight to existing enforcement strategies and 
legislation, and it can indirectly affect it by putting pressures on regulatory agencies to 
tighten controls (Gunningham et al., 1998; Gunningham et al., 2002, 2003, 2004). 
The economic license is the ability to profit or the likelihood of suffering 
financial setbacks as a result of certain behaviors. For example, research implies that 
stock market prices may be affected by regulatory reports of pollution or by 
environmental catastrophes that make headlines (Hamilton, 1995; Konar and Cohen, 
2001, Shane and Spicer, 1983).  It may also be feasible to offer economic incentives in 
the form of tax subsidies for adopting more environmentally-friendly technologies or 
meeting compliance goals (Gunningham et al., 1998).  Overall, the ability to reduce 
compliance costs or enhance profits is thought to be a strong motivator in compliance and 
overcompliance (Gunningham et al., 2003, 2004; Thornton et al., 2007, 2008, 2009). 
The style and attitudes of corporate management involves the commitment by 
management to seek out environmentally relevant information (e.g., looking into cost-
effectiveness of environmentally-friendly strategies), respond to information about 
environmental policies (e.g., from regulators), and the institutionalization of 
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environmentally-relevant policies in the company (e.g., audits, training).  The style and 
attitudes of management generally interact with the external licenses.  For example, 
managerial attitudes will often affect how firms respond to regulatory regimes, or may 
mediate the influence of economic slumps on corporate noncompliance (Gunningham et 
al., 2002, 2003, 2004; Kagan et al., 2003).   
It is important to note that the license framework was developed to explain 
corporate-level behavior.  As such, it has only been studied at the corporate level.  The 
present study uses individual-level data (but asks individuals about consequences to the 
corporation as well as themselves) and therefore has the advantage of being able to 
distinguish between individual- and corporate-level influences.  It is likely that individual 
and firm-level factors have different effects on corporate compliance and overcompliance 
(Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Piquero et al. 2005, Simpson et al. 1998; Simpson et al., 
2013).  Therefore, an important contribution of the present research is specifying how the 
licenses operate on the corporation and how that relates to individual-level 
considerations.  Although the economic, social, and legal licenses remain conceptually 
the same in my theoretical model, I think it is important to take the license framework’s 
“managerial attitudes” concept and distinguish between two factors: 1) managerial 
attitudes about environmental behaviors and 2) corporate cultures regarding compliance.  
I believe that the environmental attitudes of managers is better conceptualized as a factor 
included under the rational choice component of the integrated theory (discussed below), 
but the corporate culture remains an important element of the license framework.  
Following Clinard and Yeager (1980, pp. 58 – 60), corporate culture can be 
conceptualized as guidelines for behavior within a firm or industry.  Such guidelines or 
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cultural norms are affected by many factors, including top management goals and 
priorities, the monitoring of behavior and use of sanctions within the firm, the attitudes of 
supervisors towards company goals and methods used to meet such goals, the goals of the 
company themselves, behavioral patterns in the industry, etc.  The key for this study is 
that corporate culture is diffused throughout the corporation, while managerial attitudes 
rest within an individual leader.  The next section discusses concerns and characteristics 
that individual managers consider when deciding how to act on behalf of the corporation. 
 
b. Rational Choice Theory 
Rational Choice Theory stems from economics and argues that people act to 
maximize benefits and minimize costs. Related to criminal behavior, offenders seek to 
benefit themselves and weigh the “choice-structuring properties” of alternative actions 
(Cornish and Clarke, 1987, p. 935). After considering the skills required, potential 
benefits, and costs/risks, offenders make decisions to engage in a criminal act (or not) and 
the methods to employ. Cornish and Clarke argue that to understand and prevent crimes, 
one should look at the motives, opportunities, rewards, and costs offered by various 
activities. Importantly, choice-structuring properties not only provide information about 
the crime but also tell us about the offender (e.g., his/her needs, preferences, personal 
characteristics, and perceptions). 
Corporate crime, including environmental crime, is thought to be particularly 
amenable to rational choice explanations as corporate managers are considered to be 
highly rational beings who make decisions to maximize profit and minimize damages to 
the corporation (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006; Weisburd et al., 1995).  Paternoster and 
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Simpson (1993, 1996) explicitly applied rational choice theory to corporate crime, 
delineating nine factors that predict managerial offending.  These factors are described 
below:  
1) Prior offending: the individual’s prior behavior hints at the person’s bounded 
rationality or decision-making capabilities more generally. 
2) Formal sanctions: the perceived certainty of getting caught and the severity of 
criminal, civil, or regulatory sanctions as well as those from internal 
compliance systems in the corporation.  In Paternoster and Simpson, the 
individual manager’s decision is influenced by concerns with legal sanctions 
against him/herself as well as against the corporation.   
3) Informal sanction threats: the perceived certainty or severity of costs other 
than those in the legal domain.  At the individual level, managers may fear 
losing the respect of peers, family, coworkers or losing their job.  In terms of 
corporate costs, managers may fear the loss of customers or tarnishing the 
firm’s reputation. 
4) Moral inhibitions: the individual’s ethical compass and internalized norms.  
Essentially, violating one’s internalized norms is an internal cost.  Evidence 
clearly shows that when people think a behavior is wrong, they are less likely 
to do it.  However, external or company factors can override our moral 
compass or make the ethicality of a behavior ambiguous. 
5) Costs of compliance: whether not offending will reduce your corporations’ 
competitiveness with other companies.  For example, sometimes new 
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regulations require the installation of new equipment which means that the 
company incurs more costs and decreased profits.  
6) Perceived legitimacy: whether the offender feels that regulations/regulators 
are fair.  If people don’t think that the law is reasonable or fair, they may be 
defiant and thus more likely to ignore regulations. 
7) Benefits of noncompliance: for example, whether the behavior leads to a 
promotion or to increased profits for the corporations. 
8) Loss of Self-Respect: another internal and informal cost occurs when the 
person experiences internal guilt (versus externally-imposed shame).  
9) Situational characteristics: the opportunity structure and other situational 
factors likely affect the perceptions of the costs and benefits of corporate 
offending or overcompliance.  Such situational characteristics may include: the 
culture of the corporation, specific opportunities, or political/cultural/economic 
factors (e.g., how many plants you own, the dominant political party). 
     
As you can see, there is some overlap between Gunningham et al.’s (2002, 2003, 2004; 
Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; Thornton et al. 2007, 2008, 2009)  license 
framework and Paternoster and Simpson’s (1993, 1996) rational choice framework.  
Specifically, individual managers base decisions not only on individual-level concerns 
but also on factors impacting the corporation (i.e., the licenses).  The next section seeks 
to distinguish between the license framework and rational choice theory, but then 
integrate them into a broad conceptual model that will encapsulate relevant interactions at 




c. The Integrated Theory of Environmental Corporate Behavior 
Although there is clearly overlap between Gunningham et al.’s (2002, 2003, 2004; 
Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; Thornton et al. 2007, 2008, 2009) license 
framework and Paternoster and Simpson’s (1993, 1996) rational choice framework, the 
fundamental difference is that Gunningham et al. are attempting to explain the behavior 
of corporations while Paternoster and Simpson attempt to explain the behavior of 
individuals.  What both theories fail to explicitly clarify is that the decisions of individual 
leaders in corporations (who are responsible for corporate policies) are the same as 
corporate behaviors.  That is, those individuals located in top management are making 
decisions (again, on behalf of the corporation) and such decisions are generally translated 
into corporate policies and behaviors (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Pinto et al., 2008).  
 Although both the license and rational choice approaches blend corporate and 
individual-level factors in predicting behaviors, each approach emphasizes one unit of 
analysis over the other.  The license framework more strongly emphasizes how factors 
affect the corporation as a whole (and provides a better conceptualization of the 
interactions among these pressures), while rational choice theory is focused more on 
individual-level perceptions and pressures.  As such, it is important to clearly delineate 
that measures of the license framework include measures of the legal license, the social 
license, and the economic license that operate on the firm, as well as corporate culture.  
Measures of the rational choice framework include managerial level attitudes and 
perceptions of risk to the individual, including environmental attitudes, attitudes towards 
regulations and compliance, and risks of punishment to oneself.  I argue that corporate-
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level factors are filtered through individual-level perceptions to influence managerial 
decisions (and thus corporate behaviors).   
One of the strengths of this integration is its attempt to explicate the relationships 
between the various external licenses and internal factors.  However, this strength also 
necessitates a level of complexity.  To assist comprehension, Figure 1 below is a diagram 
that depicts the hypothesized relationships.  For example, the three external licenses are 
depicted in the bracketed section of diagram on the left.  The arrows within the bracket 
represent expected interactions between the external licenses.  I expect that the external 
licenses will impact (and be impacted by) the culture of the corporation; as such, I expect 
measures of the corporate climate to render external license measures nonsignificant 
when included.  The variable most proximal to environmental decisions are individual-
level factors—those reflecting the rational decisions of the individual based on risk of 
sanctions to the corporate manager as well is his/her attitudes towards the behavior.  I 
think that all of the other variables will (to some extent) be filtered through individual 
considerations and thus the rational choice variables will prove to have the most 
important impact on the outcome.  However, the external licenses likely have some direct 
effect on the behavioral outcome as well. 
There are many benefits of this integration.  By more clearly separating corporate- 
and individual-level considerations using these two different frameworks, we can 
determine if inconsistent findings in the research are due to the unit of analysis being 
used.  For example, we may be able to better disentangle how instrumental and normative 
influences impact corporate policy.
6
  Furthermore, the integration allows for testing using 
                                                          
6
 Scholars argue that offending and overcompliance are due to either normative or instrumental 
considerations, both of which receive empirical support.  It may be that managers are concerned with 
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data sources at either level of analysis—with corporate-level outcomes (e.g., official 
pollution data, failed inspections) you can exclusively use license framework measures as 
predictors.  With individual-level survey data, you can determine how corporate 
characteristics and firm-level factors impact the perceptions of the individual and drive 
individual-level decision-making.   




IV. Empirical Support for the License Framework and Rational Choice Theory  
Although prior research rarely examines the license framework itself, support for 
the framework can be inferred by looking at how the licenses have been operationalized 
and studied in environmental research.  Prior research on environmental crime generally 
uses official data on toxic releases, company self-reports, or survey research on intentions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
normative considerations themselves but consider more instrumental factors impacting the corporation as 
well.   
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to offend by individuals.  Overall, research indicates that pollution has been reduced 
since the late 1970s (Ruckleshaus, 1985; Vandenbergh 2001, 2004; Yeager and Simpson, 
2009) and that most of this decline has been among large corporations (Vandenbergh 
2001, 2004).  However, despite improvements, noncompliance with environmental 
regulations continues to pose a significant threat to public and environmental health 
(Burns et al., 2008; Friedrichs, 2010; Hagan, 2011; White, 2008).   This section uses such 
research to explain the efficacy of each type of license and their interactions.  In addition 
to quantitative tests of these constructs, Raizada’s (1998) case study on pulp and paper 
manufacturers can help me demonstrate how each of the licenses function in reality.  
Specifically, I use her description of the MacMillan Bloedel corporation’s navigation of 
legal, social, and economic pressures to describe how the licenses may work.  She 
describes four different eras of operation from 1983 – 1997: Survival Mode (1983 – 
1986), Maintaining Competitiveness (1987 – 1990), Environmental Issues Gain 
Momentum (1991 – 1993), and Crisis Management (1994 – 1997).  I will describe how 
the relevant license evolves throughout these time periods.    
In the following section, empirical support for the impact of corporate culture is 
reviewed, followed by the empirical research on the actual license framework 
(predominantly by Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, with one notable exception).  I 
then describe the support for RCT’s application to corporate crime. This section 
concludes by providing a summary of the empirical research and then specifying the 
present study’s hypotheses.   
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a. Empirical Research on the Legal License 
Research on corporate offending produces mixed findings about whether 
regulatory enforcement and other legal sanctions are sufficient to deter offending.  
Proponents of legal approaches assume that increased monitoring of behavior, coupled 
with certain and severe sanctions for offending, will promote compliance.  Cohen (1999) 
reviewed the economics literature on environmental enforcement and found that 
government monitoring and enforcement mechanisms generally produce compliance.  
Gray and Shimshack (2011) reviewed the empirical research on environmental 
monitoring and enforcement behaviors—they found that regulation of the Clean Air and 
Clean Water Acts by the EPA consistently produces compliance with pollution standards 
and often promotes overcompliance among those companies who already meet the 
standards.  In specific examples, Cohen (2000) demonstrated that Coast Guard 
inspections and monitoring reduce oil spills. At the state level, Flatt and Collins (2009) 
examined compliance with the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act; they found that 
when states provide more funding to environmental regulations, companies spend less 
time in noncompliance with Clean Air Act regulations.  Gray and Shadbegian (2005) 
found that states with more stringent environmental enforcement and implementation of 
the EPA’s Cluster Rule reduced toxic releases.  
Studies consistently demonstrate that regulations and sanctions directed against 
the firm can discourage offending (Deily and Gray, 1991; Ervin et al., 2008; Gray and 
Deily, 1996; Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Magat and Viscusi, 1990; Nadeau, 1997; for a 
summary see Cohen, 2000).  LaPlante and Rilstone (1996) found that inspections and 
threats of inspections of pulp and paper manufacturers in Quebec predict reductions in 
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pollution emissions and promote more frequent firm reports of pollution. Gunningham et 
al. (2005) interviewed managers of electroplating and chemical manufacturing plants and 
found that when inspections and enforcement actions are sustained over time, such 
actions promote “implicit general deterrence” and lead to a “culture of compliance” (see 
below for more details).  Magat and Viscusi studied pulp and paper firms under the 
EPA’s jurisdiction and found that EPA inspections and enforcement action improve 
pollution and reporting practices at firms. Gray and Shadbegian (2005) also examined 
pulp and paper mills in the 1980s and found that, after controlling for endogeneity issues, 
increasing the number of regulatory actions by one inspection or one other type of action 
increases the likelihood of a firm being in compliance by 10 percent.  They did note, 
however, that firm characteristics affect how reactive firms are to regulatory pressure.  
Short and Toffel (2008) found that when companies participating in the EPA’s Toxic 
Releases Inventory program are subject to regulatory enforcement or are provided 
immunity from prosecution, they are more likely to report violations.  Simpson, Gibbs, 
and Slocum (n.d.) noticed that formal sanctions against the firm decreased intentions to 
offend.   Stafford (2008) observed that firms experiencing an increased frequency of 
inspections are more likely to self-report to regulators for instrumental reasons (i.e., they 
are trying to decrease the frequency of inspections in the future).  Thus, the author argued 
that its possible firms will disclose only minor violations as a strategy to reduce regulator 
attention.  Simpson et al. (2007) analyzed EPA data and found that inspections are 
positively associated with the number of violations; they note that larger facilities (who 
have more opportunities for violations) are targeted for inspections.  Overall, the authors 
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argued that EPA sanctions are not effective at the firm level; instead, it seems that more 
violations lead to more EPA monitoring and enforcement efforts.   
Regarding the effect of regulations or legal sanctions on extreme volunteerism, 
prior research indicates that companies may overcomply because they anticipate stricter 
regulations in the future (Taylor et al., 2005; Wu, 2009).  Porter and van der Linde 
(1995a, p.128; 1995b, p. 99 – 100) warned that companies generally will not choose to 
innovate without regulatory pressure because of cost and time constraints.  Ideally, 
regulation provides the necessary pressure to motivate companies, improves 
environmental quality in those cases where innovations do not completely offset the cost 
of complying with regulatory orders, provides technical assistance and education to 
companies, and ensures that competing companies are on a level playing field as an 
industry transitions to more environmentally-friendly policies. Wu (2009) found that 
regulatory pressures are marginally significant predictors of overcompliance.
7
   
Many people assume that fear of detection by enforcement agencies and 
consequent formal/informal punishments are the most important factors encouraging 
compliance, particularly for corporate or white-collar crimes which seek to maximize 
profit (Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991).  However, this assumption is questionable since 
offenders face a low risk of detection and formal punishments tend not to be severe.  For 
example, the Office of the Inspector General conducted six audits of the EPA’s 
enforcement of the Clean Air Act and found that enforcement programs were deficient.  
Specifically, many state enforcement agencies either did not want to report violators or 
                                                          
7
 As mentioned above, certain scholars find, instead, that normative considerations drive overcompliance.  
These factors will be reviewed in the discussion of corporate culture and rational choice literatures.  Given 
that support exists for both models, I hope that this study can inform this debate especially given the unique 
measurement of such factors.  
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inspections were not adequate to detect violations (Office of the Inspector General, 
1998).   In many countries, the responsibility for environmental regulation is delegated to 
local authorities who may be less inclined to punish businesses that contribute to the local 
economy, opting to take a cooperative approach instead.  Local politics also play a role in 
determining available resources for environmental enforcement which influences 
agencies’ abilities to detect infractions (Yeager and Simpson, 2009).   Furthermore, 
enforcement efforts generally target large industrial sites.  While this strategy has resulted 
in pollution reductions over time, Vandenbergh (2001, 2004) argued that such targeted 
enforcement has created social norms castigating large firms but absolving small business 
owners and individuals from responsibility.  Small business owners and individuals are 
more often portrayed as victims of industrial pollution and may not see how they 
contribute to the problem.  Thus, they do not believe they are subject to sanctions and a 
significant source of pollution is unhindered.   
Given that companies (and individuals within them) do not face particularly 
certain or severe punishment, fear of regulatory agency action may not be a strong 
explanation for environmental compliance or over-compliance.  For example, Simpson et 
al. (2007) analyzed firm-level EPA data and found that EPA sanctions did not 
significantly affect violations; instead, firm-level characteristics were more important 
predictors of violations.   
A potential reason for inconsistent results in the research on the legal license is 
that government agencies employ many different types of strategies to promote 
environmental compliance, making it problematic to compare research on different 
regulatory actions or agencies.  It may be that certain approaches are more effective than 
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others, or the effect of law enforcement/regulation may be context-specific (Axelrad, 
2000; Gezelius and Hauck, 2011; May, 2005; May and Winter, 1999; Welles and Enge, 
2000).   For example, May (2005) examined the effect of regulatory context on 
compliance in three different settings: farmers in Denmark, marine facilities in California 
and Washington, and homebuilders in Washington.  He found that regulations can be 
framed in one of three ways: 1) as a “societal contract” in which industry members feel 
obligated to be responsible and are in turn met with a more accommodating regulatory 
approach; 2) as a “social contract” in which frequent and certain inspections lead to a 
common idea between the regulators and the regulates about the definition of compliant 
behavior, or 3) as “no contract” in settings with little interaction, resulting in few 
opportunities to negotiate the meaning of compliance or emphasize obligations.  He 
argued that legal enforcement is most important for inducing compliance among those in 
the third setting.  Overall, the study demonstrates that context matters and that you cannot 
make a general policy recommendation that will fit all environments or regulatory 
agencies.   
In general, research indicates that regulators should employ multiple approaches 
when dealing with regulatees, a thought consistent with much of the literature on the 
increasingly popular “soft” regulatory approaches that seek to diminish the adversarial 
nature of the relationship between regulators and their clients.  While much of the 
research on a soft approach is supportive in certain contexts, there is much literature that 
shows cooperative regulation is not enough.  In support of a soft approach, Axelrad 
(2000) compared the interactions of one company’s subsidiaries with regulators in the 
U.S., the UK and in the Netherlands and found that the U.S. has more legalistic and 
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prescriptive regulations which then makes (because of increased costs/delays in the 
investigation stage) the process of remediating contaminated manufacturing sites slower. 
Dwyer et al. (1999) found the same thing in comparing automobile assembly plant paint 
shops in the U.S. and Germany—the U.S. regulatory process slowed adoption of new 
pollution controls and making production changes.  Aoki et al. (2000) compared the firms 
of an electronic parts multinational corporation who had sites in the U.S. and in Japan; 
the authors argued that the U.S. firm is subject to more stringent regulations but that the 
rules are also more complex and uncertain.  Although the U.S. firm operates under a 
stricter regulatory environment, this has not led to more compliance or environmentally-
friendly behavior than in Japan.  Verweij (2000) argued that the regulatory regime 
controlling pollution in the Rhine is more consensual and leads to more voluntary 
investments by corporations in that area as compared to the more adversarial regime in 
the Great Lakes basin; overall, the author argued that this is why the Rhine is much 
cleaner than the Great Lakes. 
However, Koutalakis et al. (2010) argued that soft regulations (that are less 
coercive, more flexible and simpler such that all mediums of pollutants are covered under 
one law) have not been effective in countries of the European Union because these 
countries have problems interpreting and enforcing them.  They discussed the need to use 
the same resources to implement both “soft” regulations as well as more legalistic ones—
the two approaches should be thought of as reinforcing each other. McCarthy and Zen 
(2010) came to similar conclusion in studying regulation of oil palm and rubber 
industries in Indonesia.  Harrison (1995) compared environmental regulation in the pulp 
and paper industry in Canada (which is more cooperative) versus the U.S. (which is more 
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legalistic) and noted that compliance rates were lower among Canadian firms; this 
contradicts the general consensus in the literature which seems to favor cooperative 
approaches.  Gunningham (1987) conducted a case study of the New South Wales Mines 
Inspectorate in Australia which demonstrated that the regulatory agency’s cooperative 
approach at an asbestos mine in an Aboriginal community neglected to take appropriate 
enforcement actions to back up its advisory role.  When enforcement actions are not a 
credible threat, he argues, regulated industries are not likely to take on the cost of 
implementing remedial actions.  In Gray and Shimshack’s (2011) review of the empirical 
literature on environmental regulation, they noted that the literature on voluntary, 
informational, cooperative, or compliance programs have inconsistent effects on 
compliance.   
The notion of cooperative versus punitive regulation (and the need for both) is 
described more fully by Ayres and Braithwaite’s (1992) concept of “responsive 
regulation.” Responsive regulation is a prescription for regulatory policy that argues 
different people/corporations may have different reasons to obey the law (or one 
person/corporation may have multiple factors to consider).  This implies that regulatory 
strategies must include both cooperative and punitive components to be “effective, 
efficient, and legitimate” (Nielsen and Parker, 2009, p.376).  Ayres and Braithwaite 
illustrated such a strategy in their “enforcement pyramid” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, 
p. 35) in which regulators initially respond to offenses with a cooperative strategy.  
Sanctions then become increasingly punitive as corporations resist regulation and/or 
continue to be out of compliance.   
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The importance of incorporating multiple types of regulatory responses receives 
support in previous research (Braithwaite, 2002; Braithwaite et al., 2007; Burby and 
Paterson, 1993; Flatt and Collins, 2009; Gunningham, 1987; Gunningham et al., 1998; 
Koutalakis et al., 2010; McCarthy and Zen, 2010; Mehta and Hawkins, 1998; Scholz, 
1984; Short and Toffel, 2008; Simpson, 2002; Stafford, 2008; Winter and May, 2001, 
etc.).  Burby and Paterson (1993) examined how enforcement systems and a coercive 
approach affected compliance with sediment and erosion control standards at 
construction projects in North Carolina.  They found that both deterrent and cooperative 
approaches were influential.  Interestingly, the salience of these two strategies may differ 
according to which type of standards the company is trying to meet.  Deily and Gray 
(2007) compared OSHA regulation to EPA regulation in the steel industry and found 
some differences in how they respond to firm noncompliance; the likelihood of 
complying with one set of standards is not highly correlated with compliance with the 
other; however, enforcement by OSHA predicted enforcement actions by the EPA and 
vice versa.  This implies that regulatory agencies differ in how they approach their 
regulatees and that firms may respond differently to different strategies.   
In Raizada’s (1998) case study on the MacMillan Bloedal (MB) pulp and paper 
company, the corporation’s interactions with regulators and the government were 
inconsistent.  In the Survival Mode time period, MB would only react to more coercive 
approaches by the government before cleaning up waste products.  However, the 
government became fairly lenient to the forest industry as a whole when Canada entered 
a recession and therefore MB was not subject to very stringent legal actions.  Most 
interesting, perhaps, is the fact that during this era (and generally for the decade 
31 
 
following) legal actions were the method of choice for both MB and environmental 
groups in their conflict over various natural areas.  In the Maintaining Competitiveness 
era, the government stopped being as friendly to corporate interests; the Ministry of 
Forests and the RCMP both investigated and challenged various MB operations.  During 
the election year in 1991 environmental issues became more salient to the public.  The 
government responded by making penalties and controls for discharges much more 
stringent.  Note that during this period, MB found that the government was no longer a 
consistent ally and, in fact, a more adversarial relationship developed.  During the 
Environmental Issues Gain Momentum time period MB was subjected to a very different 
regulatory environment than what they had experienced before as a result of the elections 
of 1991—the new administration scaled back on cutting rights in some locations, 
revamped environmental laws, put a moratorium on logging in one area and reduce MB’s 
logging area in the Clayoquot Sound.  Facing legal pressures, MB began to invest in 
pollution reduction equipment in order to comply with regulations but continued to do the 
bare minimum and continued to use legal resources themselves to fight against interest 
group attacks.  During the Crisis Management period, the government became much 
more stringent after finding significant noncompliance with fishing and forestry 
regulations; they implemented more inspections and increased enforcement for 
violations.  MB was specifically targeted and charged for violating the Fisheries Act, and 
a chlorine dioxide spill in 1994 resulted in criminal charges.   All of these actions show 





b. Empirical Research on the Economic License 
In addition to regulatory mechanisms, prior research finds that economic factors 
such as financial strain, shareholder pressures, costs of compliance, and competitive 
pressures influence corporate behavior.  Scholars have found that firms and plants may be 
encouraged to offend or pollute in the face of financial strain (Aoki and Cioffi, 1999; 
Alexander and Cohen, 1996; Clinard et al., 1979; Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Kagan et al., 
2003; McKendall et al., 1999; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Simpson, 2002; Simpson 
and Piquero, 2002; for exceptions, see Hill et al., 1992, McKendall and Wagner, 1997; 
Simpson et al., 2013).  Alternatively, firms may fear shareholder pressure.  It has been 
noted that firm stock prices and profitability fall after the public release of a firm’s 
environmental offending (Hamilton, 1995; Khanna, 2001; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Shane 
and Spicer, 1983) and firms may therefore be motivated to comply out of fear that 
shareholders will stop investing (Cohen, 1999; Ervin et al., 2008; Harford, 1997; but see 
Wu, 2009).   
Indirectly related to economic incentives are characteristics of the company such 
as its size (operationalized in various ways such as the number of employees or 
profitability) or age.  Research has found that larger firms and plants are more likely to 
violate regulations (Alexander and Cohen, 1996; Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Gray and 
Deily, 1996; Gray and Shadbegian, 2005; Hill et al., 1992; McKendall et al., 1999; 
Yeager, 1987; for an exception, McKendall and Wagner, 1997) and to have higher toxic 
release emission rates (Grant et al., 2002; Grant and Jones, 2003; Grant et al., 2004).  The 
age of the facility may matter such that older facilities are less able to meet changing 
emission standards (Gray and Shadbegian, 2005; Yeager, 1987), or it may cost older 
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facilities more to come into compliance (Gray and Deily, 1996, Helland, 1998). Wu 
(2009) found that high costs of compliance (high upfront investments, day-to-day costs, 
risk of downtime/delivery interruptions) and the uncertainty of future benefits predicted 
environmental violations.  However, vignette studies fail to replicate this effect 
(Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Simpson, 2002).   
The role of economic factors (e.g., financial resources) has an inconsistent 
relationship with extreme volunteerism.  Some studies found no effect (Arora and Cason, 
1995; Cohen et al., 1997; DeCanio and Watkins, 1998) while others found that good firm 
and industrial financial performance encouraged participation in EPA voluntary programs 
(Videras and Alberini, 2000).  Overcompliers may gain competitive advantage over 
market opponents who are less able to meet stringent regulatory standards (Porter and 
van der Linde, 1995a, 1995b; Wu, 2009).  More consistently, studies have found that 
larger companies are more likely to overcomply (Arora and Cason, 1995; DeCanio and 
Watkins, 1998; King and Lennox, 2000). Wu (2009) demonstrated that competitive 
pressure is a consistent predictor of both violations (competition deters violations) and 
overcompliance (competition promotes overcompliance).  Lower costs and risks 
predicted an increased likelihood of overcompliance; if extreme volunteerism is a 
consequence of calculated self-interest, regulators may be unable to rely on these firms to 
“police” themselves because such behavior is generally not cost-effective (Gunningham 
et al., 2003; Zhu and Sarkis, 2007).  Wu (2009) also found that when upper management 
believed that overcompliance behaviors would be good for business, the firm was more 
likely to engage in extreme volunteerism. 
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Economic factors also influenced MB’s environmental strategy (Raizada, 1998).  
In the Survival Mode time period, Raizada notes that MB’s desire for profit was 
inherently at odds with the preservation goals of environmental interest groups.  During 
this time, MB was experiencing limited profitability and argued that their company could 
not change their policies because they would go out of business, which would result in a 
loss of jobs and damage the economies of the communities in which their facilities were 
located.  In the Maintaining Competitiveness and Environmental Issues Gain Momentum 
eras, MB was forced by changes in legislation (the BC Forest Act), government actions, 
and potential boycotts to engage in equipment upgrades.  Internal documents clearly 
demonstrate that MB management saw such environmental investments as a financial 
burden and were very reluctant to implement such measures.  During the Crisis 
Management time period, MB experienced financial constraints and were also facing 
pressures from shareholders who saw the company as unresponsive to their needs.  
Furthermore, customers of MB were being pressured by interest groups to stop buying 
paper from them.  Because of the pressures for profit and the financial constraint, MB 
had few resources to make changes and clearly saw such changes as providing very little 
potential for economic benefit.   
 
c. Empirical Research on the Social License 
Informal sanctions by the public or non-government organizations have been cited 
as potentially salient factors in corporate decisions as well.  Studies by Gunningham and 
his colleagues illustrated the importance of the “social license” for self-regulation in the 
pulp-and-paper industry—mills located in communities with more active environmental 
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groups and/or active campaigns have lower pollution emissions.  The authors argued that 
legal or regulatory sanctions were inadequate for deterrence; environmental managers 
saw the environmental community pushing accountability more so than regulatory 
agencies, who were perceived as more forgiving than the public (Gunningham et al., 
2002, 2003, 2004; Kagan et al. 2003).  Some research indicates that extreme volunteers 
may be more amenable to persuasion and normative social influences than other 
companies, which has implications for the social control of corporations and regulatory 
strategies (see Simpson, Gibbs, and Slocum, n.d.; Wu, 2009).  The social license takes 
many forms, but the empirical literature tends to measure the effect of non-government 
organizations (NGOs) and general collective action, as well as environmental labels.   
Much research supports the impact that social groups and collective behaviors can 
have on environmental decision-making by corporations (Arora and Cason, 1999; Binder 
and Neumayer, 2005; Hamilton, 1993; Phuong and Mol, 2004; Sonnenfeld, 1996a, 
1996b, 1998a, 1998b, 2002; van Alstine, 2007; Zamprile and Llorente, 2009; but see van 
Rooij, 2010a).  Binder and Neumayer (2005) found that countries with a higher number 
of environmental NGOs per capita had less sulfur dioxide, smoke, and heavy particulate 
levels.  Hamilton (1993) used the percent of the population that was of voting age to 
proxy for community capacity for collective action.  The author found that higher voter 
turnout led to decreased intentions of hazardous waste firms to plan capacity expansions; 
in fact they were more likely to plan capacity decreases in those communities. Arora and 
Cason (1999) also found that political action can influence toxic releases in a desirable 
way and that political behaviors may be most important in rural Southern communities 
(those most vulnerable to environmental injustices).  The authors argued that it would be 
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particularly helpful to educate residents in these areas about the consequences of toxic 
releases and assist them in resistance efforts.   
The inclusion of the community was also important in the preliminary findings of 
Zamprile and Llorente’s (2009) case studies of two mining sites in Latin America.  The 
Alumbrera mining site in Argentina did not consider community factors when developing 
the project and failed to recognize its role in industrial accidents.  This site encountered 
much societal resistance and protests and ultimately faced criminal charges for violating 
environmental laws.  In contrast, the Michiquillay mine in Peru was mandated to get 
community approval before moving forward.  This site met with community members 
and negotiated the terms of development, as well as communicating technical and impact 
information.  This study was still in progress at the time of the article but preliminary 
results demonstrated that community input is helpful.  Sonnenfeld (1996a, 1996b, 1998b) 
argued that the pulp and paper industry in Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand (countries 
not known for stringent environmental regulation) responded to Greenpeace and 
environmental activists in their adoption of cleaner technologies.  However, van Rooij 
(2010b) studied citizen actions in China and argues that citizens need assistance from 
state or intermediary institutions (e.g., scientific experts, lawyers, media, or civic 
organizations); the main problem is that state institutions are likely to side with 
industrialists and impede political or legal actions by citizens.  While a variety of groups 
(not just NGOs) employed different strategies to control environmental behavior in 




Environmental labeling programs are another form of the social license.  Labeling 
programs seek to provide information to consumers about the environmental effects of 
certain products or services.  Such programs allow an organization to verify that a 
corporation’s products, services, etc. are not environmentally harmful or are actually 
benefiting the environment in some way.  Labeling programs can involve either first or 
third parties, be product- or corporation- related, and can be either mandatory or 
voluntary (U.S. EPA, 1998).  For example, many people recognize the EPA’s “Energy 
Star” program in which the agency identifies energy-efficient appliances, computer parts, 
electronics, buildings and homes. (EPA, 2013)   
I classify labeling programs as part of the social license because they are a means 
by which regulators or companies disseminate information to the public about their 
environmental performance.  Fischer and Lyon (2008) modeled the impact of industrial 
labels compared to those put out by NGOs, and find that NGO labels improve 
environmental quality in the market.  However, van Amstel et al. (2008) found that in the 
Netherlands, third party labels for arable farming failed to communicate accurate 
information to consumers—this might reduce the effectiveness of labels to promote 
environmental compliance or overcompliance.     
 We see how the social license may be one of the more salient influences on an 
organization’s operations by looking at Raizada’s (1998) case study on MB.  Throughout 
all of the different eras, social pressures in the form of protests/civil disobedience by 
environmental and native groups, publicity campaigns, increased public awareness about 
environmental groups, boycotts, etc. caused MB to be on the defensive throughout the 
1983 – 1997 period.  They responded to such pressure by taking legal action, engaging in 
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publicity campaigns of their own, and changing their operations, but ultimately their 
emphasis on profits and general resistance to environmental group demands (although 
some collaboration began to emerge in 1997) meant that they faced more and more 
pressures (from multiple domains) without any sort of alleviation.  When contrasting 
MB’s reaction to social pressures to another organization’s strategy, Raizada argues that 
achieving buy-in from community groups and local residents in the beginning would 
have eased the problems that MB faced.  
 
d. Interactions of External Influences 
It is important to note that the legal, social, and economic licenses are very 
difficult to isolate and more than one type of license is generally operating at the same 
time.  For example, regulations that incorporate social or economic pressure can be 
thought of as combining legal and social/economic licenses in order to produce 
compliance.  Much research has examined such policies.  I will first look at research 
examining the combination of legal and social licenses.  Second, I will look at the 
combination of legal and economic licenses.  Third, I consider the interaction between 
the social and economic licenses.  I conclude with a look at interactions among all three 
of the external licenses.   
 
i. The Interaction between the Legal and Social Licenses  
 Evidence suggests that corporate-level environmental compliance may be 
influenced more by informal sanctions (e.g., community pressures, reputational concerns; 
Gunningham et al., 2002, 2003, 2004) than by formal deterrence strategies.  However, 
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legal and regulatory strategies have received much empirical support in the literature.  
Scholars also argue that informal and formal sanctions may interact to promote 
compliance (Simpson et al., 2007; Williams and Hawkins, 1986) and much research 
notes that it is imperative to include other parties in the regulation of corporations 
(Grabosky, 1997; Gunningham et al., 2003; Gunningham et al., 1998). 
Most of the literature that falls under the rubric of both legal and social licenses 
examines the effectiveness of regulatory programs that use public disclosure of violations 
to trigger social pressures on corporations.  Public disclosure programs such as the EPA’s 
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) or Indonesia’s Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation 
and Rating (PROPER) involve regulatory agencies publishing the environmental records 
of or criminal sanctions against corporations.  The rationale behind such programs is that 
corporations feel pressure from consumers and public groups (e.g., NGOs) to operate in a 
socially responsible manner and that such groups can exert external pressures on the 
organization.  Although the regulatory body has the legal authority to conduct inspections 
and sanction the corporation, the main “punishment” comes from the potential to lose 
legitimacy in the organization’s social sphere.  Much research on public disclosure 
regulatory programs finds that such programs have an effect but that there are limits as to 
what these programs can actually accomplish (e.g., Afsah et al., 2000; Arora and 
Gangopadhyay, 1995; Blackman et al., 2008; Brooks and Sethi, 1997; Bui and Helgeson, 
2008; Lee 2010; van Erp, 2011; but see Baker et al., 2008; Coglianese, 2002). Only three 
studies seem to fully support disclosure programs. Grant (1997) found that states 
providing funding for disclosure programs or those with right-to-sue laws have lower 
rates of emissions over time; he argues that citizen participation programs are unlikely to 
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be effective unless the appropriate resources are put forth to support them.  Blackman et 
al. (2008) found, using data from Oregon, that regulators can use public disclosure about 
contamination, as well as threats of formal regulation, to induce participation in voluntary 
cleanup programs.  Arora and Cason (1995, 1996) used TRI data and found that 
companies with higher emission levels are more likely to overcomply in an attempt to 
maximize positive publicity.  
Other studies offer conditional support for such programs.  For example, Bui and 
Helgeson (2008) used data from the TRI in the printed circuit board industry in the 
United States and found that mandatory disclosure programs can be effective when they 
include a credible threat of formal (state) sanctions and provide information about 
pollution prevention/abatement strategies to corporations. This finding is similar to Afsah 
et al. (2000) and Lee (2010) who argued that participation mainly promotes compliance 
because of an educative effect—that is, it provides corporate managers with more 
information which motivates more actions to come into compliance. Afsah et al. (2000) 
surveyed plants participating in PROPER and found that while PROPER increased public 
pressure from community groups and company stakeholders, the main mechanism by 
which PROPER promoted emissions reductions was by educating managers about their 
plants’ performance and potential areas for improvement.   However, the authors noted 
that without the public disclosure aspect, managers may not be motivated to make 
improvements.  Lee (2010) found similar results when he used a case study approach on 
18 companies participating in PROPER.  PROPER motivated compliance and 
overcompliance with regulations, but mainly because of the new information provided to 
managers.  Lee noted shortcomings of the program, including that the data collection was 
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not transparent and that many community groups did not see the process as legitimate 
(i.e., it is possible that corporations are bribing the regulators for favorable ratings).  The 
friction between government officials and community groups, coupled with a lack of 
awareness or interest by investors in environmental information meant that the program is 
not fully harnessing the potential for public castigation to motivate compliance.  Finally, 
Brooks and Sethi (1997) developed a unique index that accounts not just for the level of 
air pollution in zip codes but also their toxicity.  Community characteristics and 
collective action predicted air pollution levels; after controlling for these, TRI disclosures 
also reduced air toxicity over time.   
Brooks and Sethi (1997) also argued that firms try to reduce the consequences of 
negative publicity by moving production sites to areas less capable of collective action 
and those with a higher minority population.  In fact, others have argued that firms may 
care more about their reputation than their actual environmental performance; King and 
Lennox (2000) found that firms who joined the chemical industry’s Responsible Care 
program made slower progress in performance improvement than non-participants, 
implying that the program is used to appear environmentally proactive but doesn’t 
actually encourage such behaviors.  van Erp (2011) conducted a case study of the Dutch 
financial and capital markets, whose regulatory authorities published sanctions as a 
method of deterring other organizations from offending.  In the financial market, where 
companies are more directly involved with clients, publicity of sanctions promoted 
general deterrence.  However, in the capital markets there was a lack of reputational 
damage and less media coverage, so publicity had less of a deterrent effect.  The author 
noted problems with how the information itself was disseminated—respondents noted 
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that the publications only told them what NOT to do (not what the proper action is) and 
the publications emphasized sanctions for seemingly minor offenses which actually 
reduced the legitimacy of the regulators.  The publishing of sanctions actually seemed to 
promote defiance because companies thought they would be punished despite their best 
efforts to maintain fulfill regulatory expectations.   
Still other studies demonstrate that disclosure programs are ineffective for various 
reasons.  Terlaak (2008) examined whether participating in the ISO 14001 program truly 
provides the public with more information about a corporation’s environmental 
performance.  The author argued that ISO 14001 has not been as effective as people have 
expected for two reasons: 1) it does not accurately inform the public about corporations 
with superior environmental performance, and 2) it does not truly improve the 
performance of laggard firms.  Instead, the author argues that multi-plant companies may 
implement ISO standards only at its higher-profit facilities that can subsume the costs of 
compliance—this is a form of satisficing in order to appease the company’s stakeholders.  
Baker et al. (2008) also used TRI data and find no evidence that companies newly 
disclosing information are more likely to reduce their toxic releases.   
Another form of community involvement in legislation can be seen in the notion 
of “negotiated rulemaking” whereby regulations are created through a process that 
involves government representatives as well as those from the private sector and public 
agencies.  Coglianese (2002) compared the EPA’s rulemaking processes (negotiated 
versus conventional) and found that both processes took about the same amount of time 
to produce regulations but that participants found the negotiating process to be 
burdensome.  Furthermore, third-party participation in rulemaking did not reduce the 
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number of challenges to the rules, and there is no empirical evidence demonstrating that 
negotiated rules are superior.  In fact, he argued that the process of negotiation may 
decrease the quality of regulation as some components may be sacrificed to make all the 
parties happy.   
Instead of examining how legal mechanisms induce social pressures, other studies 
examine how community efforts (the social license) can impact regulatory efforts (the 
legal license) which then affect corporate behavior.  Levine (1994) argued that it was 
community pressure and the creation of innovative social groupings that overcame the 
EPA’s reluctance to address industrial odor problems in California and Arizona 
communities.  Fredriksson et al. (2005) collected data from 22 OECD countries and 82 
developing countries to demonstrate how the presence of environmental lobbying groups, 
participation in democratic elections, and the level of political competition in the election 
process affected regulatory stringency (measured as the maximum allowed lead content 
in gasoline in a country).   They found that countries with more lobbying groups, more 
democratic participation, and more political competition had more stringent regulation—
this demonstrates that both social groups and political factors impact regulatory 
processes.  Earnhart (2004a) examined wastewater treatment facilities in Kansas from 
1990-1998 and found that community characteristics impacted the number of regulatory 
actions taken against corporations which then influenced wastewater discharges; 
community characteristics also had a direct effect on facility performance.  Sonnenfeld 
(1996a, 1996b, 1998b) argued that local activism efforts against the pulp and paper 
industry in Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand prompted changes in government 
regulations.  Simpson et al. (2007) interviewed EPA inspectors and found that these 
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inspectors prioritized citizen complaints—about 20% of inspections are generated from 
citizen information.  Similarly, Knowles and Espinosa (2009) argued that businesses in 
England were held more accountable because of social pressures on legislators.  
However, these businesses were only motivated to comply with regulations and would 
not go beyond because there are no incentives to do so; furthermore, innovation (and 
effective implementation) was discouraged because policies were communicated in a top-
down manner in organizations.  
 
ii. The Interaction between Legal and Economic Licenses 
There are five studies that examine the interplay between regulatory processes 
and a firm’s economic license; two of these studies examined how both legal and 
economic pressures affected corporate behavior and the other three looked at how 
economic constraints limit corporate compliance or overcompliance with regulations.   
To begin with research indicating that legal and economic licenses are 
independent but not sufficient in isolation, Khanna (2001) surveyed literature on non-
mandatory regulation and found that firms are motivated to self-regulate and control 
pollution for both economic reasons (financial incentives/technical assistance, cost 
efficiency, competitive pressures) and legal reasons (regulatory pressure, influencing 
future regulation). Khanna and Anton (2002) further specified the reasons for adopting 
environmental policies, and found that environmental management systems were 
designed as a reflection of different pressures.  Regulatory pressures predicted the 
adoption of internal environmental policies and environmental standards by 
organizations, as well as the administration of environmental audits.  Economic pressures 
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(the potential for gaining a competitive advantage and improving relations with 
stakeholders, consumers, investors, and the public) predicted the corporation adopting 
total environmental quality management practices and reporting environmental 
information; these practices were seen as enhancements to mere regulatory compliance 
such that they enabled the firm to be more competitive (e.g., because they establish a 
better environmental reputation for the firm, make corporate practices more cost-
effective, etc.).  
In terms of economic constraints on compliant behavior, Zhu and Sarkis (2007) 
studied the adoption of Green Supply Chain Management practices and how such 
practices impacted the environmental and economic performance of Chinese 
manufacturing firms.  They found that both pressures from investors and from regulators 
increased the adoption of GSCM practices and hence improved the environmental 
performance of firms.  Competitive pressures improved the firm’s economic performance 
but did not improve environmental outcomes.  The authors argued that corporate 
managers need to recognize the financial investment that is required to make 
environmental improvements; regulatory pressures motivate environmental practices by 
firms, but may also hurt profits.  Norberg-Bohm and Rossi (1998) explained the U.S. 
pulp and paper industry’s preference for incremental (as opposed to radical) changes in 
environmental technologies.  They suggested that regulatory uncertainty in the U.S., 
coupled with the economic investment required for radical changes, creates ambivalence 
toward the advantages of adopting new technology to improve environmental outcomes.  
Johnston (2006) evaluated the EPA’s Strategic Goals program and found that regulations 
can change firm behavior (here, pollution in the metal finishing industry) but that 
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companies are often limited in how much they can comply because of economic 
constraints.  He suggested that the U.S. government should consider offering financial 
assistance to promulgate changes. Thornton et al.’s (2007, 2008, 2009) work on the 
trucking industry in Texas and California further explicated how economics may 
suppress regulatory efforts as well as how regulators consider the economic impact of 
policies in enforcement decisions. 
 
iii. The interaction between Social and Economic licenses 
A few studies examined the combination of social and economic licenses, 
predominantly by examining stock market reactions to public disclosure of corporate 
environmental behaviors.  Generally, these studies find that stock markets punish those 
companies publicly identified as polluters and reward those with good performances.  
Hamilton (1995) demonstrated that high pollution figures in a firm’s TRI report led to an 
increased probability of such numbers being reported in the media, and also to larger 
negative stock returns after the release of such information.  Dasgupta et al. (2001) 
examined the capital markets in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines and found 
that markets in these countries react positively to announcements of superior 
environmental performance and negatively to announcements of citizen complaints.  The 
authors argued that regulators should take advantage of such market reactions by 
implementing public disclosure programs.  Lanoie et al. (1998) examined the impact of 
environmental announcements on future profits of firms in the U.S. and in Canada; they 
noted that capital markets reacted to announcements and that larger polluters suffered 
more consequences in the market than firms with less pollution. Gupta and Golder (2005) 
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found that in India, the announcement of poor environmental performance by firms 
negatively affected stock returns; they also found a generally positive correlation between 
environmental performance and abnormal stock returns (i.e., better performance is related 
to higher returns).  The authors argued that capital markets may be an integral part of 
regulating corporate environmental behavior, particularly in countries with weak formal 
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement.  Konar and Cohen (1997) examined the 
EPA’s TRI program.  Firms experiencing the largest decline in the stock market 
following public disclosure of their environmental record reduced their emissions more 
than others in the industry without such large stock declines.  Similarly, firms may be 
influenced by consumer willingness to pay for environmentally-friendly products and 
overcomply to establish a pro-environment reputation especially in the face of disclosure 
programs promulgated by regulatory agencies (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Wu, 
2009).   
Although the above articles demonstrate the potential for the social license and 
the economic license to work cooperatively, Thornton et al.’s (2007, 2008, 2009) study of 
16 trucking firms in Texas and California showed how the economic license can 
sometimes mute the effect of social pressures and prevent compliance or overcompliance.  
The authors conducted field studies and examined mono-nitrogen oxides emissions in 
highly competitive but low-profit trucking firms.  They concluded that economic 






iv. Interactions Among All Three External Licenses 
In general, studies illustrate that it is not enough to use legal sanctions or 
economic motivations or social pressures in isolation to promote compliance or extreme 
volunteerism; instead, it is imperative to include all three external licenses to manipulate 
corporate behavior (Delmas and Toffel, 2004; Grabosky, 1995; Gunningham and Kagan, 
2005).  This is at least in part because corporations may have a different history or 
operate in certain industries/environments with different pressures (e.g., Sonnenfeld, 
1998a).   To begin a discussion of the external licenses overall, a seminal piece of 
literature is Gunningham et al.’s (1998) Smart Regulation, in which the authors proffered 
a strategy for (and emphasized the necessity of) incorporating third party actors (e.g., 
public interest groups, green consumers, investors, buyer-supplier relations, etc.) in 
regulatory enforcement.  They argued that while various environmental crime policies are 
often seen as alternatives to one another, it is important to examine how various policies 
can complement one another.  Specifically, the government should support third-party 
regulation through various strategies such as disclosing company activities, conferring 
private parties the right to enforce regulations, engaging private consultants as opposed to 
relying on organized interests, among others.  Basically, Gunningham et al.’s goal was to 
describe how various instruments and policies can act synergistically to produce optimal 
policies in various situations; since many factors affect compliance and overcompliance a 
broad approach to regulation is necessary (see also Gezelius and Hauck, 2011; Grabosky, 
1995; Wu, 2009). For example, Wu spelled out three necessary ingredients to promote 
environmentally-friendly behavior: 1) reducing firms’ costs of environmental 
management, 2) maintaining a credible threat of regulation, and 3) training employees 
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and fostering upper managements’ beliefs (pp. 3370-3371).  In general, studies are 
supportive of legal, social, and economic pressures sparking improvements in the 
environmental behavior of companies (but see van Rooij, 2010a).  However, these studies 
often contain caveats and demonstrate the nuances in the relationships between the 
external domains.  
In support of all external licenses, Liu (2009) examined external pressures on 
firms located in the Yangtze River delta in China.  In this study, the path analysis showed 
that all three forms of pressure (government regulation, market pressure, and 
community/NGOs) were related to improvements in three different kinds of 
environmental behavior (defensive, preventive, or enthusiastic).  It seems that firms 
facing a high cost of implementation tended to engage in defensive behaviors, which 
were most influenced by formal government regulation—that is, legal requirements 
forced companies to make at least modest improvements in environmental management.  
Market pressure was important because companies wanted to attract green consumers, 
and therefore engaged in preventive behaviors.  When companies were already compliant 
with regulations, pressure from the community and NGOs motivated “enthusiastic” 
behaviors by which the firm could sustain their profitability.  The author argued that 
complementary measures are necessary to address varying needs of companies.  Delmas 
and Toffel (2004) conducted a literature review to support their proposed model 
delineating how institutional pressures affect corporate overcompliance behaviors.    
They drew on institutional sociology and argued that firms within a particular industry 
were subject to similar institutional pressures but that unique plant and parent company 
50 
 
characteristics affected the firm’s response to such pressures.  While not an empirical test 
of the framework, the authors provided ideas for potential data collection efforts. 
As mentioned above, most studies examining external pressures are only partially 
supportive.  Cashore and Vertinsky (2000) examined forest companies in Canada and the 
U.S. and found that companies respond to legal, economic, and social pressures; 
differences in corporate responses were related to differences in external pressures 
(including environment groups, the media, business interests, and regulators).  However, 
the authors noted that while firms responded to legal pressure and came into compliance, 
highly legalistic governance systems actually suppressed innovations and/or 
overcompliance.  Thornton et al. (2007, 2008, 2009) illustrated how the economic license 
may supersede social and legal licenses in their study of small/medium-sized trucking 
firms; the lack of surplus funds in this industry meant that the costs of implementing 
better emissions control programs constrained the firms’ ability to respond to legal and 
social pressures.  Karpoff et al. (2005) compared the size of various financial costs 
resulting from environmental violations, including fines, damage awards, remediation 
costs, and market value losses.  They found that market value losses are similar to, and 
related to, the legal costs imposed on the corporation; the authors concluded that 
environmental violations tend to be disciplined through legal/regulatory penalties, not 
reputational penalties.  Khanna and Damon (1999) also examined the impact of the 
EPA’s TRI and noted that companies participated in this program because they desired 
public recognition for their behaviors and wanted to avoid the potential costs of 
liabilities/compliance that occur under mandatory regulatory regimes.  They found that, 
after controlling for motivations to participate, TRI involvement led to reduced 
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emissions.  However, it also had a negative impact on profits in the short-term, although 
long-term profitability was positive.   
van Rooij (2010a) offers a different take on external licenses.  In his review of 
studies used by the World Bank to promote alternative forms of regulation, he identified 
inherent limitations of different models that emphasize third party regulation (grouped 
under economic, social, voluntary control, and state control).  Starting with the economic 
license, he said that the use of discharge taxes is not clearly supported because reductions 
in pollution may not be due to the taxes so much as it is to extra inspections.  
Furthermore, you would likely see changes only among those companies that can afford 
it.  Stock market pressures are limited because 1) they are likely to affect only companies 
that deal directly with consumers, and 2) in states with weak enforcement it’s unlikely 
that anyone will find out about crimes in order to publicize them. 
Under the social license, community pressures are not clearly supported in the 
literature—it could be that community pressure is driving legal pressures which then 
impacts corporate behavior.  Also, community pressure is not likely to occur in 
communities that rely on the corporation for much of their economic revenue.  van Rooij 
noted that studies of public disclosure programs have generally relied on self-report data 
and concentrate only on a small group of firms (those that market directly to consumers).  
In terms of state controls, he noted that targeted law enforcement efforts are often biased 
towards more visible forms of pollution and on those complaints coming from more 
influential parties.  Technical innovations in enforcement and monitoring are expensive 
and are easily tampered with by the company.  Another form of state control is using 
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discharge fees to fund regulators, which is limited if such a practice leads to regulators 
becoming reliant on discharge fees for support.   
The crux of van Rooij’s argument is that in countries with weak law enforcement 
(e.g., developing countries), the potential of non-legal enforcement mechanisms is 
limited.  Also, in developing countries there tends to be a lack of social and market 
pressures which means that public disclosure and public education systems will not be 
effective.  Therefore, effective strategies will include state and non-state (legal, 
economic, and social) components.    
In Raizada’s (1998) case study of MB, social pressures consistently played a very 
important role but interacted with economic and legal pressures to shape MB’s actions 
from 1983 – 1997.  Environmental groups often used legal tactics (e.g., lobbying, 
lawsuits) to challenge MB’s behavior.  Also, public pressure (e.g., election platforms, 
publicity campaigns) led to the passage of stricter environmental regulations and more 
resources for inspections and enforcement.  Raizada notes that the organization was 
under financial constraints for much of the time period, which constrained their ability to 
respond to public demands—however, regulations coerced the company to adopt new 
technology in order to meet compliance standards.   
 
e. Corporate culture 
Factors internal to the organization are also key to understanding compliance and 
overcompliance (del Rio Gonzalez, 2009).  Individual-level managerial attitudes and the 
organizational culture can influence behavior within the corporation and ultimately the 
corporation’s behavior overall.  While Gunningham et al. (2003) discussed managerial 
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attitudes, they did not delineate the difference between a manager’s personal commitment 
to the environment and corporate culture as defined by specific policies and directives 
that are disseminated throughout the organization.  As mentioned above, a major 
contribution of this study is that it separates and examines corporate culture separately 
from factors salient to managers at an individual level.   
When describing corporate climate, it may be helpful to start by thinking about 
how companies differ in their environmental strategies.  Some scholars have developed 
typologies of corporations based on their willingness to comply or overcomply with 
environmental regulations.  Gunningham et al.’s (2003; Kagan et al., 2003) typology of 
corporations is described in more detail below, but Haverkamp et al. (2010) also created 
categories of corporate environmental behaviors.  Specifically, Haverkamp et al. defined 
four types of organizations in the Dutch Food and Drink industry based on environmental 
management practices:  compliance-oriented, environmental transition, compliance-plus, 
and commercial/behavior excellence.   These clusters are driven mainly by the influence 
of suppliers and on internal communication about environmental issues.  Compliance-
oriented companies are generally only meeting requirements and they don’t face many 
external pressures. Environmental transition companies are those that face external 
pressures and have top management who are environmentally committed but cannot 
translate this commitment into corporate practices.  Compliance-plus organizations face 
strong external pressures, have management that is committed to environmental policy 
compliance, and implement strategies to address environmental issues.  
Commercial/behavior excellence is a category occupied by organizations facing the 
strongest external pressures; these companies are also the most proactive (i.e., they 
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innovate without regulations telling them to do so) because they perceive that there are 
benefits in doing so. 
Empirical studies often examine corporate culture (i.e., normative guidelines for 
behavior in the corporation; Clinard and Yeager, 1980) when they assess management-
based regulation.  Management-based regulation (MBR) is a strategy that requires 
regulated companies to examine their own procedures.  This approach emphasizes the 
development of internal processes and analysis so that the company can improve its 
environmental performance and make sure it’s in compliance with environmental 
regulations.  The assumption behind such programs is that internal management of the 
corporation plays a critical role on the environmental outputs, an assumption reinforced 
in the literature (Coglianese, 2008).  However, the effectiveness of MBR is not generally 
supported.  Coglianese reviewed the MBR literature and noted that whether the 
government can effectively induce firms to improve management practices is 
questionable; such adoption may be symbolic at best.  The most important impact of a 
management-based approach may be that corporate managers get more information about 
what is going on in the company and they can react to this new knowledge accordingly. 
Gunningham and Sinclair (2009) similarly reviewed the limitations of MBR in their 
survey and case studies of Australian mining companies.  They noted that even when a 
corporation adopts a certain culture, this may not translate to individual firms because of 
resistance among the employees, a lack of trust in the larger organization, and failure to 
get buy-in from middle managers or corporate managers.  MBR can be effective when 
the informal system supports a formal regulatory system and is not used to replace a 
formal system.  Specifically, the management-based system should improve cohesion, 
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initiative, and morale at the workplace and motivate employees to engage in prosocial 
behaviors (in Gunningham and Sinclair’s case, safety practices).   
Borck and Coglianese (2009) reviewed the literature on voluntary environmental 
programs, under which organizations volunteer to reduce their environmental impact.  
Most of the literature they reviewed focused on why companies choose to participate in 
such programs
8
 while fewer studies examined the impact of voluntary initiatives on 
company outputs.  Overall, the research reported mixed results and generally modest 
reductions.   The authors noted that volunteers in these programs are likely to be different 
from non-volunteers (i.e., they would have improved anyway) and that voluntary 
programs have a smaller reach than mandatory regulations.  However, corporations like 
voluntary programs more than mandatory regulations because changes are less costly—if 
the same benefits can be accrued at a lesser cost under a voluntary program then such 
programs could be seen as beneficial.  However, research has yet to compare voluntary 
programs to mandatory regulations to compare their efficacy and cost.  Khanna et al. 
(2008) found that the adoption of environmental management strategies in a corporation 
increased pollution prevention techniques, even after controlling for regulatory pressure 
and other firm characteristics.  However, this effect may be mainly related to procedural 
changes (not actual toxic releases).  van Rooij (2010a) argued that educating corporations 
about their environmental impact may not be influential when the costs of compliance are 
too much for the company.  He also noted that voluntary environmental management 
systems do not measure actual environmental performance, use only self-reported data 
that is easily manipulated, and that such programs need to be backed up with law 
enforcements efforts when the economic costs of compliance are high. 
                                                          
8
 Generally, they do so for economic benefits as well as for leverage to negotiate formal regulations. 
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Vignette surveys have found that the ethical climate of a firm can motivate 
individual behavior.  As one measure of the firm’s climate, company authority structures 
are consistently found to affect offending and overcompliance intentions in vignette 
surveys.  Managers who are told that offending is common practice in the firm or the 
industry are more likely to violate regulations (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Simpson, 
2002; Simpson et al., 2013).  Simpson, Gibbs, and Slocum (n.d.) and Simpson et al. 
(2013) found that overcompliance is more likely when the hypothetical manager is asked 
to behave that way by a supervisor.  When individuals were told that ethics guide top 
management decisions in a corporation or that ethics are considered important but distinct 
from top management (compared to a reference measure of ethics being irrelevant to 
decisions), respondents reported decreased intentions to offend (Simpson, Gibbs, and 
Slocum, n.d.).  In addition, the presence of internal compliance programs (e.g., hotlines 
or audits) that increase the likelihood of detection decrease offending intentions, although 
the findings are not always significant (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Simpson, 2002; 
Simpson and Piquero, 2002).  Similarly, Primmer and Wolf (2009) found that an 
industrial norm about conservation motivated modest conservation behaviors in Finnish 
forestry firms, but this shared norm may also have prevented radical changes.  Simpson et 
al. (2013) and Simpson, Gibbs and Slocum (n.d.) noted that corporate environmental 
offending was more likely when the individual’s normative beliefs in ethical behavior 
were not reinforced by a compliance system within the organization.  The authors also 
noted that corporate incentives systems (i.e., tying career benefits to compliant behaviors) 
may be an important way to motivate compliance with regulations.  Extreme 
volunteerism is more likely when the acceptability of such behavior is communicated by 
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top management, when such behavior is seen as ethical, and among those individuals 
who plan to stay in their current positions for a long time (Simpson et al., 2007).  Gray 
and Deily (1996) argued that the culture of the corporation and its relationship with 
compliance is indicated by findings that the compliance rate at plants owned by the same 
firm were strongly correlated with each other.   
In addition to directly affecting outcomes, the license framework also posits that 
the corporation’s internal culture can mediate or moderate the effect of external licenses 
on outcomes (Gunningham et al., 2002, 2003, 2004; Kagan et al. 2003).   For example, 
Delmas and Toffel (2008) used data from high-pollution industries in the United States 
and examined how external pressures on corporate behavior were treated by firms with 
either a strong internal legal department or a strong internal marketing department.  They 
found that firms with a strong legal department were less likely to adopt voluntary ISO 
14001 standards
9
 (likely because of the potential for increased liability) but were more 
likely to adopt voluntary programs put forth by the government.  Firms with a strong 
marketing department were more likely to adopt ISO 14001 standards, likely because of 
the publicity advantage it gives them.  Thus, it seems that the internal mechanisms of a 
corporation shape how external pressures affect corporate behaviors.  Raizada’s (1998) 
dissertation (used to provide examples of the licenses in prior sections) gathered 
information on two British Columbia-based pulp and paper manufacturers from 1983 - 
1997 to examine the interactions between internal and external factors on environmental 
                                                          
9
 The ISO 14000 standards are promulgated by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).  
These standards offer guidance for companies desiring to implement an environmental management system 
(EMS) which can then be certified by ISO.  More specifically, the company should “identify and control 
the environment impact of its activities, products or services, and to improve its environmental 
performance continually, and to implement a systematic approach to setting environmental objectives and 
targets to achieving these and to demonstrating that they have been achieved” (ISO, 2012). 
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behaviors.  One company, Confor, was very environmentally conscious from the start.  
They were proactive in preventing problems, adopted a cooperative approach to 
regulation, and sought solutions to problems when they did arise.   The previously-
mentioned Macmillan Bloedel mill, on the other hand, merely reacted to crises as they 
emerged, did not adopt an environmental approach early on, met with much social 
resistance, and took a confrontational approach with regulators.  Instead of seeking 
solutions to important problems, they tended to downplay or ignore them.  She concluded 
that companies facing similar external pressures (here, pressures from government and 
environmental groups) may respond differently to such pressures because of internal 
organizational characteristics (e.g., the environmental commitment of the corporation; see 
also Gunningham et al., 2003).   
Not only can internal licenses moderate the effect of external pressures, but 
external licenses may change corporate cultures as well.  Aoki and Cioffi (1999) argued 
that different firms in different countries, even under the same corporate head, may adopt 
different “personalities.”  A U.S. operation of a precision metalworking company was 
compared to the Japanese firm; they found that the regulatory regime in America is much 
more adversarial than in Japan.  The authors argued that the adversarial nature of U.S. 
regulations promoted a defensive culture in the U.S. company and ultimately made 
regulatory efforts less effective as well as more costly (because of legal disputes).  On the 
other hand, there was no antagonism between the Japanese firm and regulators which 
ultimately reduced the cost of regulation because individuals in the firm were responsible 




f. Empirical support for Gunningham et al.’s License Framework 
While some research provides evidence about the salience of specific licenses, the 
main crux of Gunningham et al.’s framework (Gunningham et al. 2002, 2003, 2004; 
Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; Thornton et al. 2007, 2008, 2009) is that 
environmental crime control and the promotion of overcompliance requires a holistic 
approach (see also Gunningham and Young, 1997; Gunningham et al., 1998).  To 
examine the concept of the license framework as put forth by these authors, I will review 
their relevant works in chronological order.  This is the best way to show how the idea 
has evolved over time and how the authors supported the concept.  I will also review the 
only non-Gunningham et al. study I have found explicitly examining the license 
framework. 
While not referring to it as the “license framework” specifically, this notion of 
holistically including multiple domains to regulate businesses can first be seen in 
Gunningham and Young’s (1997) examination of biodiversity conservation in Australia.  
In this article, the authors outlined five types of policy instruments (regulatory, voluntary, 
price-based, property right, and motivational/informational incentives) that should be 
combined to create optimal policy for controlling corporate behavior.  They reviewed the 
various pressures that can be exerted on corporations and specified circumstances under 
which certain policies would be most effective.  They also discussed the optimal 
combinations that should be implemented in certain environments and situations.  
Overall, they argued that using a single approach for regulation is inadequate and that 
policymakers should draw on the ecological, political, social, and economic concerns of 
the community and corporations to make effective policy instruments.  Gunningham et al. 
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(1998) expanded this notion into a book called Smart Regulation, in which they 
emphasized the utility of third party regulation (such as public interest groups, green 
consumers, financial institutions, etc.) in controlling corporate environmental behavior.  
Similar to the 1997 article, the authors explicated optimal instrument mixes as well as 
those that are counterproductive, including combinations of command and control 
regulation, self-regulation, voluntary strategies, education/information strategies, 
economic instruments, and mandated reporting. 
While the above works emphasize the role of formal policy, in 2002 we see 
Gunningham et al. discuss more informal concerns of corporations.  In this working 
paper, the three external licenses were explicitly labeled as “legal,” “social,” and 
“economic” and defined in terms of corporate pressures from multiple domains.  The 
difference here is that the authors were not just describing how such pressures are useful 
to create policy, but argued that such pressures already exist in the corporation’s 
environment and may already drive decision-making.  This paper, as well as Kagan et al. 
(2003) and the Gunningham et al. (2003) book Shades of Green, drew on interviews and 
data from 14 pulp and paper manufacturing firms in Australia, New Zealand, British 
Columbia, and the United States.  In the 2002 working paper, the authors focused on the 
social license, and argued that most managers viewed the social license as more 
important than legal bodies.  Corporate managers were more motivated to introduce 
environmental changes based on informal sanctions by the public and the media than by 
legal/regulatory threats.  Managers also noted the need to build up “reputation capital” (p. 
11).  That is, by investing in relationships with community members and local 
stakeholders, the company’s reputation can be protected in the case of a serious incident 
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(e.g., a hazardous waste accident).  The authors also described interactions between the 
social, economic, and legal licenses.  For example, the corporation’s compliance with 
regulations is often considered a yardstick by which the community judges the firm’s 
efforts.  Also, changes in regulations may provide stakeholders with more influence by 
improving access to corporate records, legally mandating that the company obtain 
community input on policies, etc.  The community can also increase the coverage of the 
legal license as politicians respond to community members’ concerns.  Social efforts can 
also interact with economic concerns, as when boycotts or bad publicity leads to a 
decrease in sales or stock prices.  Communities can sometime restrict the corporation’s 
access to necessary resources or drive up the price of such access.  Additionally, the 
influence of the social license might vary by such factors as the geographic location of 
the mill (i.e., whether located far away from communities) or the reliance of the 
community on the mill (e.g., for the provision of local jobs) can affect how much 
pressure the social license holders put on the corporation.  Finally, management style 
matters for environmental outcomes as different managers have unique responses to 
social pressures. 
Kagan et al. (2003) continued to use interviews from the pulp and paper mill 
managers, but also ran some basic descriptive comparisons and correlations on water 
pollution data and chemical spills.  They examined the role of regulation versus other 
external licenses as well as the corporation’s internal “environmental management style” 
(p. 57) in explaining compliance.  The authors identified five “ideal types” of 
corporations with regards to their environmental strategies, listed here in order of 
environmental commitment (least committed to most committed): environmental 
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laggards, reluctant compliers, committed compliers, environmental strategists, and true 
believers.  These types were constructed based on measures of how much managers 
sought out environmentally relevant information, the degree to which management 
responded to this information, and whether the firm has institutionalized procedures to 
promote environmental consciousness in its operations.  Overall, the study indicated that 
the use of stringent regulatory approaches (the legal license) did not correlate highly with 
the environmental performance of the firm, that corporate profits (the economic license) 
predicted environmental performance a decade later, and that managers of companies 
labeled “environmental strategists” or “true believers” invested in better environmental 
technologies, were more dedicated to learning about environmental issues, and did a 
better job of building up reputational capital with both regulators and activists.  The 
authors also noted that managerial attitudes were a better predictor of environmental 
performance than either the regulatory regime or economic factors, but that economic 
considerations may overrule managerial preferences.  While the authors did not have 
quantitative measures of the social license, they used interview data to support the idea 
that the social license is the most influential pressure.  Overall, the authors argued that 
while regulation did promote environmentalism, the social license and managerial 
attitudes were the most important factors promoting compliance or overcompliance; 
however, economic pressures limited even the most motivated managers.   
Gunningham et al. (2003) expanded their research on the pulp and paper 
manufacturing firms into a full-length book.  Based on the lack of true “laggards” in their 
research, they put more emphasis on overcompliance in this book.  They argued that not 
only is there a lack of noncompliance in their data, but there is much evidence that 
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corporations attempt to go above and beyond regulations which belies the traditional 
view of corporations as “amoral calculators” only concerned with maximizing profits and 
not concerned about social welfare (see also Gunningham and Kagan, 2005).  Reasons 
for overcompliance are grouped here according to the various licenses and internal 
factors.  Economic reasons for overcompliance include increased cost efficiency, 
economic benefits of having a good reputation, and the desire to maintain 
competitiveness with other companies.  Social reasons include the need to protect the 
firm’s reputation or enhance legitimacy, or responding to community pressures.  Legal 
reasons include the anticipation of future regulations or the desire to maintain a good 
relationship with regulators.  The authors argued that the social license is the most 
important in motivating corporations, followed by legal pressures, and then economic 
considerations.  Internal to corporations, the existence of monitoring systems may 
promote overcompliance as might the adequate communication of environmental 
information throughout the company.  Also within the company, the environmental 
values of managers were crucial in motivating firm overcompliance.   
The book also explained the complexity of the license framework, specifically 
noting the interactions between the firm and its various stakeholders (see also 
Gunningham and Kagan, 2005). While improvements in emissions and overcompliance 
behaviors are due to stricter regulations and increased social pressures over time, 
economic pressures (e.g., costs of compliance and profit strain) may inhibit firms from 
going above and beyond.  Furthermore, the regulatory license and the social license may 
be merging as time passes—for example, new regulations often mandate public 
disclosure of environmental data or require the corporation to have community input 
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about policies.  In addition, the regulatory and economic licenses interact such that 
regulations often force companies to make costly environmental improvements that they 
are otherwise reluctant to implement.  The social and economic licenses also interact, 
such as when consumers pressure the corporation or threaten to take their money 
elsewhere, or demand environmentally friendly products. There is also an interaction 
between external and internal licenses, such that some companies may be better/less able 
to respond to external pressures and emphasize that managerial attitudes mediate the 
influence of external licenses.   
Gunningham et al. (2003) conducted a descriptive comparison with quantitative 
data similar to the work done by Kagan et al. (2003).  Here, they find that external 
licenses explain some variation in environmental behaviors between firms, but that the 
external licenses alone do not completely explain such variation.  Instead, external 
pressures are filtered through corporate manager’s perceptions, attitudes, and 
interpretations.  This filtering process leads to unique responses by the corporation.  As 
such, the book explicated the impact of management style more fully, including measures 
of managerial attitudes as well as company policy efforts.  Importantly, the typology is 
unclear about managers or firm types (discussed in more detail in the following section) 
and therefore it’s necessary to delineate individual attitudes versus firm strategies.  While 
there is certainly overlap in manager attitudes and firm policies, it’s likely that policies 
are not solely determined by one manager.  Gunningham et al. (2003) observed that the 
environmental management style of the firm is highly related to the firm’s environmental 
performance and to its reputational capital.  They also showed that economic constraints 
affect environmental performance; more profitable companies had better environmental 
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performance and efforts.  Overall, Gunningham et al. concluded that the interactions of 
the various licenses are more effective than any of them operating in isolation.  However, 
they noted that the license parameters are ambiguous and negotiable by corporations.  
They described the policy implications of each type of license but emphasized the need 
for a variety of approaches.  They also admitted that they are unsure of how to impact 
managerial attitudes and the management style of corporations.   
Gunningham et al. (2004) concentrated on the social license, again using the 
sample of pulp and paper manufacturers.  They made many of the same arguments as 
above, but also made clear that firms may be responding to social license pressures and 
overcomplying for instrumental reasons—corporations may think that not responding to 
social pressures will lead to increased regulations or greater economic costs to the 
company.  The authors more clearly delineated variations in the social license (e.g., how 
the geographic location of the company and the economic needs of a community may 
impact the strength of the social license).  In addition, they outlined interactions between 
the social license and legal/economic pressures.  For example, they argued that social 
license pressures are often exercised through the application of informal economic 
sanctions (e.g., bad publicity, calls for boycotts, denying the corporation access to local 
resources, etc.).  The social license and legal license interacted in two possible ways: 1) 
the legal license can expand the social license (e.g., when regulations mandate 
community participation in corporate decision-making), or 2) the social license can 
expand the legal license (e.g., when politicians put more pressure on corporations in 
response to community concerns).  They also pointed out that the social license faces 
three important limitations.  First, members of the community may not recognize that 
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harm to the environment/humans is occurring or community members may not have the 
capacity to mobilize resources to address it.  Second, legal and political representatives 
have to recognize community concerns as legitimate and as something that should be 
addressed.  Third, economic concerns limit the ability of firms to go beyond compliance 
(pp. 332 – 336).  They ended the article by detailing the potential for social license 
considerations to make for more effective policies.   
Gunningham et al. (2005) examined the various licenses in a new sample, 
conducting interviews with employees of chemical manufacturers and electroplating 
firms in the United States.  They were also able to examine the role of company size in 
this study, as the companies in the chemical industry were comprised of a mix of large 
and small firms.  They found that the effect of licenses differed between the two 
industries and firm types—for example, the social license was not particularly important 
for electroplating firms overall but was important for larger firms in the chemical 
industry.  It was less important for smaller chemical firms.  In general, the legal license 
seemed to be most important in this sample, but not because the firms feared punishments 
for violations (specific deterrence).  Instead, regulations reminded firms to check their 
compliance mechanisms, reassured firms that violators were not getting away with it, and 
created a “culture of compliance” (p. 44) embedded in the company’s operations as they 
responded to inspections and enforcement over time (see also Thornton et al., 2005).  
Regulations also set normative guidelines—laws remind corporations about the damage 
caused by noncompliance (see also Gunningham and Kagan, 2005).  Most managers saw 
noncompliance as morally reprehensible, not just something to be avoided because of 
potential punishments.  For large companies, regulation was salient mainly because 
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formal sanctions would lead to reputational damage and hence informal sanctions.  
Smaller corporations generally felt that they were not subject to much public scrutiny and 
therefore didn’t feel much social pressure.   
Another way that regulations mattered was because of the economic costs related 
to compliance—small businesses generally reacted to regulations by doing just enough to 
be in compliance because that is all they could afford to do.  Larger corporations 
overcomplied in order to avoid any possibility of being noncompliant.  Overall, the 
authors argued that there is little support for specific and general deterrence preventing 
corporate crimes.  Instead of calculating the costs and benefits of compliance, regulations 
themselves (not enforcement) create a culture of compliance that impacts behavior.  
Moreover, the law serves to define moral boundaries about acceptable and unacceptable 
behavior.  Note that the effects of various licenses differ by the size of the corporation 
and the industry. 
Thornton et al. (2007, 2008, 2009) conducted field studies of small and medium-
sized trucking firms in California and Texas to further examine the license framework in 
an industry affected by unique considerations.  Specifically, the trucking industry is one 
that is not highly visible to consumers yet is highly competitive (but with low profits).  It 
is also one that is tightly regulated in California, but much less so in Texas.  Due to the 
lack of profitability and high competition, trucking firms cannot easily pass on the costs 
of environmental innovations to consumers.  Overall, the authors found that the economic 
license is much more important to trucking firms than in other industries and that the 
economic license is more important than the social license in this sample.  Importantly, 
no firms in the sample had been targeted by community or environmental groups; instead, 
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most of the variation in environmental performance was due to economic pressures 
(especially the market niche in which the firm was located).  Economic considerations 
limited the coerciveness of regulations (i.e., regulators realize that such an approach 
would put many firms out of business) but regulatory stringency remained associated 
with emissions and firm environmental performance.  Even government subsidies for 
new technology were minimally effective. Interestingly, while overcompliance was 
highly related to managerial attitudes in the pulp and paper industry, the authors noted 
that in the trucking industry operating measures that go beyond compliance (e.g., controls 
on driving speed/idling times, engine maintenance efforts) were primarily driven by 
economic considerations—that is, they did not consider the positive environmental 
impact when making such a decision.   
In Thornton et al. (2009), the authors noted similarities in their findings from the 
trucking industry to their findings from the pulp and paper industry.  They argued that 
intensely competitive industries encourage firms to search for opportunities that would 
save money as well as improve environmental performance.  Larger companies are more 
influenced by the social license, while in small firms the economic license is the most 
important.  In highly competitive markets, the social license will not promote 
overcompliance in small firms but economic considerations will. Overcompliance is 
more likely among larger firms in general, because these firms can afford the initial cost 
of overcompliance.  In terms of the legal license, the authors argued that regulations force 
all companies to implement certain policies and that these companies will likely pass off 
costs to consumers.  However, size would still play a role because small companies find 
it more difficult to comply with costly regulations.  In highly competitive markets, 
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legislators and regulators are reluctant to push demanding regulations on corporations 
because of the economic costs to firms.  However, the authors noted that when businesses 
are subject to a demanding regulatory regime the social license and managerial 
commitments become more important for three reasons: 1) regulations and enforcement 
offer a clear criteria by which social groups can criticize company behavior, 2) 
regulations raise awareness of company officials and employees about social purposes 
and norms underlying regulatory requirements, and 3) regulations can generate publicity 
and raise consciousness of the general public about the problem which then leads to more 
activism (pp. 430 - 431).   
One of the primary motivations for conducting the present study is a lack of 
empirical research examining the license framework in and of itself, despite its existence 
as a cohesive explanation for corporate environmental behavior for over 10 years.  As 
evidence of this, I found only one article in my review of the literature empirically 
studying this concept aside from the work done by  Gunningham and his colleagues 
(Gunningham et al. 2002, 2003, 2004; Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; 
Thornton et al. 2007, 2008, 2009).  Specifically, Howard-Grenville et al. (2007) used 
qualitative data from facilities participating in the EPA’s National Environmental 
Performance Track program to examine how a company’s social, economic, and 
regulatory licenses influence the decision to participate in a voluntary environmental 
program.  The authors matched facilities participating in the program to those not 
participating, and found that the two groups were similar in how they perceived 
regulatory requirements (all companies saw compliance as non-negotiable) and economic 
pressures (not mentioned often, but when mentioned managers were generally concerned 
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with consumer pressures).  Community pressure was salient to both groups as well 
although differences emerged in how important this relationship was to top management.  
What differed the most were factors internal to the organization: managerial incentives 
(e.g., support from superiors for participating in voluntary programs), organizational 
identity (e.g., the firm’s commitment to environmental norms, their image), and 
organizational self-monitoring efforts (e.g., interactions with regulators, desiring 
recognition for compliance efforts).  Overall, the authors argued that external pressures 
mattered but that factors internal to the corporation exerted independent effects on 
participation decisions. 
It is these internal factors that receive more attention as I integrate this theory with 
the Rational Choice perspective.  The decisions of people within the organization are 
driven not only by the licenses operating on the firm as a whole, but also by factors 
operating on those individuals responsible for company policies.  In the next section, I 
describe the empirical support for Rational Choice in the context of corporate offending 
and demonstrate how this complements the license framework.   
 
g. Empirical Support for Rational Choice Theory, as applied to Corporate 
Crime 
There has been much work done on the factors impacting the decisions made by 
corporate managers.  In addition to the corporate-level variables outlined above, factors 
impacting individual managers themselves have been shown to impact managerial 
decisions and therefore corporate behaviors.  It is rare, however, that individual-level 
concerns act in isolation to predict behavior—often, managers are influenced by both 
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their own risks/benefits as well as those for the corporation.  In this section, I focus on the 
cost/benefits to the individual him or herself. 
In terms of legal sanctions, vignette studies demonstrate that managers tend to be 
more concerned about threats to themselves as individuals (although firm-level sanctions 
have also been shown to impact offending; Simpson et al., 2007). Simpson et al. (2013) 
found that legal sanctions directed at the manager deter intentions to violate 
environmental regulations.  Gezelius (2007) found that compliance with fishing 
regulations is motivated by perceptions that the law is formally enforced and perceptions 
of high risk for detection and penalty.   
Enforcement regimes may serve other purposes beyond deterrence.  Enforcement 
activities remind managers to check their policies and equipment for compliance and/or 
reassure compliant managers that obeying regulations is the correct behavioral choice 
because the alternative can have undesirable consequences.  The use of formal sanctions 
against offending companies also restores industry participants’ confidence that deceit 
does not necessarily give competitors an advantage in the competitive market (National 
Research Centre for OHS Regulation, 2004; Thornton et al., 2005). Additionally, scholars 
have found that regulations and enforcement behavior (e.g., inspections) can create social 
norms about the immorality of pollution behaviors (Vandenbergh, 2001, 2004).  
Regulations may also motivate most environmental managers to comply because they see 
regulatory adherence as normatively desirable—that is, it is the “right thing to do” 
(National Research Centre for OHS Regulation, 2004, p. 23; Thornton et al., 2005).   
As discussed in the section on the legal license, decisions to comply may depend 
on the specific enforcement style used by regulators.  Winter and May (2001) used a mail 
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survey to examine inspectors’ enforcement styles when interacting with Danish farmers.  
They found that inspectors who were more formal (i.e., were focused on rules and were 
less flexible) enhanced compliance with four agro-environmental requirements among 
farmers.  This is due to the approach providing 1) more information about regulations to 
farmers, and 2) an increased sense of certainty about potential consequences.  However, 
use of a highly coercive approach resulted in less compliance overall.  This is supported 
by studies examining individuals’ perceptions of legal or regulatory processes.  Gezelius 
and Hauck (2011), in their study of fishing communities, found that a lack of 
participation in regulatory-making processes was the predominant explanation for 
noncompliance (see also Tyler, 2006).   
In addition to the legal license, economic incentives/costs to the manager are also 
important.  Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagne (1993) modeled the relationship between 
monetary incentives for managers and corporate environmental policy.  They found that 
managers were more likely to comply when environmental performance was 
incentivized, but not under all conditions.  Furthermore, accurate monitoring of 
environmental performance was necessary to make economic incentives effective.  In 
vignette studies, the potential for individual profit (e.g., receiving a promotion, enhancing 
one’s job prospects) predicts intentions to commit environmental offenses (Simpson, 
Gibbs, and Slocum, n.d.).   
The rational choice framework emphasizes the importance of managerial norms 
as a potential factor in the decision to behave in a certain way.  This is supported by 
much research on individual managerial attitudes.   For example, Kuperan and Sutinen 
(1998) found that deterrence variables did not sufficiently explain why Malaysian 
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fisherman complied with environmental regulations; including measures of moral 
obligation and social influence improved their models greatly.  Notably, Kuperan and 
Sutinen also found that violations were more likely when regulations were perceived to 
benefit one group of fishermen more than others.  They attributed this to a decrease in the 
perceived legitimacy of such regulations.  Research by Kagan et al. (2003) implied that 
industrial plants may overcomply because of a strong moral commitment by 
environmental managers which, in turn, encourages a strong environmental management 
system (see also Ervin et al., 2008).  In their study of Finnish foresters, Primmer and 
Karpinnen (2010) found that the normative beliefs about how relevant others would 
expect them to behave and general attitudes towards overcompliance with regulations 
predicted whether foresters were willing to go beyond Finnish Forest Act regulation 
when planning their operations.  Wu (2009) found similar results in his study of Oregon 
firms; overcompliance was much more likely when management believed that they had a 
moral responsibility for conservation (see also Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991).  The 
author concluded that the attitudes and environmental beliefs of upper management are 
strong influences on compliance.  For offending, Simpson et al. (2007) found that 
individuals with strong anti-regulatory feelings and who were defiant to authorities were 
more likely to offend.  Other vignette surveys examining beliefs about the ethicality of 
environmental behaviors consistently find that such beliefs predict compliance and 
volunteerism (Rorie et al., n.d.; Simpson et al., 2007; Simpson, Gibbs, and Slocum, n.d.). 
It is important to note that while external pressures are filtered through existing 
managerial attitudes, external influences also impact managerial attitudes.  Vandenbergh 
(2003) argued that deterrence from legal sanctions is unlikely unless people feel there is a 
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normative or moral justification for the norm—that is, the content of law activates 
individual moral norms by describing the consequences of illegal actions and the 
individual’s responsibility for preventing these outcomes.  Law should go beyond 
describing likely sanctions to describe the potential harms to human and environmental 
health that can be avoided by complying with regulations (see also Simpson, Gibbs, and 
Slocum, n.d.).  Feldman and Perez (2009) found that how the legal license is portrayed 
and perceived influences people’s moral perceptions and their willingness to engage in 
civic enforcement of environmental regulations.  Results from their environmental 
vignette survey suggested that how a legal instrument is framed (in regards to their 
governance technique, the process by which they were enacted, and their allocation of 
enforcement responsibilities) has a strong impact on people’s moral and emotional 
attitudes toward corporate polluting behavior as well as whether they would engage in 
civil strategies to stop the polluting behavior.  This study implied that managerial 
attitudes toward environmental regulations may be influenced by how the regulation is 
presented and thus may affect corporate policies.  
 
h. Summary of Research on the License Framework and Limitations of 
Previous Research 
Prior research has identified various factors that prove important for corporate 
compliance and overcompliance (e.g., economic incentives, legal sanctions, pressures 
from community groups).  This accords with Gunningham and colleagues’ (Gunningham 
et al. 2002, 2003, 2004; Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; Thornton et al. 
2007, 2008, 2009) interviews with pulp and paper manufacturers, electroplating and 
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chemical industry members, and trucking companies.  Formal regulations (the “legal 
license”) appear not to be the main influences on corporate environmental behavior; the 
legal license seems to matter mainly because it educates management, impacts corporate 
cultures and forces a minimal level of environmental effort.  Instead, a corporation’s 
“social license” (i.e., pressure from environmental groups and the public) or “economic 
license” (e.g., competitor behavior, profit maximization) are more important, but which 
one is most salient depends on the industry.  Internal factors (managerial 
attitudes/corporate culture) are also important in explaining compliance and 
overcompliance, and may mediate or interact with the three external licenses to explain 
corporate behavior.   
Although Gunningham and colleagues’ description of the various licenses is a 
useful framework for understanding how corporations are affected by their environments 
and management, the empirical support for these ideas to date is mainly qualitative, 
although Kagan et al. (2003) and Gunnigham et al. (2003) produced some limited 
quantitative work.  A necessary step in developing a cohesive theory of corporate 
environmental behavior is to test measures of the relevant constructs more rigorously 
(i.e., to better rule out other potential predictors) than what has been done before as well 




This study also seeks to improve upon previous corporate crime research through 
a more direct assessment of individuals’ opinions about salient factors and then using 
                                                          
10
 Some literature indicates that the effect of external pressures on corporations may depend on the 
sequence in which such pressures are applied (Milstein et al., 2002).  While this is an interesting addition to 
the license model that should be investigated further, the nature of our instrument and methodology will not 
allow us to empirically test how corporate behavior is affected by temporal ordering.  
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such measures to predict behavior.  While most of the quantitative research used official 
and firm-level data, this does not get at the decision-making made by individuals within 
corporations.   Although looking at individual-level decision-making and then 
interpreting such decisions in terms of corporate behavior outcomes may seem 
problematic, it is important to realize that at certain levels of the corporation, individual 
decisions are corporate behaviors when those individuals are able to influence corporate 
policies.  Our vignettes ask the respondents to imagine themselves as a manager in a 
corporation who is directly responsible for corporate offending or overcompliance.  In 
this case, when it is the individual who is deciding how the corporation should act, he/she 
will be subject to both individual-level concerns as well as factors influencing the 
corporation.  Therefore, the external licenses affecting a corporation will also be the 
predominant influences on those people within the corporation who dictate its policies 
and actions and who are concerned with the corporation’s well-being.    
Furthermore, scholars have long noted the lack of data on corporate crime 
(Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Friedrichs, 2010; Simpson et al. 1995; Sutherland, 1949) and 
more recently have documented the problems with currently available environmental 
crime data (Borck et al., 2008; Gibbs and Simpson, 2009; Simpson et al., 2007; more 
detail provided in Chapter 3).  The proposed study will avoid the inherent biases in 
official crime data through the use of two methods.  First, I employ data from a 
randomized vignette survey that correlates respondents’ actual opinions about legal, 
regulatory, economic, social, and cultural aspects involved in corporate decision-making 
and link that to intentions to offend or overcomply.  The sample from the vignette survey 
also improves upon previous research because it focuses on environmental managers 
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located in a wide variety of settings.  The current study is based on a nationwide sample 
of organizations (sampling environmental decision-makers within them) which makes the 
results more generalizable than previous studies focusing on only a few corporations, a 
small geographic area, or employing case-study methodologies.   
Second, I also assess how the license framework is supported in prior quantitative 
research using data from a meta-analysis of studies on environmental crime prevention.  
Given the inconsistency in previous research about the impact of many factors (likely 
related to measurement difficulties and complexities as well as varying 
operationalizations), it is imperative to use multiple methods to inform knowledge about 
how the various licenses predict environmental behavior.  Chapter 3 will describe the 




This section will consider the body of prior literature in its entirety and will derive 
hypotheses to be tested using the vignette data and/or the meta-analysis data.  First and 
foremost, there is much literature that supports Gunningham et al.’s (2002, 2003, 2004; 
Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; Thornton et al. 2007, 2008, 2009) idea that 
influences external to the corporation impact decision-making within the corporations 
and therefore the actions of the corporation.  The legal, economic, and social pressures 
that an organization and its managers face are likely to play a large role in environmental 
decision-making—either inhibiting offending or promoting overcompliance.   
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Hypothesis 1: If managers/corporations are subject to greater external license 
pressures, they are less likely to offend and more likely to overcomply with 
environmental regulations. 
 Second, Gunningham et al. (2002, 2003, 2004; Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et 
al., 2003; Thornton et al. 2007, 2008, 2009)  postulate that those external licenses will be 
filtered through internal corporate processes and policies.  They lump the concept of 
managerial attitudes and corporate culture into one concept which I have separated.  
Therefore, hypothesis 2 deals explicitly with corporate culture and predicts that internal 
corporation-wide norms/policies will be predictive of offending and overcompliance.  I 
will also examine how the inclusion of corporate culture measures impacts the magnitude 
of the coefficients for the external licenses; I expect the impact of the external licenses to 
be somewhat mitigated when corporate culture is accounted for.   
Hypothesis 2: If the corporation’s culture is favorable to environmental compliance, 
then managers are less likely to offend and more likely to overcomply. 
Hypothesis 2B: After accounting for corporate culture, the external licenses will be 
less salient in managers’ behavioral decisions. 
 Third, I argue that individual-level considerations should be conceptualized 
separately from the license framework factors; specifically, I use rational choice theory to 
explain how factors affecting the environmental manager him/herself impact decision-
making by the manager on the corporation’s behalf.  However, as Gunningham et al. 
(2002, 2003, 2004; Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; Thornton et al. 2007, 
2008, 2009) and others point out, individual managerial attitudes are likely affected by 
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their environment and that of the corporation (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Sharma, 
2000).   
Hypothesis 3: Measures of the external licenses and corporate culture will predict 
individual-level perceptions of risks and benefits to the corporation and to the 
managers themselves.  
Much of the literature on rational choice predicts that individuals base decisions on the 
costs and benefits of potential actions and outcomes.  Therefore, I argue that the 
individual-level perceptions of risks and benefits to the managers themselves will predict 
managerial behavior.  Since these factors are the most proximal to the decision to offend 
or overcomply, I expect that the inclusion of these measures will make firm-level factors 
insignificant in the decision-making process.  
Hypothesis 4: When managers perceive low risks and high benefits to themselves, 
they will be more likely to offend and more likely to overcomply.  
Hypothesis 4B:  After accounting for individual-level considerations, firm-level 
factors will be less salient in managers’ behavioral decisions. 
Another goal of this dissertation is to examine whether the same factors that predict 
offending also explain overcompliance.  The research that is out there is equivocal as to 
whether instrumental variables guide overcompliance as they seem to guide offending, or 
whether overcompliance is due more to normative considerations.  To test this 
exploratory question, I will argue that the predictors will be the same for both behaviors.   





Chapter 3: Sample and Methodology 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a main impetus for this dissertation is the lack of 
quantitative tests on the license framework explanation for corporate environmental 
behavior.  Although much research exists testing various programs and measures that fall 
under one of the five constructs outlined in Chapter 2, these studies do not test all of the 
concepts using a common dataset and thus cannot offer a holistic look at the various 
factors as recommended by Gunningham and colleagues (2002, 2003, 2004; Gunningham 
et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; Thornton et al., 2007, 2008, 2009).  Furthermore, much 
of the research examines environmental behaviors using official data or self-report data, 




The present research improves on previous studies of environmental behaviors by 
using two different datasets and two different methods.  First, I employ a factorial 
vignette survey (containing both randomized and non-randomized elements) of 
environmental managers to assess influences on individual offending and overcompliance 
intentions—such individual-level decisions are directly related to corporate behaviors 
when made by a person responsible for corporate behaviors.  Second, I use meta-
analytical techniques to examine the impact of the external licenses using a different 
method.  I will discuss the two methods separately, but for each will examine the 
                                                          
11
Some common criticisms of existing corporate environmental crime data include: the data is incredibly 
complex and of poor quality, there is no review process to improve the quality, there is no uniform data 
collection and standardization of measures (making comparison across agencies and studies difficult), there 
is little data on corporate culture and relationships with stockholders, data on actual environmental 
performance (as opposed to management approaches) is lacking, it is difficult to calculate a corporate crime 
rate that is not overly biased by firm size, the data is not easily accessed, and funding for this type of data 
collection is sparse (Borck et al., 2008; Gibbs and Simpson, 2009; Simpson et al., 2007). 
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advantages/limitations of the approach, the procedure employed, measures used, and the 
appropriate statistical treatment of the data.  
 
 
I. Vignette Surveys 
  
a. Advantages and Limitations of Vignettes 
To more directly assess managers’ perceptions of the law as well as instrumental 
considerations, I use data from a web-based factorial vignette survey of environmental 
managers.  Factorial surveys combine hypothetical scenarios (vignettes), in which certain 
statements are randomly assigned, with survey questions to measure respondent 
intentions, decisions, attitudes, or judgments (Rossi and Nock, 1982).  With such a 
design, researchers can inquire about the individuals’ attitudes, perceptions, or likely 
behavior under various circumstances.  This allows researchers to examine more complex 
and nuanced situations yet maintain empirical rigor (Wallander, 2009; Weber et al., 
1988).  Unlike other research designs, which are limited by temporal ordering problems 
and fluctuating individual perceptions and opinions, factorial designs allow us to measure 
offending decisions at the same time that relevant circumstances are presented (Saltzman 
et al., 1982).
12
  Vignette surveys may also reduce social desirability bias for two reasons: 
the vignette dimensions are randomized and the respondent is not aware of how the 
elements are varied, plus the respondent is answering questions about a hypothetical 
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Not all of the analyses in this dissertation use randomized measures as independent variables.  In these 
cases, the benefits of randomization are lost and the results should be interpreted as merely correlational, 
not causal.  As discussed in the results, these methodological issues may be why we find fewer significant 




person (not about his/her own behavior).  Since individuals are not generally aware of 
how they form opinions and intentions (i.e., they don’t know what exactly is influencing 
their thinking), vignette surveys are considered ideal for examining determinants of 
individual estimates of their feelings or intentions.  Additionally, vignette surveys can 
allow researchers to disentangle the effects of variables that may be too correlated in 
normal survey research (e.g., race and socioeconomic status; Wallander, 2009).   
Although the ability to disentangle such variables is often cited as an advantage of 
this method, other scholars argue that certain hypothetical situations may create contexts 
that you would rarely or never see in real-life—in other words, the hypothetical scenarios 
created through randomization may be unrealistic which leads people to respond in a 
similarly unrealistic way (Auspurg et al., 1999).  Even if the scenario is viewed as 
realistic, some scholars question whether behavioral intentions would accurately translate 
to real-life behavior overall (Durham, 1986; Hughes and Huby, 2004; but also see 
Alexander and Becker, 1978; Hughes, 1998; Pogarsky, 2004; Rahman, 1996).  
Loewenstein et al. (2003, p. 1210) examine what they call projection bias which occurs 
when people “exaggerate the degree to which their future tastes will resemble their 
current tastes.”  In other words, I may truly believe that I would engage in a certain 
behavior depicted in the scenario in the manner in which I answered, but when placed 
under the same circumstances in reality would act very differently.  To help account for 
such issues and reduce bias in the regression estimates, I include a measure of scenario 
realism in the survey as a control variable and use an alternative method to assess the 
robustness of the test of hypothesis 1.
13
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 I also ran the models separately for respondents who said they found the situations to be realistic versus 




b. Creating and Administering the Vignette 
To create the hypothetical scenarios presented, the researcher must first determine 
the relevant “domains” likely to influence decision-making.  For example, one may think 
that the potential for public knowledge of the company’s environmental performance will 
affect the respondent’s decision to offend or overcomply with environmental laws.  To 
assess the role of public disclosure one would then include a sentence within the scenario 
that presents the company as either 1) mandated to report emissions data, or 2) not 
mandated to do so.  One-half of respondents would see a scenario depicting the first 
sentence while the other half would see the second sentence—who sees which sentence is 
randomly determined.  In corporate crime research, pushes and pulls toward crime can be 
conceptualized to operate at the individual and company-level so both kinds of risk are 
incorporated into the vignette design.  All vignette dimensions included in this study can 
be found in Appendix A.  
The survey instrument contains three “offending” vignettes.  One of the 
noncompliance scenarios describes a failure to act on an Environmental Protection 
Agency compliance order, another depicts an employee ignoring hazardous waste 
labeling regulations, and the third depicts the intentional release of a toxic substance into 
a local waterway that exceeds permitted levels by 200% (a more serious pollution event).  
The survey instrument also includes two scenarios depicting “overcompliance” 
behaviors.  One describes an attempt to keep pollution emissions at 40% below the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
obtain accurate estimates, but dropping respondents who deemed the scenarios as unrealistic did not change 
the results found with the full sample.  For the overcompliance scenarios, there were some differences 
between the two samples but substantively the results were consistent.  I have begun to examine the effect 
of realism on overcompliance intentions (Rorie, 2012) and will explore this in future research.   
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required levels and the second describes voluntary counter-terrorism measures 
(enhancing security around toxic storage sites).  The vignettes are followed by a series of 
questions that 1) relate to the specific scenario, 2) measure respondents’ opinions and 
beliefs more generally, and 3) inquire about the respondent’s demographic information 
and business experience.  
 
c. Sample 
My sample includes a large and diverse set of environmentally-minded business 
people.  TMone (a company that provides targeted databases, database processing, and 
database appends to customers for mail and telesales campaigns) provided us with a 
database of contacts—this was the sampling frame.  The company produced a list of 
7,292 individuals who were environmental decision-makers within organizations of all 
sizes and every industry in the United States.  The list from TMone contained the 
individual’s name as well as information on the organization by which he/she was 
employed.  Information included the company’s name, address, telephone number, 
webpage (if applicable), and the name of the company’s owner.
14
 
From December 2008 – March 2009, Vanderbilt University and the University of 
Maryland sent letters to each individual on the list informing him/her that they had been 
selected for participation.  The letters also provided a link to the web-based factorial 
survey.  Of the 7,292 contacted, 1,373 letters were returned as undeliverable, leaving a 
                                                          
14
 A reviewer noted that letting one person represent an entire corporation may be problematic.  However, 
we are asking the respondents to put themselves into the position of a hypothetical manager, in charge of 
acting on behalf of a hypothetical corporation; the person is assumed to be responding based on the 
information in the scenario.  In these scenarios, we provide a detailed description of the environment in 
which the manager and the corporation are located.  Given that high and mid-level managers are often 
expected to make decisions that directly affect corporate behavior (see Chapter 2) and that most of our 
respondents report being in high-level positions in their organizations (see footnote 18), I believe that the 
responses to the survey are adequate representations of how a corporate player may act in these situations.    
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potential sample pool of 5,919.  To increase response rates, Vanderbilt researchers sent 
out follow-up postcards about three weeks after the initial letter was sent (from January 
2009 – April 2009).   
Seven hundred and seventeen individuals logged into the survey site, for a 
response rate of about 12%.  This response rate is not atypical of that seen in previous 
studies on web-based surveys (Porter and Whitcomb, 2003; Ranchhod and Zhou, 2001).  
Scholars have long noted that web-based surveys lack certain aspects that would increase 
the likelihood of response.  For example, researchers cannot include tangible incentives 
(e.g., pens, stickers), the formatting of web surveys may make the questionnaire appear 
longer and less professional, respondents may be concerned about the data not being kept 
secure, and/or potential respondents may encounter technical issues (Ranchhod and Zhou, 
2001; Sax et al., 2003).       
The data collectors received about 30 contacts from individuals about the surveys, 
including reasons for participating/not participating.  Most of the individuals who said 
they would not respond to the survey mentioned that they lacked the technical skills to 
navigate the web survey or that they did not own a computer; others mentioned that they 
simply were not interested or did not feel like they were an appropriate respondent 
because of their work experience.  The team provided technical assistance to individuals 
who wanted to respond to the survey but had trouble accessing the website and 
encouraged those who felt they were inappropriately contacted to respond with the 
understanding that their job description and experience would be taken into consideration 
when interpreting results.   
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Low response rates do not necessarily equate to nonresponse bias.  If respondent 
characteristics are similar to those of non-respondents, then the survey responses can 
reasonably be attributed to the larger target sample (Sax et al., 2003).  To assess 
nonresponse bias, a random sample of 500 individuals was chosen from the 5,919 who 
received the invitation to participate.  For these people, more information was gathered 
on the type of business (publicly or privately-owned corporation, government agency, 
NGO or civic association, law firm, private consulting firm, or other) and the type of 
profession (environmentally-related or not), the size of the company, and the gender of 
the individual.
15,16
  We compared respondents to non-respondents on these dimensions 
and found that the only significant difference between the two groups was in the size of 
the company.  Respondents came from slightly larger companies (mean = 14.04 
employees) than non-respondents (mean = 9.59 employees).  Considering that the 
average size of the company is fairly small for both groups, this significant difference in 
not likely to affect results to a great extent.   
Finally, it is important to note that each respondent received (and thus could 
potentially answer) three scenarios.  Since the scenario (not the individual) is the unit of 
analysis for our research, our sample size is actually much larger than 717.  Of the 717 
respondents, 517 responded to all three scenarios, 63 responded to two scenarios, and 137 
responded to one scenario
17
 which equates to a potential sample size of 1,814.  However, 
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 Specifically, this was done by checking company websites or looking in the Business and Company 
Resource Center database for more information.  
16
 Although we only use one individual-level variable to examine response bias, this should not be 
interpreted as us thinking that corporate-level factors are more important in guiding response behavior.  
The choice of variables here reflects the data available from TMone. 
17
 Using ANOVAs for each type of scenario, we analyzed whether the order in which the scenarios were 
presented (i.e., whether the scenario was seen first, second, or third) had any effect on the number of 
scenarios the respondent completed.  We found one significant test for the enhancing security scenario, but 
the effect was nonsensical and the significance likely due to the large sample size.  
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we dropped all people who did not have data on the dependent variable, leaving us with a 
final sample of 1,465 scenarios (879 offending and 586 overcompliance) from 548 
individuals.
18
   
 
d. Measures 
The vignette data contains both vignette dimensions and survey questions that can 
be used to tap into the effect of various licenses and organizational climate.  Furthermore, 
the measures allow us to examine the effect of both individual manager considerations 
and at the level of the organization.  This section describes the independent variables, the 
control variables, and then the dependent variable of interest.  All variable names, 
descriptions, ranges, and alphas (where relevant) can be found in Appendix A, along with 
a histogram showing the distribution of the overcompliance dependent variable. 
Independent variables. Regarding the legal license, respondents indicated how 
certain/how severe a problem it would be for the following to occur: having the firm be 
criminally prosecuted, having the firm be investigated by a regulatory agency, and having 
the firm be sued.  Each item’s score ranged from 0 (representing “no chance” or “not a 
problem) to 10 (representing “100% chance” or “very severe problem”).  I combine the 
certainty items into one scale (FIRM LEGAL CERTAINTY; alpha = 0.91) and the 
severity items into a second scale (FIRM LEGAL SEVERITY; alpha = 0.94) by adding 
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 The sample was chosen by TMone to represent environmentally-involved individuals in corporations.  
While there may be some concern that the individual responding to the survey cannot provide an accurate 
assessment of the corporation’s behavior, we think that this is addressed in two ways.  First, the individuals 
are responding to a hypothetical scenario—we do not ask them to discuss the likelihood of the behavior in 
the context of their own corporation.  Second, the respondents are highly knowledgeable and influential in 
terms of environmental decision-making in their organization (75.7% of those who provided demographic 
information were top management, 85.1% were “routinely involved” in environmental decision-making in 
their organization, and 69.1% were both top management and routinely involved).   
88 
 
the scores of the three items.  I then standardized the scales for ease of interpretation.  
Note that the legal sanctions measures are only relevant for the offending scenarios.  
To assess the impact of the social license there is one vignette dimension 
depicting whether the firm was mandated to report its actions publicly or not 
(MANDATED).  Note that the vignette scenario dimensions are the same for both types 
of behaviors.  To examine the social license in noncompliance scenarios, we have one 
survey question asking about the certainty of tarnishing the reputation of the firm (FIRM 
SOCIAL CERTAINTY) and another question asking how much of a problem that would 
be (the severity component; FIRM SOCIAL SEVERITY).  In the overcompliance 
scenarios, we have survey questions asking about how likely and rewarding it would be if 
overcompliance enhanced the reputation of the firm (FIRM SOCIAL CERTAINTY 
(OVER); FIRM SOCIAL REWARDS).  All of these questions are measured on an 11-
point Likert-type scale where 0 represents “no chance”, “no problem at all”, or “not 
beneficial at all” and 10 represents “100% chance”, “a severe problem”, or “very 
beneficial”.  We also include a vignette dimension indicating whether the firm is publicly 
or privately owned (PUBLIC).   
In terms of the economic license, we have vignette dimensions detailing economic 
constraints of the firm (FOREIGN COMP., ECON HEALTHY), the firm’s competitive 
position (STRENGTHENS COMP.), the firm’s environmental marketing strategy 
(GREEN MARKET), and the firm’s economic status (DECLINING REVENUE). There 
were no survey questions about perceived certainty or severity/benefits of firm-level 
economic sanction/rewards.  
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To measure the construct of corporate culture, we have vignette dimensions that 
assess corporate culture—specifically, whether the depicted behavior is common in the 
firm (COMMON FIRM), whether it is common in the industry (COMMON 
INDUSTRY), or no description about culture.  We also have vignette dimensions 
depicting whether the firm has previously exceeded or met EPA compliance standards as 
opposed to violating them (EXCEED STANDARDS, MET STANDARDS), whether the 
firm voluntarily participates in an EPA program (VOLUNTARY PARTICIPANT), 
whether a prior employee acting in the same way had been punished (REPRIMAND, 
FIRED), the presence of internal compliance structures (HOTLINE, ETHICS CODE, 
AUDITS, SELF REPORTING), whether the manager in the scenario was asked by a 
supervisor to behave in a certain way versus the hypothetical manager asking someone 
else to do it (SUP. ASKED), and whether ethics are important to managerial decisions 
(ETHICS GUIDE, ETHICS DISTINCT).
19
   
The individual-level rational choice measures encompass many different 
domains.  In terms of legal sanctions, the survey accompanying the offending vignettes 
ask about the likelihood and severity that the individual him or herself would personally 
be sued, be arrested, or be personally investigated by a regulatory agency. Each item is 
measured using an 11-point Likert-type scale similar to those at the firm level.  The 
certainty measures were combined into one scale (IND. LEGAL CERTAINTY; alpha = 
0.90) and the severity items made up a different scale (IND. LEGAL SEVERITY; alpha 
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 A reviewer pointed out that people choose to be in various professions and therefore there may 
endogenous relationships between the corporate-level factors and individual-level factors.  To assess the 
potential for this, I ran regressions that included controls for the type of organization in which the 
respondent was located.  There were no significant effects of these variables and the results of the models 
did not change.  Therefore, for the sake of parsimony, I dropped those variables.    
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= 0.90).  Each scale was standardized for ease of interpretation.  There are, for obvious 
reasons, no questions about legal sanctions following overcompliance scenarios.   
For social sanctions (in the offending scenarios), the respondents are asked about 
the likelihood and severity of: losing the respect and good opinion of business associates, 
being dismissed from the company, losing the respect and good opinion of close friends, 
and jeopardizing future job prospects.  Each response uses an 11-point Likert-type scale 
where 0 means “no chance” or “not a severe problem” and 10 means “100% chance” or 
“a very severe problem.” The items are then summed to create a scale reflecting the 
certainty of individual-level social sanctions (IND. SOCIAL CERTAINTY; alpha = 0.85) 
and the severity of such social sanctions (IND. SOCIAL SEVERITY; alpha = 0.88).
20
  In 
the overcompliance scenarios, respondents are asked about the likelihood and benefit of 
social rewards that may result from the behavior. Specifically, they are asked about the 
likelihood and benefit of: gaining the respect and good opinion of business associates, 
gaining the respect and good opinion of close friends, advancing future job prospects, and 
being promoted in the company.  These items were also measured on an 11 point Likert-
type scale.  The certainty items were combined into one scale by summing the scores 
(IND. SOCIAL CERTAINTY (OVER); alpha = 0.88) and the same method was used to 
combine the perceived benefit items (IND. SOCIAL REWARDS; alpha = 0.95).  All 
social sanctions/benefits scales are standardized for ease of interpretation.    In both the 
offending and overcompliance behaviors, we ask two questions about the certainty and 
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 Some scholars argue that social sanctions will not have salience unless they become known.  In an 
alternative version of  the social sanctions variables, each item was multiplied by the respondent’s answer 
to the question “What is the likelihood that this would become known within then firm?” before the scales 
were created.  However, there was no analogous chance of discovery question in the overcompliance 
scenarios.  Therefore, I decided to run the social sanctions regressions using variables that did not include 
the chance of the action becoming known in the firm.  Running the regressions using the original scale does 
not produce substantively different results.   
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benefit of advancing one’s career (CAREER) as a result of engaging in the behavior 
(measured on an 11-point Likert type scale where 0 means “not a great deal” and 10 
means “a great deal”).  
As conceptualized by Paternoster and Simpson (1994, 1996), decision-making by 
corporate managers also entails considerations of managers’ normative and deontological 
stances regarding behaviors.  For both the offending and overcompliance scenarios, we 
asked respondents to evaluate the ethicality of the depicted act using a multi-dimensional 
ethics scale (MES) developed by Reidenbach and Robin (1990, see also Smith & Cooper-
Martin 1997).  Out of the nine measures of ethicality, we created three scales following 
Reidenbach and Robin’s (1990) analysis of the items.  The first factor, “broad-based 
moral equity” contains four items pertaining to justice (whether the behavior was fair or 
just), deontology (behavior was morally right), and relativism (behavior is acceptable to 
my family).  This scale (BROAD MORALITY) had alphas of 0.86 for the offending 
scenarios and 0.95 for the overcompliance scenarios.  The second ethicality factor is 
related to the idea of a social contract (SOCIAL CONTRACT), and includes two items 
testing whether the behavior violates an unspoken promise or an unwritten contract (α = 
0.78 for offending; α = 0.91 for overcompliance).  The last dimension produced by the 
ethicality measures is one describing the relativism of the behavior (RELATIVIST); it 
contains two items about whether the behavior is traditionally or culturally acceptable (α 
= 0.72 for offending; α = 0.73 for overcompliance).  All ethics scales are standardized for 
ease of interpretation.  We also ask a separate question about how ethical the depicted 
behavior is perceived to be (ETHICAL).  In addition to the ethics scale, we ask two 
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questions about one’s opinion of how thrilling it would be to engage in the behavior 
(THRILL) and how desirable the behavior is (DESIRABLE).    
Control variables. In addition to theoretically-relevant measures, it is important to 
control for individual characteristics that may influence behavioral intentions and/or the 
five main constructs.  As such, I include 20 variables in the regressions that depict the 
amount of time the individual has been working (YEARS EXP.), the importance of 
religion in their life (RELIGION), how involved they are in environmental decision-
making in their organization (COINVOLVE), whether they’ve had a personal experience 
with a situation similar to those depicted in the scenarios (PERSONEXP_YES, 
PERSONEXP_NO), how environmentally committed their organizations are (ENV. 
COMMIT), whether they see the situation as realistic (SIT. REALISTIC), the ethics 
policies present in the respondent’s own organization (CODE OF ETHICS, MAND. 
TRAINING, RANDOM AUDITS, ANON. HOTLINE, TOP MAN. ETHICS, 
COMPANY POLICY), and the number of employees in the respondent’s organization 
(SIZE).  I also control for the specific scenario depicted in the vignette (DISCHARGE 
TOXINS, HAZ. LABEL; POLLUTION 40), and whether the vignette depicted the 
hypothetical manager as an upper-level manager (UPPER LEVEL) versus a middle 
manager. 
Before describing the dependent variable, it is important to emphasize that not all 
of the independent variables are randomized vignette dimensions—many of the measures 
are based on respondents’ answers to survey questions posed after the scenario that are 
used to predict the measure of the dependent variable (which is also a survey question).  
In those cases where a survey question is used to predict a survey question, some benefits 
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of the vignette methodology are lost—i.e., causality cannot be inferred and these 
relationships are best described as correlational. 
Dependent variables. The dependent variable of interest for both offending and 
overcompliance is the survey taker’s willingness to behave the same way as the 
hypothetical manager given the circumstances laid out in the vignette (OFFEND; 
OVERCOMPLY).  This is measured on an 11-point scale, where the value of 0 indicates 
no chance of offending or overcompliance, a value of 1 indicates a 10% chance of 
offending/overcompliance, and so forth until the value of 10 which implies a 100% 
chance of behaving as the scenario suggests.
21
   
 
e. Statistical procedures 
Multiple imputation.  Although I dropped individuals who did not respond to the 
dependent variable,
 22
 data were still missing on our predictor variables. In both the 
                                                          
21
 Although the literature often discusses offending-overcompliance in terms of a continuum (e.g., one 
decreases the amount of pollution until they cross the threshold at which they become overcompliant), our 
instrument construction depicts very specific types of behaviors in independent scenarios—either offending 
behaviors or overcompliance behaviors.  Each individual saw each hypothetical scenario in its own context 
and therefore could only evaluate their intentions for one type of behavior (not whether they would offend 
or overcomply in that particular scenario).  Our analyses, therefore, look at offending intentions separately 
from overcompliance intentions.  Future research should explore using different conceptualizations and 
operationalizations of these behaviors.   
22
 Correlational analysis performed between an indicator of the missing outcome variable and the 
independent variables revealed few variables to be significantly related to missing outcomes, although the 
presence of various compliance programs in the respondents’ own organization were negatively related to 
missingness.  It may be, then, that our respondents are more educated or cognizant about environmental 
ethicality or drawn to organizations that demonstrate a dedication to ethics.  Sample bias may occur if these 
respondents prioritize environmental values over instrumental perspectives (or if they expect a hypothetical 
manager to do so).  However, in the offending regressions, missing outcome values were also predicted by 
perceived desirability of the behavior (perceiving the behavior as desirable was associated with non-
missing values) and personal experience with the scenarios (having experience was associated with non-
missing values).  This implies that our respondents may be less environmentally motivated.  In the 
overcompliance scenarios, missingness was also predicted by age (older respondents were less likely to 
report overcompliance intentions) and relativism (viewing the behavior as violating an unwritten 
contract/promise is associated with responding to the question) which, again, indicates that respondents 
may be less environmentally inclined.  Overall, the inconsistent relationships with missingness (and the 
94 
 
offending scenarios and overcompliance scenarios, missing data ranged from 1% to a 
little more than 9% per variable (see Appendices B and C).  If analyses were conducted 
using complete-case analysis, 26% of the offending scenarios and 21% of the 
overcompliance scenarios would have been lost.  Not only would this reduce power, but 
it’s likely that the cases with no missing data are different in some way from those with 
missing data.  Using only cases with complete data would likely produce biased results 
(Graham, 2009; Tsikriktis, 2005).  Diagnostic tests (e.g., using logistic regressions to 
predict missingness, correlations among missingness indicators) indicate that data are not 
“missing completely at random” (MCAR) because some variables significantly predicted 
missing values, or the missingness indicators exhibited significant correlations amongst 
themselves (Tsikriktis, 2005).  The question becomes whether the data are “missing at 
random” (MAR) as opposed to “missing not at random” (MNAR).  Data that are MNAR 
imply that some unmeasured condition is producing missing data patterns and 
consequently will provide biased results regardless of controls or methods employed by 
the researcher (Brame and Paternoster, 2003; Graham, 2009; Stuart et al., 2009; 
Tsikriktis, 2005). In logistic regressions predicting missing values, most variables were 
nonsignificant or were significant for only a few of the measures and no variable 
consistently predicted missingness.  Based on these diagnostic tests, I address missing 
data issues by performing multiple imputation.
23
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
small correlation coefficients) indicate that dropping cases with missing outcomes is unlikely to result in a 
strong sample bias, although these research questions should certainly be re-tested using different methods.  
23
With more than 10% missing data, Tsikriktis (2005) recommends imputation using hot-deck or 
maximum-likelihood models.  However, maximum-likelihood assumes that the observed data are a sample 
drawn from a multivariate normal distribution.  Since we don’t know much about how our sample is 
created, it is better to take a conservative approach.  I would have used the hot-deck procedure available in 
STATA, but STATA’s hot deck imputation replaces the entire row of values with the values from a 
complete case.  Since the pattern of missingness is not consistent, in this case multiple imputation is a more 
conservative approach.    
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Multiple imputation uses regression equations specified by the user to estimate 
missing values based on what you expect from the data present.  The regression models 
should include all of the variables of substantive interest to the researcher as well as any 
other variables that appear to predict missingness.  In the present study, my imputation 
models included all of those used in the analyses as well as a few auxiliary variables 
found to be related with three or more missingness indicators.  Per White et al.’s (2011) 
recommendations,  all cases with missing data on the dependent variable were dropped 
and missing values were not imputed on that variable—it is not proper to impute the 
outcome values when the variables used in imputation are the same as those in the main 
analysis.  When this is the case, the imputed dependent variables are essentially predicted 
by the analytical models and therefore will not add any new information to the actual 
analysis.  Non-linear regression models (e.g., logistic regression for binary variables and 
ordinal regression for categorical) were used to impute missing values for variables not 
normally distributed. 
As opposed to single imputation in which this process is done once, multiple 
imputation does n iterations.  After creating the desired number of datasets with the 
imputed data, the original models are run using all of the datasets; the results are 
combined across data sets by using “combining rules.”  This procedure not only produces 
reasonable estimates of missing values, but it also accounts for variability in the final 
estimates.  By using multiple imputation methods, we are not “making up data” but are 
attempting to preserve attributes of the dataset in its entirety (Graham, 2009; Stuart et. al., 
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2009).  Using STATA 10.1’s ICE procedure (Royston, 2009), I created 10 iterations of 
the dataset to use in the analyses.
24
  
Regressions.  All analyses are conducted in STATA 10.1, using the MICE 
program to combine the imputed databases.  In examining the distribution of the 
dependent variable, it was notably skewed in the noncompliance scenario data (i.e., 62% 
of the respondents indicated a 0% chance of offending).  Therefore, I dichotomize this 
outcome measure (the intention to offend) to reflect the values of 0 = no chance of 
offending and 1 = a 10% or more chance of offending.  I then ran logistic regression for 
the offending models.  The distribution of the overcompliance outcome was slightly 
skewed, but the scale measure provides important detail lost by a dichotomous variable 
so I decided to keep the 11-point scale and use Ordinary Least Squares regression
25
.   
Given that the unit of analysis is the scenario (and not the respondent), it is 
important to consider clustering effects.  Most individual respondents responded to more 
than one scenario and therefore those observations are not independent, violating an 
important assumption of multivariate regression.  When this assumption is violated, 
coefficient estimates will be consistent (i.e., unbiased) but standard errors are no longer 
valid (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2005).  I thus estimated robust standard errors using the 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator in STATA 10.1.
26
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 I ran the regressions on the original dataset, without imputed data.  As one might expect, there were 
changes in the significance of variables but all variables are consistent in magnitude and directionality 
regardless of the imputation procedure.   
25
 I ran both scenario types using various models to check how robust my results are to different strategies; 
results were substantively the same. 
26
 Alternative methods for handling lack of independence between observations would be to estimate either 
a random effects model or a multi-level model.  The random effects model allows the intercept to vary 
across individuals.  While estimating robust standard errors treats the correlation among time varying 
variables as a nuisance, random effects models explicitly model the lack of dependence and decompose the 
total residual into between- and within-individual components (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2005).  
Employing a multi-level approach similarly corrects the standard errors as well as disaggregating 
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In this section of the dissertation, I present my models for each hypothesis test.  
Again, note that logistic regression is employed for regressions using the binary 
offending variables and OLS regression is used for the overcompliance outcome.  For the 
following equations, let Yoff be the probability of offending and Yover be the likelihood of 
overcompliance.  The external licenses will be represented by  for the vector of firm-
level legal license variables,  for the vector of firm-level social license variables,  for 
the vector of firm-level economic license variables,  for the firm-level corporate culture 
variables,  for the vector of individual-level considerations, and  for the vector of 
control variables.  The subscript k represents individual respondents.  
Hypothesis 1 argues that if managers/corporations are subject to greater external 
license pressures, they are less likely to offend and more likely to overcomply with 
environmental regulations.  Therefore,  
(1) Logit:   (         )   
      
   ∑      
, where 
                                      
 
(2) OLS:                                     
 
Hypothesis 2 states that if the corporation’s culture is favorable to environmental 
compliance, then managers are less likely to offend and more likely to overcomply.  
Therefore, 
(3) Logit:   (         )   
      
   ∑      
, where 
                                                                                                                                                                             
unexplained variance into two parts—at the level of the vignette and the level of the individual respondent.  
This allows you not only to examine whether respondents’ judgments change as a result of vignette 
conditions, but also whether your respondents differ from one another with regards to their average scores 
on the outcome (Wallander, 2009).  This is an interesting avenue for future research; however, in this study 
there are many cases in which the individual saw only one offending scenario (and two overcompliance 
scenarios) or only one/no overcompliance scenarios (and saw two or three offending scenarios).  For the 
purposes of this research, the clustering option in Stata is employed to retain all scenarios in the analysis.  
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                         
 
(4) OLS:                              
 
I also argue in Hypothesis 2B that after accounting for corporate culture, the external 
licenses will be less salient in managers’ behavioral decisions.  To test this, I will 
compare the results for (3) and (4) to the results for the following models: 
(5) Logit:   (         )   
      
   ∑      
, where 
                                           
 
(6) OLS:                                          
 
Hypothesis 3 states that measures of the external licenses and corporate culture will 
predict individual-level perceptions of risks and benefits to the corporation and to the 
managers themselves.   Most of the models will look like this (but note that the legal 
license variables will not be included in the regressions of the overcompliance rational 
choice variables): 
 
(7)                                          
 
Note also that the rational choice variables of SHAME (in the offending scenarios), 
FEELGOOD, and PRIDE (in the overcompliance scenarios) are dichotomous in nature 
and therefore will require logistical modeling.  For those variables, the model will look 
like this: 
 
(8)    (    )   
      
   ∑      
, where 





Hypothesis 4 states that when managers perceive low risks and high benefits to 
themselves, they will be more likely to offend and more likely to overcomply.  The test 
for this is as follows: 
(9)  Logit:   (         )   
      
   ∑      
, where 
                         
 
(10) OLS:                               
 
 
I also believe that after accounting for individual-level considerations, firm-level 
factors will be less salient in managers’ behavioral decisions.  I will compare equations 
(9) and (10) to equations (11) and (12) shown below:   
(11) Logit:   (         )   
      
   ∑      
, where 
                                                
 
(12) OLS:                                               
 
The final hypothesis states that the predictors of offending behavior are the same 
as those for overcompliance.  To test this, I will compare equation (11) to equation (12), 




As mentioned above, vignette studies are limited in certain ways—most notably, 
people question the ability of scenario to create a realistic context and whether reported 
behavioral intentions would translate to actual behavior.  Furthermore, much of the 
previous research on environmental crime produces inconsistent results, likely due to 
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differences in samples, measures, and methods. To address this, I reviewed all prior 
empirical and quantitative studies on environmental offending through the year 2006.  I 
used meta-analytical techniques to obtain a statistical estimate as to the overall impact of 
prevention and enforcement strategies under the rubric of each license.
27
  In doing so, I 
will also be able to assess the impact of the 3 external licenses using studies that rely on 
actual offending behavior.    
Meta-analysis is a quantitative synthesis of research studies that examine the same 
conceptual idea (even if this idea is operationalized in different ways; Wilson, 2010).  
With this method, the research standardizes the statistical relationships found in prior 
studies by creating an “effect size statistic” for each study.  The effect sizes of each study 
are then averaged to get a sense of the impact of a construct in the literature, and possibly 
compare the average relationship to other constructs of interest.  The type of effect size 
that you calculate depends on the type of data that you have.  There are three types of 
effect sizes that I was able to compute with these data:  1) the mean difference (or d-type) 
effect size, in which the mean scores of two groups are compared; 2) the product-moment 
correlation effect size, which is appropriate when you are looking at the relationship 
between two continuous variables; or 3) the odds-ratio effect type, which should be used 
when you are looking at dichotomous individual variable/dichotomous outcome and want 
to express the effect size in terms of the odds of an outcome.   
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The meta-analytical data used for this research comes from a larger project which reviewed all prior work 
on corporate crime prevention and enforcement for multiple crime outcomes up through 2003.  Given the 
breadth of the research reviewed in the larger project, only articles reporting corporate compliance versus 
noncompliance were included; overcompliance outcomes were only included in the coding as they related 
to noncompliance and therefore were not coded separately.  Thus, this section of the study is only 
examining the impact of programs/factors on corporate environmental offending.  
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a. Advantages and Limitations of Meta-analyses 
Meta-analysis was designed to overcome limitations of older review 
methodologies, such as “vote-counting” or literature review methods.  Literature reviews 
seek to identify the body of research relevant to a particular topic and discuss the state of 
knowledge that exists based on the overall results of specific studies.  Vote-counting 
methods take the literature review a step further and count the number of studies showing 
significant effects of the treatment of interests versus those that are nonsignificant 
(Bushman and Wang, 2009).  Lipsey (2007) argues that vote-counting of significance 
tests is problematic because of the reliance on significance tests (see, e.g., McBride et al., 
1993; Meehl, 1997). Specifically, the studies included in reviews tend to have small 
sample sizes and limited power to find significant results, but conversely scholars can get 
significant results merely by increasing their sample (McBride et al., 1993).  
Furthermore, the conclusions drawn by this method become even more inaccurate with 
the inclusion of more studies because you are not doing anything to overcome the lack of 
power and biases inherent in the selection of published articles/exclusion of unpublished 
articles.  Meta-analysis deals with the limitations of traditional reviews and has many 
advantages over such reviews, including: 1) meta-analyses are more precise because they 
look at both the significance as well as the magnitude of relationships to inform 
judgments about the relationship, 2) each step of the meta-analysis is very public and 
open to scrutiny so that other scholars can assess and replicate the process, 3) the 
databases are dynamic such that as more relevant studies are identified they can be added 
in and the relationships can be re-examined with new information, 4) findings from a 
large number of studies (including unpublished studies) are organized and recorded in a 
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computerized database which facilitates analysis of the information, 5) the procedure has 
more statistical power than other methods and can demonstrate relationships or effects 
not found elsewhere, and 6) one can compare findings across studies to determine why 
differences exist across studies (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, pp. 5 - 6; Pratt and Cullen, 
2000; Wilson, 2010). 
Although meta-analysis has advantages, it is not without limitations that need to 
be understood and addressed when discussing the results.  Lipsey and Wilson (2001) note 
that meta-analysis is more complicated than traditional literature reviews and requires a 
lot of training and an understanding of the statistical underpinnings of the method.  Also, 
because the approach provides a numeric summary measure and emphasizes quantitative 
testing of the data, scholars are not as likely to notice subtle or nuanced differences 
among a group of studies that would escape quantitative coding.  There is also a problem 
in combining studies that measure the construct of interest with different 
operationalizations; researchers using ambiguous constructs that can be measured in a 
variety of ways risk comparing and combining effect sizes among studies that are 
essentially dissimilar.  Finally, Lipsey and Wilson note that studies vary widely by 
methodological quality and that there is a lack of consensus about what the criteria should 
be for including a study in these meta-analyses.  While it would be ideal to only include 
randomized experiments, the rarity of true experiments (especially for those topics of 
most interest to criminologists; see Farrington and Welsh, 2005; Lum and Yang, 2005; 
Weisburd, 2000) means that relying on this method alone would make meta-analysis 
impossible to do and would impede the generalizability of findings (Lipsey, 2007).  The 
authors argue that we need to find a balance between excluding studies that are not 
103 
 
methodologically adequate versus learning from studies that may not be randomized 
trials—e.g., including all studies and coding methodological differences to examine why 
study results differ (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001).  
More fundamentally, Berk (2007) argues that the meta-analysis method itself 
requires assumptions about the collection and inclusion of studies that are not verifiable 
and likely untenable.  For example, scholars assume that within studies, the sample is a 
randomized group from a representative population and that the only differences between 
treatment and control groups arise from the treatment itself—in meta-analysis, you 
cannot observe whether this is true.  Further, he says that effect sizes across studies 
included in a meta-analysis are assumed to differ only because you are looking at 
different samples of the same population; variation in the treatment effect is due to 
random measurement error.  Berk says that we do not know the true population that is 
being measured when we collect a wide variety of studies (especially when various 
operationalizations of the independent variable is used) and therefore it is inappropriate to 
use meta-analytic methods to draw inferences about this unknown population of interest.  
He also argues that people assume the treatment is going to have the exact same effect in 
different studies—which is problematic especially since studies measure the “same” 
concept in many different ways.  Even if researchers employ fixed effects methods to 
model differences in effect sizes, this does not adequately address the fundamental 
problem and instead introduces the limitations of regressions into the method.  Another 
assumption of meta-analysis is that the studies included involve different samples and are 
thus independent from each other.  In collecting meta-analysis data, scholars generally 
look for studies that have overlapping samples and combine the data from the studies in 
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such a way as to make this less of a problem (discussed in more detail below).  However, 
Berk argues that even when study samples are composed of different subjects, the 
assumption of independent samples is violated because the “scientific community is built 
around a web of personal contacts, peer reviews, and funding competitions in which 
earlier studies guide later studies, senior researchers mentor junior colleagues, and 
academics train their students to carry on some traditions and challenge others” (pp. 261 
– 262).  Basically, Berk argues that the models used in meta-analysis do not appropriately 
represent how the included studies were actually conducted—when your model should 
not apply to the sample, then trying to infer anything through statistical analyses is 
improper.   
Lipsey (2007) responded to Berk’s (2007) criticisms in support of the use of 
meta-analysis.  First, he takes on Berk’s argument that meta-analysis leads to invalid 
conclusions, arguing that individual studies rarely involve random sampling strategies 
and even when a random sample is used the study still suffers from non-random attrition 
and non-response.  Under Berk’s criteria of which methods can be trusted to provide 
accurate inferences, then we would be able to use hardly any existing studies to draw 
conclusions.  Furthermore, a strength of meta-analysis is that it examines the magnitude 
of effects and de-emphasizes the statistical significance in assessing whether the effect is 
“real” or not.  He also compares meta-analysis to simulation exercises.  In fixed-effects 
models, we are essentially looking at whether the effect sizes we calculate from each 
study would be generated through random sampling of a population of studies similar to 
those included in the analysis but who have a mean effect size of zero.  With regard to 
Berk’s concern about dependency, Lipsey argues that we can create models for such 
105 
 
dependencies as Berk describes and that there are methods to correct them (e.g., using 
multi-level models).  Instead of disregarding the method completely because of this fear, 
scholars should be motivated to overcome limitations by developing better statistical 
methods or by making more conservative assumptions in their analyses.   
It is important to realize the limitations of meta-analysis, but I feel that the 
advantages of this methodology outweigh the concerns of scholars.  Meta-analysis is 
particularly well-suited for the study of corporate environmental crime because there is 
such a vast amount of literature that inconsistently supports prevention and deterrence 
efforts.  I will consider the limitations of the strategy when interpreting my results, but 
overall I feel that I can make a strong contribution through analysis of research using this 
method. 
 
b. Identification and Coding of Studies 
One of the biggest advantages to the method is that it is very transparent, and calls 
for precise recording of the steps employed.  The first step in conducting a meta-analysis 
is identifying the criteria you will use to collect the studies to be used.  Data collection 
occurs in three steps: 1) searching various databases for published and unpublished 
studies that are empirical in nature and that examine your outcome of interest, 2) coding 
those articles gathered in the first step according to more stringent eligibility criteria to 
determine whether they will be included into your final database, and 3) coding the 
relevant information into a computerized database.  In this section, I will describe in 
detail each of these three steps as they pertain to the data collection and coding.   
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Searching databases.  The meta-analytic method emphasizes the need to review 
both published and unpublished and include relevant data from both types.  It has been 
well-documented that studies with non-significant results are often subject to the “file-
drawer” effect where such work is not submitted for publication.  Scholars note that non-
significant findings may be just as informative as studies finding effects—in other words, 
it is just as important to know that an intervention has no impact or even iatrogenic 
effects (Wilson, 2009).  To this end, I have searched multiple bases that include both 
published and peer-reviewed articles as well as places where unpublished manuscripts are 
made available to the public.  Below is a list of the 20 databases and web sources to be 
used:  
Published databases: Unpublished databases: 
 Social Work Abstracts  Google Scholar 
 ABI  Digital Dissertation databases 
 PsycINFO  Department of Justice website 
 Sociological Abstracts  Securities and Exchange commission website 
 ERIC  Federal Trade Commission website 
 CJA  Financial Crimes Enforcement Network website 
 BSP  Australia Institute of Criminology website 
 EconLit  The World Bank website 
 PAIS International  Environmental Protection Agency website 
 Worldwide Political Science 
Abstracts 
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
 
In each database, I used 390 search terms (the list of search terms is provided in 
Appendix E) relevant to finding empirical studies of environmental crime behaviors.  As 
I went through each search term, I recorded the number of “hits” that the search term 
brings up—for example, when I plugged in “community AND ‘environmental 
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compliance’” into the EconLit database I retrieved 31 articles.
28
  After recording the 
number of articles returned by the search, I then read each article’s abstract and coded 
whether it was: 1) empirical, 2) related to environmental crime, and 3) both empirical and 
related to environmental crime.  For those studies that are both empirical and are related 
to environmental crime, I saved a copy of the study for further coding.   This process 
produced a database with information on how many hits a search term got, how many of 
those were empirical studies, how many of those were related to environmental 
offending, and how many of those were both empirical and dealt with environmental 
crime (and thus potentially eligible for further coding).  It is important to note that in the 
unpublished databases, search terms can bring up an impossible amount of information to 
go through with any hope of putting together a database of current articles (e.g.,  putting 
“community AND ‘environmental compliance’” into Google Scholar produces 4,630 
hits) and many of those studies were not likely to be relevant for our meta-analysis.  A 
decision was made to randomly sample 50 studies from the unpublished databases to 
code for inclusion. 
After collecting the articles that are empirical and deal with environmental crime, 
the second round of eligibility coding involved reading those gathered articles and 
determining whether they met five criteria relevant to my needs.  Specifically, I went 
through each article and marked whether the article:  
 Was an evaluation of a corporate crime prevention/control strategy in the legal, 
economic, or social domains. 
 Includes a comparison group (or a pre-intervention comparison period in the case 
of pre-post studies) that did not receive the treatment condition.  Studies may be 
                                                          
28
 Note that the search terms come from a larger review that includes all types of corporate crime (Simpson 
et al., 2008).  To make the search for articles more efficient I added the term “environmental” where the 
term was not already included.  I recorded the initial number of hits as well as the hits returned by the more 
specific search.   
108 
 
experimental, quasi-experimental, or pre-post evaluations.  If the study does not 
include a treatment group, does it report standardized regression 
coefficients/Pearson correlations if the treatment is measured continuously?  
 Reports on at least one environmental crime/misconduct outcome.  In accordance 
with our broad definition of corporate crime, the outcome of interest may be one 
of a wide range of criminal behaviors, regulatory violations, or civil violations. 
 Is written in English, but may be cross-national. 
 Was published in 2004 or later.29 
 
Once an article met the above criteria and was deemed eligible for the review, I 
then looked through its reference list to see if there are other relevant articles that I did 
not find in my initial search.  For this study, I have finished coding articles through the 
year 2006.  I plan to continue coding articles through 2011 and hope to have a complete 
database by January 2014.   
   
c. Coding the studies 
After collecting all of the relevant studies, coding of the data begins.  We 
developed a coding protocol (see Appendix F) that identifies data needed to calculate 
effect sizes as well as examine how study factors may influence the treatment effects 
found in the research.  I collected data on the source of the study (e.g., country of 
publication, whether it was a book or article), characteristics of the study (e.g., 
randomized experiment or not, whether the authors expressed concerns about validity), 
sample characteristics (e.g., whether made up of individuals or corporations), the 
methods and procedures used by the study authors (e.g., use of a survey), descriptions of 
the independent variable (e.g., construct and operationalization), descriptions of the 
                                                          
29
 Note that this meta-analysis is an update to an earlier systematic review for the Campbell Collaboration, 
which covered all corporate crime research published before 2003 (see Simpson et al., 2008).  I use the 




dependent variable (e.g., construct and operationalization), the data employed to calculate 
an effect size, and then conclusions made by the study authors (e.g., whether the 
treatment had a beneficial effect).  There are also shaded boxes at the very end that 
describe the various types of effect sizes and relevant statistics needed for future analysis. 
 
d. Dependent variables 
In meta-analyses, the “dependent variable” is the effect size (ES) calculated for 
each study.  These ESs from various studies are combined to get a sense of the overall 
effect of the intervention.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I calculate effect sizes to 
represent each of the three licenses.  Specifically, I calculated an ES to represent the legal 
license (including studies that look at the effects of laws, official sanctions/fines, or 
regulatory policies), the economic license (e.g., the cost of compliance, experiencing 
abnormal stock returns after publication of reports), and the social license (e.g., bad 
publicity or NGOs).  Given that the conceptualization of each license is so broad, I broke 
the ESs down into more specific examples of the licenses.  The six constructs I present in 
the results section include: 1) the legal license (command-and-control approach), 2) the 
legal license (persuasive/cooperative approach), 3) the legal license (resources available 
to regulators), 4) the economic license (compliance costs), 5) the economic license 
(size/profitability of the company), and 6) the social license.   
As mentioned above, various study designs yield different types of effect sizes.  
After completing the meta-analyses, there was never more than one odds-ratio effect 
sizes representing one construct.  For brevity’s sake, I will not discuss this type of effect 
size further since a meta-analysis necessitates more than one study be analyzed.  For our 
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purposes, two types of effect sizes are relevant: the mean-difference (ESd) and the 
product-moment correlation (ESr).   The mean-difference effect size standardizes 
categorical group differences (e.g., treatment vs. control) among studies.  This effect size 
can be calculated using the N, means and standard deviations of the groups; a t-test value 
and df, plus Ns; an ANOVA F-value and df, plus Ns; an exact t-test of the ANOVA p-
value, plus Ns or total sample size; or a categorical p-value of t-test or ANOVA and Ns 
or total N.  Basically, you need to have the scores of two groups and/or a difference test.   
The product-moment correlation ES is a bit different in that it is not comparing 
group differences; instead, it is describing the covariation among variables; that is, how 
does one continuous variable change as another continuous variable changes?  
Calculating this ES requires knowledge about the covariance between x and y, the sample 
size, and the standard deviation of x and y; recently, other calculations have shown that 
you can derive ESr using standardized beta coefficients (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001; 
Wilson, 2010).  
In addition to calculating the effect sizes, it is important to adjust the effect size 
and then calculate the standard error and inverse variance weights for each average ES.  
All of these calculations weight the effect size according to the study’s sample size in an 
attempt to give more weight to more precise estimates. I will now discuss how to 
calculate each type of effect size and associated statistics more specifically.   
Calculating the mean difference effect size and associated statistics.  As 
mentioned above, the mean difference effect contrasts two groups on a continuous 
dependent variable, while adjusting the effects based on the pooled standard deviation.  




  ̅̅̅̅    ̅̅̅̅
       
.  Here,   ̅̅ ̅ is the mean for Group 1,   ̅̅ ̅ is the mean for Group 2, and spooled is the 
pooled standard deviation (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, p. 48).  It is important to note, 
however, that there are ways to calculate the mean difference effect size from a variety of 
statistics (see Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, pp. 198 – 200); this study will use the most 
appropriate formula based on the data available.   
The mean difference effect size from each study should be adjusted to correct for 
differences in sample sizes using the “small sample size bias correction” (Lipsey and 
Wilson, 2001, p. 49) such that more precise estimates are given more weight in the 
calculating the average.  This is calculated using the formula:       (   
 
    
)    .  
In this formula, ES’sm is the adjusted effect size, ESsm is the effect size prior to the 
adjustment, and N is the total sample size (both groups) used in the study.  
To calculate the standard error for the mean difference effect size, we employ the 
formula      √
       
      
 
     
 
 (       )
 (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, p. 49).  Here, nG1 is 
the number of respondents in Group 1, nG2 is the number of subjects in group 2, and 
ES’sm is the adjusted effect size.  The inverse variance weight is simply calculated as 
    
 
    
  (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, p. 49). 
Calculating the product-moment correlation and inverse variance weight.  The 
correlation coefficient effect size is equal to the correlation reported in the study:       
(Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, p. 64).  However, there are more ways to calculate the 
correlation coefficient using different types of data (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, p. 201; 
Wilson, 2010); this study will employ various formulas to calculate correlation 
coefficient effect sizes as needed.   
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To adjust correlation coefficient effect sizes, the Fisher’s Zr transformation is 
applied using the formula:              
   
   
  (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, p. 63). In the 
above formula, ESZr is the adjusted correlation effect size, r is the correlation coefficient 
and loge is the natural logarithm. 
Once you have the Fisher’s Zr transformation, you calculate the standard error as 
      
 
√   
. The inverse variance weight is calculated in the same way as before: 
    
 
    
   = n – 3 (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, p. 64). 
 
e. Statistical Analysis 
  Once the effect sizes are transformed (e.g., into an unbiased ESd or Fisher Zr), it is 
important to examine the distribution of effect sizes.  To do this, I created independent 
sets of ESs, making sure not to violate the assumption of independence by including 
more than one ES from the same study on the same construct.
30
  I then took the group of 
ESs representing the construct of interest and calculated the mean, using the adjusted ESs 
described above.  Once one calculates the average ES, then the confidence interval is 
calculated to assess its precision.  In addition, I calculated the Q statistic which assesses 
whether differences in the individual effects (at the study level) are due only to sampling 
error or if there are methodological/other differences in studies that affect the observed 
effect.   
                                                          
30
Lipsey and Wilson (2001) recommend either averaging the effect sizes within a study (or multiple studies 
if they use the same data) or randomly choosing one effect size to be included.  You could also model the 
lack of independence, but this is often very difficult and requires data not generally reported in studies.  As 
such, I chose to average the effect sizes within datasets. 
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If the effect sizes are not representative of a homogeneous underlying population 
then it is important to adjust your average weighted mean ES.  As discussed in the results, 
I found my Q statistic to be highly significant.  I calculated the random effects variance 
component and adjusted my ESs according to Lipsey and Wilson’s (2001, pp. 134 – 135) 
instructions
31
.   
  
                                                          
31
 Given that the ESs vary more than would be expected with mere sampling error, future analysis will 
analyze how effect sizes vary by study characteristics.  The meta-analysis presented here is incomplete and 
is essentially a check on robustness.  Therefore, the average weighted mean ESs (calculated using the 
random effects approach) is presented for illustrative purposes in the dissertation.     
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
In order to test the five hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2, I use a web-based 
randomized vignette survey of environmental decision-makers from a variety of 
organizational types.  As described in Chapter 3, I employ a variety of regression models 
in my exploration of the data.  In this chapter, I will discuss the results of those statistical 
tests.  The first section describes our sample and then examines descriptive statistics and 
correlations among the key variables of interest.  Included in this discussion is a 
demonstration of the success of the multiple imputation process.  The second section 
discusses the regression results for each of the five hypotheses.  The third section 
examines the sensitivity analysis of Hypothesis 1, in which I use meta-analytic data to 
determine the impact of the external licenses on corporate environmental offending.  The 
fourth section will summarize what we have learned about environmental offending and 
overcompliance. 
 
I. Descriptives, Correlations, and Multiple Imputation 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the target audience for the web survey included 
environmental decision-makers in organizations.  Table 1 shows the demographic 
characteristics of our survey respondents.  Our respondents are predominantly male, in 
their mid-fifties on average, and a strong majority are married. A little over half of the 
respondents have experienced one of the behaviors depicted in the scenarios they saw—
of those who said they had experienced such a behavior, a little over 70 percent said they 
had experienced a violation situation while about a quarter of them said they had 
experienced overcompliance situations.  Over half of our respondents said they had no 
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more than a high school education, and over three-fourths of our respondents said they 
had less than a college education.  Many of our respondents (38 percent) said they 
worked as private consultants, a little over a quarter of them worked for a corporation, 
and about 17 percent worked in a non-profit organization.  Interestingly, despite the fairly 
low education level of our respondents, over ¾ of them report being executives (as 
opposed to employee or middle-management level) in their organizations.  This likely 
reflects the strong representation of small organizations (the average company size is 
10.19 employees, with the median being 3 employees) in our sample.  About 85 percent 
of the sample are “very involved” in environmental decision-making in their 
organization.  About 84 percent of the sample said the environmental commitment of 
their organization is “about right,” 12 percent said it was “excessive” and only about 5 
percent said that it could “use work.”  Although predominantly representing small 
organizations, our respondents match the characteristics of our targeted population 
well—they are experienced, have positions of authority in their organizations and are 
highly involved in environmental decision-making.   
 
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents (N = 717) 
Demographic Measure Range Mean 
(S.D.) 
Gender 0 = male, 1 = 
female 
0.23 (0.42) 
Age 23 – 82 54.59 
(9.78) 
Are you married? 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.79 (0.41) 
Have you ever personally experienced one of the 
behaviors depicted in the scenario?  Yes 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.54 (0.50) 
Have you ever personally experienced one of the 
behaviors depicted in the scenario?  No 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.36 (0.48) 
Have you ever personally experienced one of the 
behaviors depicted in the scenario?  Not Applicable 





Demographic Measure Range Mean 
(S.D.) 
[If marked yes to having personal experience]—Have you 
ever experienced the situation depicted in the hazardous 
waste scenario? 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.00 (0.00) 
[If marked yes to having personal experience]—Have you 
ever experienced the situation depicted in the EPA 
compliance order scenario? 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.35 (0.48) 
[If marked yes to having personal experience]—Have you 
ever experienced the situation depicted in the Discharge 
Toxins scenario? 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.38 (0.49) 
[If marked yes to having personal experience]—Have you 
ever experienced the situation depicted in the pollution 
overcompliance scenario? 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.18 (0.38) 
[If marked yes to having personal experience]—Have you 
ever experienced the situation depicted in the Security 
Overcompliance scenario? 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.06 (0.23) 
Highest educational decree achieved: HS or equivalent 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.60 (0.49) 
Highest educational decree achieved: Some college 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.20 (0.40) 
Highest educational decree achieved: 4-year college 
degree 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.08 (0.27) 
Highest educational decree achieved: Some graduate 
study 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.02 (0.15) 
Highest educational decree achieved: Graduate Degree 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.10 (0.30) 
Type of organization: Corporation 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.26 (0.44) 
Type of organization: Government 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.09 (0.29) 
Type of organization: NGO 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.17 (0.37) 
Type of organization: Law 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.03 (0.16) 
Type of organization: Private consulting 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.38 (0.49) 
Type of organization: Other 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.01 (0.09) 
Type of organization: Retired 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.02 (0.13) 
Type of organization: Academic 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.02 (0.14) 
Type of organization: Self-Employed 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.02 (0.14) 
Size of organization 0 – 1267 10.91 
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Demographic Measure Range Mean 
(S.D.) 
(62.93) 
Years of Business Experience 2 – 60 29.85 
(10.36) 
What is your management level? Employee 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.05 (0.22) 
What is your management level? Manager 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.19 (0.39) 
What is your management level? Executive 0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.76 (0.43) 
How involved are you in environmental decision-making 
in your company? Not at all 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.03 (0.18) 
How involved are you in environmental decision-making 
in your company? Somewhat 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.11 (0.32) 
How involved are you in environmental decision-making 
in your company? Very 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.85 (0.36) 
The environmental commitment of my company is: 
Excessive 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.12 (0.32) 
The environmental commitment of my company is: About 
Right 
0 = no, 1 = 
yes 
0.84 (0.37) 
The environmental commitment of my company is: Could 
use work 





Tables 2 and 3 show the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the 
offending scenarios and the overcompliance scenarios, respectively.  Note that these 
descriptives are for pre-imputation variables only.  Appendices B and C compare the 
means and standard deviations of the variables before and after the multiple imputation 
process.  Although independent samples t-tests founds significant differences (p<0.10) 
between some of the means of the original data and the imputed data, the significant 
findings are likely due to the large sample size.  Other criteria to look for problematic 
imputation (e.g., the absolute difference in means pre/post imputation is more than 2 SDs, 
or the ratio in variances in pre/post imputed data is <.05 or >2) and  the small substantive 
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differences in mean, variance, and distribution suggest that  imputation was successful 
(Stuart et al. 2009).   
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics, Offending Scenarios 









































Career  874 0 - 10 2.670 2.758 












Ethical 870 1 - 7 5.916 1.981 
Desirable 879 0 - 10 0.775 1.643 
Thrilling 874 0 - 10 0.609 1.615 
Shame 841 0 - 1 0.043 0.202 



























 Firm Rep. Certainty 864 0 - 10 6.753 2.533 
Firm Rep. Severity 852 0 - 10 7.910 2.289 
Mandated 879 0 - 1 0.476 0.499 












 Foreign Comp. 879 0 – 1  0.350 0.477 
Econ. Healthy 879 0 – 1 0.313 0.464 
Strengthen Comp. 879 0 – 1 0.473 0.499 
Green Market. 879 0 – 1 0.524 0.499 
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 Variable Name N Range Mean SD 













Common Firm 879 0 – 1 0.330 0.470 
Common Ind. 879 0 – 1 0.345 0.475 
Exceed Standards 879 0 – 1 0.338 0.473 
Met Standards 879 0 – 1 0.334 0.472 
Voluntary Participant 879 0 – 1 0.491 0.500 
Fired 879 0 – 1 0.365 0.482 
Reprimanded 879 0 – 1 0.344 0.475 
Hotline 879 0 – 1 0.182 0.386 
Ethics Code 879 0 – 1 0.205 0.404 
Audits 879 0 – 1 0.208 0.406 
Self-Reporting 879 0 – 1 0.188 0.391 
Ethics Guide 879 0 – 1 0.337 0.473 
Ethics Distinct 879 0 – 1 0.319 0.466 













Discharge Toxins 879 0 – 1 0.345 0.475 
Hazard. Labeling 879 0 – 1 0.313 0.464 
Years Experience 815 2 - 60 29.971 10.502 
Marital Binary 798 0 - 1 0.781 0.414 
Religion 816 0 - 3 1.692 1.208 
Coinvolved 802 0 - 2 1.812 0.477 
Personexp_No 879 0 - 1 0.340 0.474 
Personexp_Yes 879 0 - 1 0.487 0.500 
Envcommit 806 0 – 2 0.922 0.396 
Sit. Realistic 876 0 – 1 0.858 0.349 
Upper Level 879 0 - 1 0.485 0.500 
Code of Ethics 826 0 - 1 0.570 0.495 
Mand. Training 826 0 - 1 0.186 0.390 
Random Audits 826 0 - 1 0.024 0.154 
Anon. Hotline 826 0 - 1 0.121 0.326 
Top Man. Ethics 826 0 - 1 0.551 0.498 
Company Policy 826 0 - 1 0.321 0.467 
Size 877 0 - 1267 12.099 76.874 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics, Overcompliance Scenarios 
 Variable Name N Range Mean SD 
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Career 583 0 - 10 5.098 2.764 












Ethical 578 1 - 7 2.481 1.995 
Desirable 586 0 - 10 7.056 3.120 
Thrilling 583 0 - 10 4.161 3.238 
Feel Good 567 0 - 1 0.810 0.393 











Firm Social Certainty 
(OVER) 
570 0 - 10 6.353 2.659 
Firm Social Rewards 570 0 - 10 6.839 2.613 
Mandated 586 0 - 1 0.452 0.498 













Foreign Comp. 586 0 - 1 0.340 0.474 
Econ. Healthy 586 0 - 1 0.294 0.455 
Strengthens Comp. 586 0 - 1 0.522 0.500 
Green Market. 586 0 - 1 0.515 0.500 













Common Firm 586 0 - 1 0.363 0.481 
Common Ind. 586 0 - 1 0.321 0.467 
Exceed Standards 586 0 - 1 0.358 0.480 
Met Standards 586 0 - 1 0.297 0.457 
Voluntary Participant 586 0 - 1 0.486 0.500 
Fired 586 0 - 1 0.326 0.469 
Reprimanded 586 0 - 1 0.358 0.480 
Hotline 586 0 - 1 0.176 0.381 
Ethics Code 586 0 - 1 0.210 0.407 
Audits 586 0 - 1 0.206 0.405 
Self-Reporting 586 0 - 1 0.203 0.402 
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 Variable Name N Range Mean SD 
Ethics Guide 586 0 - 1 0.304 0.460 
Ethics Distinct 586 0 - 1 0.336 0.472 













Pollution 40% 586 0 - 1 0.486 0.500 
Years Experience 536 2 - 60 29.674 10.139 
Marital Binary 533 0 - 1 0.801 0.400 
Religion 538 0 - 3 1.678 1.194 
Coinvolved 531 0 - 2 1.827 0.452 
Personexp_No 586 0 - 1 0.323 0.468 
Personexp_Yes 586 0 - 1 0.509 0.500 
Envcommit 533 0 - 2 0.944 0.393 
Sit. Realistic 585 0 - 1 0.771 0.421 
Upper Level 586 0 - 1 0.548 0.498 
Code of Ethics 543 0 - 1 0.582 0.494 
Mand. Training 543 0 - 1 0.204 0.404 
Random Audits 543 0 - 1 0.035 0.184 
Anon. Hotline 543 0 - 1 0.122 0.327 
Top Man. Ethics 543 0 - 1 0.543 0.498 
Company Policy 543 0 - 1 0.346 0.499 
Size 585 0 - 370 9.141 32.22 
 
 
Tables 4 and 5 give the correlations between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable for the offending and overcompliance scenarios, respectively.  The 
full correlation matrix can be found in Appendix D.  The correlations reported here were 
run on the variables prior to imputation in order to examine significance, but the size of 
the correlation coefficients remained substantively the same pre- and post-imputation.  
Examining the offending scenario correlations, it is obvious that many of the 
survey items are correlated with offending intentions.  All of the relationships are in the 
expected directions, such that sanctions variables (certainty/severity of individual legal 
sanctions, certainty/severity of social sanctions, perceptions of the behavior as immoral 
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or unethical, certainty/severity of firm legal sanctions, certainty/severity of firm social 
sanctions, being likely to feel shame) are all associated with lowered offending 
intentions.  On the other hand, incentives (career benefits, desirability of behavior, thrill 
of behavior) are all associated with increased offending intentions.  
Most of the randomized vignette dimensions are not significantly correlated with 
offending intentions in the bivariate analysis.  That said, when the scenario depicts the 
corporation as having mandatory ethics training, when ethics are distinct from 
management decisions, and when the specific behavior depicted is the discharging of 
toxins into a local waterway, the likelihood of offending appears to be lessened (but these 
are only marginally significant).  Vignette dimensions depicting management decisions 
as being guided by ethics and the hypothetical manager as being asked to engage in 
offending by a supervisor are associated with heightened offending intentions (however, 
the “ethics guiding top management” correlation coefficient is only marginally 
significant).  If the respondent is married, is located in a company with a stronger 
environmental commitment, or is in a larger company, this is associated with increased 
offending intentions (although size is only marginally significant) while being in a 
company whose management takes ethical violations seriously is marginally associated 
with decreased offending.   
A few of the independent variables are correlated with each other at 0.8 or above 
(see Appendix D), indicating a need to assess multicollinearity in the regression 
equations.  Specifically, the correlations between firm-level legal sanction 
certainty/individual-level legal sanction certainty and firm-level legal sanction 
severity/firm-level social sanctions severity need to be examined more closely.   
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Turning to Table 5, we see again that many survey items are significantly 
correlated with the outcome variable.  All of the correlations are in the expected 
directions such that perceived rewards of the behavior (certainty/benefit of individual-
level social approbation, career benefits, desirability and thrill of behavior, likelihood of 
feeling good and pride if engaging in behavior, certainty/benefit of firm-level reputational 
enhancement) increase the likelihood of overcompliance while costs of the behavior 
(seeing the behavior as immoral or unethical) decreases overcompliance intentions. 
Few of the randomized vignette dimensions are correlated with overcompliance 
intentions at the bivariate level.  When the behavior is depicted as being common in the 
firm, when ethics guide managerial decisions, and when the hypothetical manager is 
asked to overcomply by a supervisor, overcompliance is more likely (although the 
“common in firm” effect is only marginally significant).  When the firm is depicted as 
having previously met standards and when the behavior is depicted as reducing pollution 
40% below required levels, then overcompliance is less likely. 
Regarding respondent characteristics, perceiving the situation as realistic is 
positively correlated with overcompliance intentions, while reporting that your own 
company has an anonymous hotline to report unethical/illegal conduct is associated with 
lowered overcompliance intentions.   
There is one correlation among the independent variables that suggests 
multicollinearity may be a problem (see Appendix D).  Specifically, perceived benefits to 
the firm’s reputation is correlated with perceived benefit of individual-level social 





Table 4: Correlations, Offending Scenario (N = 879) 
Independent Variable Bivariate Correlation with “Offend” 
Ind. Legal Cert. -0.123*** 
Ind. Legal Sev. -0.138*** 
Ind. Social Cert. -0.256*** 
Ind. Social Sev. -0.192*** 
Career 0.227*** 
Broad Moral -0.399*** 






Shame Sev. -0.162*** 
Firm Legal Cert. -0.073** 
Firm Legal Sev. -0.147*** 
Firm Social Cert. -0.151*** 
Firm Social Sev. -0.155*** 
Mandated -0.002 
Public -0.023 
Foreign Comp. 0.026 
Econ. Healthy -0.041 
Strengthens Comp. 0.021 
Green Market. -0.017 
Declining Rev. -0.011 
Common Firm 0.031 
Common Industry -0.009 
Exceed Stand. 0.032 
Met Stand. -0.037 




Ethics Code -0.059* 
Audits 0.05 
Self Reporting 0.015 
Ethics Guide 0.059* 
Ethics Distinct -0.061* 
Super. Asked 0.128*** 
Discharge Toxins -0.177*** 
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Independent Variable Bivariate Correlation with “Offend” 
Hazard. Labeling -0.046 
Years Exp. 0.034 






Sit. Realistic 0.060* 
Upper Level 0.003 
Code of Ethics -0.029 
Mandatory Training -0.005 
Random Audits -0.057 
Anon. Hotline -0.019 
Top Man. Ethics -0.064* 
Company Policy 0.019 
Size 0.060* 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table 5: Correlations, Overcompliance Scenario (N = 586) 
Independent Variable Bivariate Correlation with “Overcomply” 
Ind. Social Cert (OVER) 0.469*** 
Ind. Social Rewards 0.467*** 
Career 0.447*** 
Broad Moral -0.733*** 





Feel Good 0.588*** 
Pride 0.425*** 
Firm Social Cert. (OVER) 0.487*** 
Firm Social Rewards 0.458*** 
Mandated -0.055 
Public -0.066 
Foreign Comp. -0.021 
Econ. Healthy 0.043 
Strengthens Comp. 0.05 
Green Market. -0.036 
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Independent Variable Bivariate Correlation with “Overcomply” 
Declining Rev. -0.014 
Common firm 0.069* 
Common industry 0.066 
Exceed Stand. 0.027 
Met Stand.  -0.090** 




Ethics Code 0.067 
Audits -0.011 
Self Reporting -0.019 
Ethics Guide 0.080** 
Ethics Distinct -0.038 
Super. Asked 0.296*** 
Pollution 40 -0.127*** 
Years Exp. -0.029 






Sit. Realistic 0.183*** 
Upper Level 0.023 
Code of Ethics -0.026 
Mand. Training -0.004 
Random Audits 0.028 
Anon. Hotline -0.115*** 
Top Man. Ethics -0.031 





II. Hypothesis Testing 
 
Turning now to the results of my hypothesis tests, I will present the results for each 
hypothesis, discussing the results for the offending scenarios first, then the 
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overcompliance scenarios (with the exception of Hypothesis 5 which compares the two 
types of behaviors).  For hypotheses 1 – 4, all results for the offending scenarios are 
presented as Odds Ratios to make interpretation of the logistic regressions easier; the 
results for the overcompliance behaviors are reported as unstandardized betas.  To 
examine hypothesis 5 I present standardized coefficients for both models in order to 
compare models that differ in sample size, number of included variables, and 
operationalization of the dependent variable.  
 
a. Hypothesis 1 Results 
Hypothesis 1 stated that measures of the Legal, Social, and Economic licenses 
would predict offending and overcompliance.   
 
Offending Scenarios 
Table 6 shows the results for Hypothesis 1 for the offending scenarios.  There was 
some indication of multicollinearity between the firm-level legal sanctions severity scale 
and the firm-level reputational damage severity item.  I run two separate models for the 
offending scenarios, dropping one of the variables from each model in turn.  This is the 
case for all hypothesis tests using the offending data.   
Model 1 is the model that contains the legal severity scale and omits the 
reputational severity item.  In this model, the perceived severity of legal sanctions against 
the firm and the perceived certainty of tarnishing the firm’s reputation both reduce 
reported offending intentions.  Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in 
perceived severity of legal sanctions predicts about a 22% reduction in the intentions to 
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offend, while a unit increase in the perceived certainty of tarnishing the firm’s reputation 
predicts about an 8% reduction in offending intentions.  Model 2 contains the reputational 
damage severity item but omits the legal sanctions severity scale.  In this model, both the 
perceived certainty and severity of tarnishing the firm’s reputation reduce reported 
offending intentions by about 7% and 11% respectively.  It seems that publicizing 
offending would decrease the likelihood of offending, as well as increasing the severity 
of legal sanctions or the potential informal damages incurred by publicizing offending.  I 
would argue, therefore, that hypothesis 1 receives support in the offending scenarios—the 
legal and social license impact offending intentions, although the economic license does 
not.   
The same control variables are significant in both models.  We see that the 
specific type of offense is a strong predictor of offending intentions—respondents report 
that they are much less likely to discharge toxins or mislabel hazardous waste than they 
are to ignore an EPA compliance order.  Respondents are more likely to offend if they are 
married, if they see the environmental commitment of their own company as moving 
towards excessive, when their employer has an environmental compliance management 
policy in place, and when located in larger companies.  
 
Table 6: Regression of Offending Intentions on External License Measures and 
Control Variables (N = 879) 










Firm Legal Certainty 1.043 1.051 










 Firm Social Certainty 0.921** 0.929* 
Firm Social Severity -- 0.890*** 
Mandated 1.012 1.007 
Public 0.893 0.871 
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Foreign Comp. 0.933 0.939 
Econ. Healthy 0.775 0.797 
Strengthens Comp. 1.150 1.149 
Green Market. 0.966 0.969 








Discharge Toxins 0.304*** 0.298*** 
Hazard. Labeling 0.450*** 0.454*** 
Years Experience 1.004 1.003 
Marital Binary 1.566** 1.549** 
Religion 1.000 0.990 
Coinvolve 0.877 0.868 
Personexp_no 1.048 1.092 
Personexp_yes 0.917 0.946 
Env. Commitment 1.650** 1.656** 
Sit. Realistic 1.341 1.383 
Upper Level 0.970 0.966 
Code of Ethics 0.967 0.992 
Mand. Training 0.968 0.963 
Random Audits 0.590 0.560 
Anon. Hotline 0.850 0.856 
Top Man. Ethics 0.752 0.742 
Company Policy 1.515** 1.522** 
Size 1.002** 1.003*** 
N = 879 (after imputation) 




Turning now to overcompliance behaviors, Table 7 shows the results of the OLS 
regressions for the model including only measures of external licenses and controls.  
What we see in this table is that the firm’s reputation is highly salient in decisions to 
overcomply.  As one’s perceptions of both the certainty and benefit of firm-level 
reputation enhancement increases, so does the likelihood of engaging in overcompliance.  
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Specifically, a 10% increase in the certainty of enhancing the firm’s reputation predicts a 
3.64% increase in the likelihood of overcompliance.  A 10% increase in perceived 
benefits of enhancing the firm’s reputation leads to a 3.02% increase in the likelihood of 
overcompliance.  Counterintuitively, we see that when a firm is mandated to publicly 
announce pollution information the likelihood of overcompliance decreases by 5.05%.  It 
may be that the respondents associated mandated publicity with punishment for 
noncompliance and therefore predict that the manager is less likely to overcomply.
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Regarding the control variables, the type of behavior depicted has a strong 
influence on behavioral intentions—specifically, individuals are much less likely to 
reduce pollution 40% below required levels than they are to enhance security around 
toxic waste sites.  They are also less likely to overcomply if they report their own 
companies as having an anonymous hotline to report unethical or illegal conduct.  They 
are more likely to overcomply if their religion is more important to them, if they see the 
scenario as realistic, and when their company has random ethics audits.  
Overall, hypothesis 1 is partially supported for the overcompliance behaviors—
firm reputation enhancements strongly encourage overcompliance, mandated publicity 
discourages it, and firm-level economic variables seem to have little impact.   
 
Table 7: Regression of Overcompliance Intentions on External License Measures (N 
= 586) 










 Firm Social Certainty (OVER) 0.364*** 
Firm Social Rewards 0.302*** 
Mandated -0.505** 
Public -0.120 
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 Reasoning that this relationship may be driven by one type of overcompliance found that publicity 















Foreign Comp. 0.198 
Econ. Healthy 0.259 
Strengthens Comp. 0.089 
Green Market. -0.216 








Pollution 40 -0.862*** 
Years Experience -0.010 






Sit. Realistic 0.699** 
Upper Level 0.106 
Code of Ethics 0.050 
Mand. Training 0.383 
Random Audits 1.366** 
Anon. Hotline -1.356*** 
Top Man. Ethics -0.343 
Company Policy -0.045 
Size -0.001 
N = 586 (after imputation) 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
b. Hypothesis 2 Results 
Hypothesis 2 specified that measures of Corporate Culture would predict 
offending and overcompliance.  I also expected that the effect of the external license 
measures would lessen when the corporate culture measures are included in the 







The first column in Table 8 shows the regression of the corporate culture (and 
control) variables on offending intentions.  Only one corporate culture variable is 
significant, but has a very strong impact.  When the hypothetical manager is depicted as 
being asked by a higher-level manager (vs. asks an employee) the odds of offending 
increase by about 69%.  The second and third columns in Table 8 add the external license 
measures into the regression.  I expected the impact of the external licenses to become 
less salient with the inclusion of the corporate culture measures, but this does not appear 
to be the case.  The external licenses continue to exert similar effects as in the prior 
analysis; the perceived severity of legal sanctions and the perceived certainty and severity 
of tarnishing the firm’s reputation all continue to reduce offending intentions and the 
magnitudes of the coefficients is similar to the previous model.   If anything, the impact 
of the certainty of reputational sanctions strengthens when I account for the internal 
corporate culture measures.  Hypothesis 2 received little support when examining 
environmental offending intentions.   
 
Table 8: Regression of Offending Intentions on Corporate Culture and External 
License Measures (N = 879) 










Firm Legal Certainty  1.035 1.044 










 Firm Social Certainty  0.909** 0.916** 
Firm Social Severity  -- 0.899*** 
Mandated  1.034 1.030 












 Foreign Comp.  0.878 0.885 
Econ. Healthy  0.769 0.787 
Strengthen Comp.  1.177 1.173 
Green Market.  0.927 0.928 
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 Variable Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













Common Firm 1.268 1.258 1.277 
Common Ind. 1.195 1.212 1.218 
Exceed Standards 1.227 1.270 1.271 
Met Standards 0.960 0.950 0.956 
Voluntary Participant 0.847 0.824 0.828 
Fired 1.123 1.132 1.136 
Reprimanded 1.105 1.165 1.164 
Hotline 1.171 1.188 1.220 
Ethics Code 0.864 0.942 0.953 
Audits 1.302 1.342 1.357 
Self-Reporting 1.086 1.098 1.123 
Ethics Guide 1.105 1.164 1.180 
Ethics Distinct 0.808 0.832 0.822 








Discharge Toxins 0.309*** 0.311*** 0.306*** 
Hazard. Labeling 0.439*** 0.430*** 0.433*** 
Years Experience 1.008 1.005 1.004 
Marital Binary 1.552* 1.660** 1.638** 
Religion 1.022 0.998 0.988 
Coinvolved 0.893 0.866 0.856 
Personexp_No 1.152 1.185 1.225 
Personexp_Yes 1.053 1.045 1.075 
Envcommit 1.816** 1.745** 1.755** 
Sit. Realistic 1.493 1.366 1.400 
Upper Level 1.017 0.977 0.974 
Code of Ethics 0.936 0.960 0.983 
Mand. Training 0.998 0.958 0.952 
Random Audits 0.635 0.665 0.637 
Anon. Hotline 0.879 0.857 0.858 
Top Man. Ethics 0.690* 0.708* 0.703* 
Company Policy 1.427* 1.509** 1.515** 
Size 1.002** 1.002** 1.002** 
N = 879 (after imputation) 




Table 9 provides the regression of overcompliance intentions on the corporate 
culture variables in Model 1, and then compares the results of that regression to a model 
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that includes the external license measures in Model 2.  In the first model, four corporate 
culture variables significantly increase the likelihood of overcompliance.  Specifically, 
overcompliance is more likely when it is depicted as common in the firm (7.99% more 
likely) or industry (7.49% more likely; the reference category compares no mention of 
behavior being common in the firm/industry), 5.12% more likely when the hypothetical 
corporation’s management is guided by ethical considerations (the reference category 
says that ethics is irrelevant to top management decisions), and is 16.53% more likely 
when the scenario says that the hypothetical manager is asked to do so by a supervisor (as 
opposed to asking an employee). 
When adding in the measures of the external licenses, the magnitudes of the 
corporate culture coefficients are somewhat reduced, although the impact of the company 
having previously met EPA standards (vs. having violated standards) becomes 
significant.  This variable, though, reduces the likelihood of overcompliance.  It may be 
that overcompliance instrumentally serves to get back into the “good graces” of 
regulators after previous episodes of noncompliance.  The effects of the external licenses 
remain the same as in the prior model.  Overall, hypothesis 2 receives mixed support in 
the overcompliance scenario.  
Table 9: Overcompliance Scenario, Hypothesis 2 Results (N = 586) 











Firm Social Certainty 
(OVER) 
 0.326*** 
Firm Social Rewards  0.308*** 
Mandated  -0.415** 













Foreign Comp.  0.211 
Econ. Healthy  0.214 
Strengthens Comp.  0.083 
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 Variable Name Model 1 Model 2 
Green Market.  -0.204 













Common Firm 0.799*** 0.599** 
Common Ind. 0.749** 0.484* 
Exceed Standards 0.131 -0.089 
Met Standards -0.465 -0.486** 
Voluntary Participant 0.109 0.036 
Fired 0.279 0.150 
Reprimanded 0.282 0.143 
Hotline -0.327 -0.403 
Ethics Code 0.157 -0.241 
Audits 0.027 -0.120 
Self-Reporting 0.059 -0.202 
Ethics Guide 0.512* 0.220 
Ethics Distinct 0.092 -0.221 








Pollution 40% -0.637*** -0.847*** 
Years Experience -0.011 -0.008 
Marital Binary 0.340 0.278 
Religion 0.274*** 0.245** 
Coinvolved 0.273 0.173 
Personexp_No -0.767* -0.318 
Personexp_Yes -0.590 -0.404 
Envcommit -0.157 -0.061 
Sit. Realistic 0.744** 0.466* 
Upper Level 0.249 0.102 
Code of Ethics -0.274 -0.143 
Mand. Training 0.595* 0.599* 
Random Audits 1.499*** 1.563*** 
Anon. Hotline -1.594*** -1.565*** 
Top Man. Ethics -0.005 -0.144 
Company Policy 0.171 0.080 
Size -0.001 -0.001 
N = 586 (after imputation) 






c. Hypothesis 3 results 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the firm-level external licenses/corporate culture 
measures would predict or be correlated with the individual-level RCT measures.  Table 
10 shows the regressions of the 13 individual-level variables on all of the firm-level 
variables, using the offending data.  Essentially, every single RCT variable is 
significantly associated with at least two of the firm-level measures.  To take one 
example, a higher level of perceived severity of legal sanctions at the firm level is 
strongly associated with higher perceived severity of legal sanctions at the individual 
level (p<0.01).  However, when the firm is depicted as being publicly owned then the 
respondent perceives the severity of legal sanctions as being marginally less (p<0.10).  In 
Table 11, the same regressions are run omitting the legal sanctions severity variable.  
Here, the perceived severity of damaging the firm’s reputation is positively associated 
with the perceived severity of legal sanctions at the individual level (p<0.01), but none of 
the other main independent variables of interest are even marginally significant.  
Table 12 shows the Hypotheses 3 test for the overcompliance scenarios.  Again, 
every single individual-level variable is predicted by/correlated with at least of the two 
firm-level variables.  What’s interesting is that the perceived benefits (both certainty and 
strength) for the firm’s reputation is significant for all models.      
Overall, Hypothesis 3 is supported for both offending and overcompliance 
intentions, as the firm-level variables are associated with individual-level perceptions of 




Table 10: Regression of Individual-level Rational Choice Measures on Firm-Level Measures (Offending Scenarios, 





























6.704c -0.009 1.045c 0.007 0.161 0.264a 0.134 0.169 0.084 -0.003 -0.054 0.924 0.023 
Firm Legal 
Severity 
0.460b 1.416c 0.954b 3.665c 
-
0.497c 
0.557c 0.451c 0.512c 0.086 -0.166a -0.075 0.603c 1.000c 
Firm Social 
Certainty 
0.077 -0.025 1.908c 0.327c 
-
0.181c 
0.124a 0.103 0.283c 0.055 -0.099c 0.018 0.782b 0.056 
Firm Social 
Severity 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Mandated 0.022 0.174 0.089 -0.289 -0.098 -0.057 -0.313 -0.044 -0.132 0.085 0.006 1.644 -0.042 
Public -0.543
b -0.363a 0.138 -0.338 -0.017 -0.052 -0.197 -0.134 0.011 -0.031 -0.088 0.629 -0.113 
Foreign Comp. -0.636
b 0.085 -0.125 0.386 0.098 0.098 -0.076 -0.336 0.196 0.053 -0.235a 0.878 0.078 




0.143 0.140 0.057 -0.060 -0.120 -0.206 1.254 0.261 
Strengthen 
Comp. 
-0.220 0.185 0.264 0.480 0.262 0.392a 0.174 0.074 0.204 -0.226 -0.081 0.620 0.113 
Green Market. 0.129 0.127 0.456 -0.052 0.241 -0.086 0.281 0.237 0.141 -0.039 -0.051 0.799 0.279
b 
Declining Rev. 0.204 -0.117 -0.326 -0.249 -0.148 0.039 -0.148 0.339
a 0.018 0.051 -0.173 0.755 -0.016 
Common Firm -0.398 -0.055 0.240 0.171 0.199 0.324 -0.239 -0.285 
-
0.324a 
-0.041 0.119 0.934 -0.029 
Common Ind. -0.124 -0.146 -0.176 -0.114 0.312 -0.106 -0.140 -0.457
a -0.110 0.016 0.044 0.869 0.020 
Exceed 
Standards 
-0.136 -0.094 -0.316 -0.011 0.122 -0.290 -0.115 -0.012 
-
0.364b 
0.216a 0.070 1.924 -0.225 
Met Standards -0.066 0.150 0.202 -0.150 0.135 -0.471
a 0.146 -0.137 -0.101 0.318b 0.020 1.560 -0.122 
Voluntary 
Participant 
0.042 -0.030 -0.312 -0.050 -0.287 -0.059 0.316 0.020 0.244a -0.081 0.094 1.092 -0.095 
Fired 0.015 -0.219 0.556 -0.243 0.092 -0.151 -0.270 0.135 -0.142 0.011 0.003 1.067 -0.060 
Reprimanded -0.165 -0.153 0.723 -0.398 -0.186 0.214 0.290 0.156 -0.149 -0.106 0.088 0.841 -0.101 
Hotline -0.156 0.182 0.135 0.608 0.151 0.085 0.424 -0.004 0.056 0.046 -0.012 1.407 0.208 
Ethics Code 0.126 0.332 -0.366 0.091 0.494
a 0.556a 0.733b 0.159 0.339a -0.047 0.161 0.216 0.155 
Audits -0.365 0.134 0.487 0.057 0.156 0.095 0.671
b -0.125 0.187 0.022 0.197 0.291 0.237 
Self-Reporting 0.263 0.330 -0.676 0.124 0.012 -0.220 0.373 -0.143 -0.146 -0.024 0.036 0.899 0.203 
Ethics Guide 0.035 -0.028 0.273 -0.070 -0.026 0.410 0.494
b 0.183 0.028 0.021 0.077 0.553 0.126 
Ethics Distinct -0.049 -0.072 0.238 -0.026 -0.213 0.202 0.254 -0.070 0.221 0.258
a 0.016 0.447a 0.162 
Super. Asked -0.390 0.257 -1.169
b 0.268 1.021c -0.711c -0.521b -0.656c -0.145 0.251b 0.136 1.906 -0.013 
Discharge 
Toxins 
0.627b -0.006 1.510c 0.095 -0.271 1.092c 0.805c 1.092c 0.168 -0.544c -0.069 0.180c 0.215 
Hazard. 
Labeling 
0.897c -0.133 0.793 -0.147 
-
0.480b 































0.004 -0.010 0.006 -0.033 0.007 -0.010 0.012 0.015 -0.010 0.013a 0.009 1.038a -0.012 
Marital Binary -0.366 0.036 -0.029 -0.800
a -0.271 -0.381 -0.235 0.365 -0.194 0.229 -0.019 0.848 -0.135 
Religion -0.304
b 0.149 -0.300 -0.207 0.139 0.141 -0.042 -0.102 0.075 -0.153c 0.094 0.841 -0.144b 
Coinvolved -0.014 0.012 0.205 0.074 0.028 -0.189 0.135 -0.119 -0.125 0.110 -0.175 1.035 -0.052 
Personexp_No -0.296 -0.349 -0.557 -0.083 -0.315 0.068 0.511 0.695 -0.010 0.065 -0.380 0.685 0.081 
Personexp_Ye
s 
-0.908a -0.505a -0.454 -0.477 -0.213 -0.028 0.191 0.603 
-
0.466b 
0.098 -0.166 0.530 -0.105 
Envcommit -0.624 -0.015 0.086 0.118 -0.001 -0.478 -0.519 -0.229 0.243 0.158 -0.042 1.378 -0.225 
Sit. Realistic 0.288 0.134 0.812 1.088
a 1.279c 0.492 -0.004 -1.025c -0.004 -0.132 0.154 0.393 0.595c 
Upper Level 0.244 -0.253 0.108 -0.069 -0.092 0.117 -0.522
b -0.183 0.055 -0.161 0.122 1.784 -0.043 
Code of Ethics 1.095
c 0.252 1.407b 0.376 0.073 0.461a 0.192 0.276 0.251 -0.131 0.200 0.480 0.122 
Mand. 
Training 
0.846a -0.539a 0.115 -0.948 -0.467 -0.345 0.582a 0.334 -0.014 0.461a 0.142 1.239 -0.299 
Random 
Audits 
-1.267 -0.220 -0.555 -1.728 -0.587 -0.234 -0.415 0.089 0.219 0.154 -0.128 2.512 -0.314 
Anon. Hotline 0.131 -0.064 -1.229 0.651 0.160 -0.073 -0.145 -0.754
a -0.067 -0.292 -0.277 1.248 0.043 
Top Man. 
Ethics 
-0.335 0.060 0.579 0.556 -0.238 0.047 0.597b -0.072 0.261 -0.271b -0.40c 0.515 0.098 
Company 
Policy 
0.386 0.037 -0.140 -0.017 -0.057 -0.458 -0.641b -0.245 -0.231 -0.2020 0.115 2.662 0.042 
Size -0.003
c -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
-
0.004c 








Note: these results are reported as Odds Ratios, due to the dichotomous dependent variable and the need to run logistic 
regression 
 
Table 11: Regression of Individual-level Rational Choice Measures on Firm-Level Measures (Offending Scenarios, 





























6.702c -0.008 1.017c -0.114 0.161 0.243a 0.119 0.154 0.075 0.004 -0.055 0.930 -0.017 
Firm Legal 
Severity 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Firm Social 0.084 0.010 1.874

































0.152 0.430c 0.450c 1.779c 
-
0.152c 
0.280c 0.224c 0.240c 0.075b -0.093b -0.022 0.731c 0.525c 
Mandated 0.025 0.185 0.098 -0.252 -0.101 -0.052 -0.308 -0.040 -0.131 0.084 0.006 1.475 -0.032 
Public -0.502
a -0.236 0.217 -0.036 -0.062 -0.006 -0.160 -0.091 0.017 -0.045 -0.094 0.567 -0.033 
Foreign Comp. -0.650
b 0.041 -0.152 0.279 0.113 0.082 -0.089 -0.351 0.194 0.057 -0.233a 0.914 0.049 
Econ. Healthy -0.511 0.104 0.665 0.620 
-
0.469b 
0.084 0.092 0.001 -0.067 -0.104 -0.196 1.382 0.155 
Strengthen 
Comp. 
-0.209 0.225 0.272 0.503 0.248 0.394a 0.177 0.078 0.200 -0.226b -0.083 0.647 0.114 
Green Market. 0.136 0.151 0.456 -0.059 0.233 -0.088 0.280 0.236 0.138 -0.037 -0.052 0.868 0.274
b 
Declining Rev. 0.215 -0.084 -0.308 -0.188 -0.160 0.048 -0.140 0.348
a 0.018 0.048 -0.175 0.656 -0.001 
Common Firm -0.425 -0.136 0.191 -0.013 0.227 0.297 -0.262 -0.311 
-
0.326b 
-0.033 0.123 0.993 -0.078 
Common Ind. -0.128 -0.157 -0.200 -0.212 0.316 -0.121 -0.153 -0.469
a -0.116 0.022 0.044 0.871 -0.010 
Exceed 
Standards 
-0.126 -0.060 -0.307 0.019 0.110 -0.286 -0.112 -0.007 -0.367 0.216a 0.068 1.769 -0.220a 
Met Standards -0.066 0.149 0.208 -0.125 0.136 -0.467
a 0.149 -0.134 -0.099 0.317b 0.020 1.458 -0.114 
Voluntary 
Participant 
0.021 -0.099 -0.335 -0.131 -0.263 -0.070 0.307 0.007 0.247 -0.079 0.097 1.207 -0.111 
Fired -0.002 -0.275 0.545 -0.274 0.112 -0.155 -0.274 0.129 -0.137 0.010 0.006 0.976 -0.062 
Reprimanded -0.188 -0.235 0.721 -0.385 -0.157 0.219 0.293 0.155 -0.138 -0.111 0.092 0.759 -0.085 
Hotline -0.209 0.010 0.038 0.235 0.210 0.030 0.380 -0.057 0.051 0.061 -0.002 1.569 0.110 
Ethics Code 0.100 0.245 -0.412 -0.084 0.525
a 0.531a 0.712b 0.134 0.337a -0.040 0.166 0.223a 0.110 
Audits -0.393 0.037 0.454 -0.060 0.190 0.079 0.658
b -0.142 0.190 0.024 0.203 0.296 0.213 
Self-Reporting 0.225 0.208 -0.757 -0.190 0.053 -0.268 0.336 -0.186 -0.154 -0.010 0.043 1.018 0.117 
Ethics Guide 0.016 -0.088 0.225 -0.258 -0.005 0.382 0.471
a 0.158 0.022 0.030 0.080 0.596 0.073 
Ethics Distinct -0.021 0.011 0.295 0.195 -0.243 0.236 0.282 -0.039 0.227 0.248
a 0.012 0.479 0.222 
Super. Asked -0.394 0.230 -1.117
b 0.491 1.030c -0.67c -0.492b -0.628c -0.125 0.235b 0.137 1.907 0.065 
Discharge 
Toxins 
0.628b -0.018 1.561c 0.311 -0.268 1.129c 0.834c 1.119c 0.185 -0.558c -0.068 0.152c 0.288b 
Hazard. 
Labeling 
0.874c -0.207 0.755 -0.295 
-
0.455b 
0.956c 0.481b 0.823c 0.202 -0.420c -0.263b 0.567 0.050 
Years 
Experience 
0.003 -0.014 0.008 -0.027 0.008 -0.009 0.013 0.015 -0.009 0.013a 0.010 1.029 -0.009 
Marital Binary -0.346 0.101 0.012 -0.639 -0.294 -0.357 -0.215 0.387 -0.191 0.222 -0.023 0.824 -0.092 
Religion -0.293
b 0.178a -0.264 -0.062 0.128 0.163 -0.024 -0.083 0.082 -0.161c 0.092 0.774 -0.101a 
Coinvolved -0.002 0.045 0.236 0.201 0.016 -0.170 0.151 -0.102 -0.120 0.103 -0.177 1.030 -0.015 
Personexp_No -0.358 -0.535
a -0.698 -0.627 -0.249 -0.017 0.443 0.619 -0.026 0.092 -0.370 0.676 -0.071 
Personexp_Ye -0.962































Envcommit -0.635 -0.049 0.078 0.101 0.011 -0.479 -0.520 -0.233 0.246 0.158 -0.040 1.377 -0.225 
Sit. Realistic 0.216 -0.084 0.668 0.542 1.357
c 0.409 -0.072 -1.102c -0.016 -0.107 0.165 0.380a 0.447b 
Upper Level 0.245 -0.259 0.134 0.037 -0.091 0.134 -0.508
b -0.169 0.063 -0.168 0.122 1.782 -0.007 
Code of Ethics 1.060
c 0.151 1.310b -0.010 0.110 0.400 0.144 0.224 0.235 -0.111 0.205 0.509 0.009 
Mand. 
Training 
0.843a -0.560 0.118 -0.941a -0.461 -0.341 0.583a 0.334 -0.011 0.459b 0.143 1.057 -0.293 
Random 
Audits 
-1.216 -0.079 -0.407 -1.137 -0.636 -0.141 -0.341 0.169 0.243 0.124 -0.135 2.059 -0.138 
Anon. Hotline 0.130 -0.064 -1.234 0.634 0.161 -0.076 -0.147 -0.757
a -0.068 -0.291 -0.277 1.330 0.037 
Top Man. 
Ethics 
-0.306 0.155 0.625 0.726a -0.272 0.071 0.617b -0.047 0.262 -0.277b -0.41c 0.510 0.140 
Company 
Policy 
0.391 0.062 -0.149 -0.055 -0.066 -0.466a -0.647b -0.249 -0.237 -0.198 0.113 2.848a 0.025 
Size -0.003
c -0.001a -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
-
0.004c 








Note: these results are reported as Odds Ratios, due to the dichotomous dependent variable and the need to run logistic 
regression 
 
Table 12: Regression of Individual-level Rational Choice Measures on Firm-Level Measures (Overcompliance 




















1.977c 0.298b 0.384c -0.685c -0.259c -0.237c -0.177c 0.425c 0.403c 1.720c 1.595c 
Firm Social 
Rewards 
0.673c 3.119c 0.113b -1.045c -0.356c -0.193c -0.198c 0.321c 0.220c 1.373c 1.334c 
Mandated -1.159
b -0.092 -0.321 0.934b 0.000 0.426a -0.013 -0.347 0.080 -0.506b 0.603b 
Public -0.913
a -0.413 -0.227 0.076 0.416 0.162 -0.085 0.071 0.043 0.928 -0.535b 
Foreign Comp. -0.060 -0.104 -0.065 -0.181 0.077 0.055 -0.221 -0.025 -0.306 1.367 0.955 
Econ. Healthy 0.864 -0.371 -0.078 -0.275 -0.186 0.071 -0.172 0.231 0.073 1.605 1.296 
Strengthens Comp. 1.326
b 0.424 0.527b -0.447 -0.417 -0.235 -0.019 0.358 0.882c 2.027b 1.986b 
Green Market. -0.241 0.089 -0.115 0.163 -0.048 -0.032 0.223 -0.030 -0.205 1.444 0.741 
Declining Rev. 0.400 0.534 -0.316 -0.457 -0.108 0.170 -0.124 0.212 0.148 1.067 1.400 
Common Firm 0.062 -0.231 -0.027 -0.775 -0.240 -0.779




















Common Ind. 0.763 0.803 0.354 -0.823 -0.315 -0.692
b -0.178 0.190 0.026 1.780 1.027 
Exceed Standards 0.891 0.265 -0.124 -0.133 -0.783
b -0.316 -0.153 0.692c -0.336 1.999a 1.262 
Met Standards 0.875 -0.175 0.103 0.645 -0.056 -0.317 0.073 -0.036 -0.148 0.634 1.162 
Voluntary 
Participant 
-0.360 -0.015 0.275 -0.041 -0.286 -0.266 -0.052 0.056 -0.053 0.948 1.008 
Fired 0.077 0.585 0.098 0.306 -0.795
b -0.266 0.051 0.114 -0.104 0.545 0.630 
Reprimanded 0.599 0.506 0.426
a -0.292 -0.397 -0.236 0.060 0.210 0.450 0.908 1.579 
Hotline 0.422 0.640 0.063 1.108 -0.277 0.302 -0.065 -0.339 -0.286 0.568 0.844 
Ethics Code -0.536 0.396 -0.054 0.700 -0.666 0.408 -0.326 -0.057 0.052 1.056 0.569 
Audits -0.059 1.215 0.402 1.198
a -0.550 0.253 -0.139 0.184 -0.006 0.563 0.566 
Self-Reporting 0.306 -0.139 -0.173 1.240
a -0.265 0.084 0.279 -0.323 -0.101 0.704 0.665 
Ethics Guide 0.402 0.249 0.190 -0.426 -0.199 -0.484 -0.330
a 0.150 0.190 0.854 1.290 
Ethics Distinct 0.172 -0.266 -0.095 0.425 0.178 0.189 -0.084 -0.162 -0.015 1.393 0.755 
Super. Asked 0.292 -0.707 0.688
c -1.676c -1.112c -1.332c -0.400 0.347 0.141 1.393 0.687 
Pollution 40% 0.600 0.694
a 0.224 1.756c 0.635b 0.871c 0.237 -0.366a 0.843c 0.375c 0.783 
Years Experience 0.043 -0.043
a 0.001 0.027 0.008 -0.005 0.011 -0.018a -0.020 0.985 0.979 
Marital Binary 0.113 -0.274 0.080 -0.338 -0.126 -0.281 0.165 0.426 -0.260 1.196 0.877 
Religion 0.144 0.379
a 0.036 -0.759c -0.296b -0.265b -0.087 0.253b -0.019 1.375b 1.186 
Coinvolved -0.940 0.504 -0.198 -0.878 -0.586
a -0.195 -0.387a 0.280 0.115 1.589 1.820a 
Personexp_No 0.802 0.171 -0.102 -0.144 0.312 0.478 -0.081 -0.067 -0.684 0.829 0.758 
Personexp_Yes 0.311 -0.273 -0.388 -0.385 0.059 0.327 -0.363 -0.041 -0.319 0.929 0.838 
Envcommit -2.117
c -0.217 -0.290 0.079 0.218 0.614a -0.363a 0.201 0.245 0.843 1.324 
Sit. Realistic 2.083
c -0.313 1.097c -0.073 0.306 -0.978c 0.136 0.286 0.127 1.742a 2.058b 
Upper Level 0.525 -0.092 0.033 -0.391 -0.246 -0.080 0.013 0.427
a 0.162 1.120 1.512 
Code of Ethics -0.343 -1.024
a 0.113 0.284 0.376 0.324 -0.001 -0.214 0.110 0.924 1.258 
Mand. Training 0.151 -0.223 -0.168 -0.884 -0.157 -0.547 -0.420
a -0.182 -0.272 2.099 0.877 
Random Audits -1.475 -2.442 -0.054 -1.060 -0.153 -0.149 -0.680 -0.095 -0.592 0.924 0.488 
Anon. Hotline -1.121 -0.569 -0.359 2.043
b 1.118a 1.037a 0.439 -0.210 -0.021 0.368 0.683 
Top Man. Ethics -0.044 0.208 0.022 0.280 -0.225 0.083 0.129 -0.056 -0.023 0.914 0.900 
Company Policy 0.477 0.171 0.377 0.036 -0.081 -0.383 0.289 0.104 -0.192 0.807 0.607 
Size -0.003 0.010













Hypothesis 4 results 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that individual-level RCT measures predict offending and 
overcompliance intentions, and also that the impact of the corporate-level variables 
become weaker when individual-level measures are included.   
 
Offending Scenarios 
Table 13 shows the model for the offending behaviors that include only the 
individual-level (and control) variables in the first column.  In this model,  perceptions 
that engaging in the behavior would benefit one’s career, that the behavior is desirable, 
and that the behavior is thrilling all increase the likelihood of offending (by 12.6%, 
19.6%, and 21.5%, respectively).  Perceptions that the behavior is generally immoral 
significantly decrease the likelihood of offending by 55.3%.   
Models 2 and 3 are merely duplicates of the Hypothesis 2 analyses—they are 
presented here to more easily compare them to the full model.  As mentioned above, I 
expected the magnitudes of the firm-level variables to decrease when adding in the 
individual-level considerations.  This is generally supported in that the perceptions of 
firm-level criminal severity, reputational certainty/severity, and being asked by a 
supervisor are all reduced to non-significance.  What is interesting is that the certainty of 
firm-level legal sanctions becomes significant in the full model and increases the 
likelihood of offending.  This positive association appears to be driven by the certainty of 
the firm being sued (analyses not shown); perhaps, after accounting for potential 
individual-level consequences, being sued is seen as a form of payment that makes 
offending more acceptable.  Alternatively, this relationship is one that is subject to 
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temporal confusion—it may be that respondents who say that they are more likely to 
offend then predict a higher likelihood of legal sanctions against the corporation.  
Also noteworthy is that the individual-level legal sanctions certainty variable also 
becomes significant in the full model, but has a deterrent effect.  The two legal certainty 
variables are highly correlated, but multicollinearity doesn’t seem to be problem here 
according to standard tests (Williams, n.d.): none of the VIFs in the regression model are 
above 5, both of the variables are statistically significant (meaning that their standard 
errors are not likely to be inflated), and when I ran the regressions on different 
subsamples and dropping various measures from the models the coefficients of the legal 
certainty variables are consistent.  In fact, when I drop either of the legal certainty 
variables from the model the remaining variable becomes non-significant which omplies 
that dropping one of the variables results in omitted variable bias.   The main indication 
of collinearity is that the correlation between estimated coefficients is above .8.   
Although the two measures are highly correlated,  they are theoretically distinct 
(an argument supported by the factor analysis methods employed to create the scales).  
Since they exhibit consistent effects even under different regression models, I’m 
confident in these results.  However, it will be important to test these relationships again 
using different methods and samples to determine the consistency of this finding.   
 
Table 13: Regression of Offending Intentions on Individual-Level and Firm-Level 
Factors (N = 879) 








s Ind. Legal Certainty 0.985   0.716* 0.716* 
Ind. Legal Severity 0.888   0.905 0.882 
Ind. Social Certainty 0.923   0.879 0.864 
Ind. Social Severity 0.998   1.023 1.095 
Career  1.126***   1.101*** 1.102*** 
Broad Morality 0.447***   0.422*** 0.419*** 
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 Variable Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Social Contract 0.885   0.887 0.890 
Relativist 0.888   0.881 0.891 
Ethical 0.932   0.947 0.950 
Desirable 1.196**   1.221** 1.224** 
Thrilling 1.215***   1.206*** 1.209*** 
Shame 0.512   0.464 0.486 










Firm Legal Certainty  1.035 1.044 1.454** 1.468** 










 Firm Rep. Certainty  0.909** 0.916** 0.999 1.007 
Firm Rep. Severity  -- 0.899*** -- 0.933 
Mandated  1.034 1.030 1.015 1.019 













Foreign Comp.  0.878 0.885 0.850 0.853 
Econ. Healthy  0.769 0.787 0.833 0.830 
Strengthen Comp.  1.177 1.173 1.395* 1.396* 
Green Market.  0.927 0.928 0.926 0.924 













Common Firm  1.258 1.277 1.336 1.345 
Common Ind.  1.212 1.218 1.136 1.143 
Exceed Standards  1.270 1.271 1.140 1.143 
Met Standards  0.950 0.956 0.834 0.838 
Voluntary Participant  0.824 0.828 0.808 0.810 
Fired  1.132 1.136 1.102 1.098 
Reprimanded  1.165 1.164 1.248 1.248 
Hotline  1.188 1.220 1.369 1.371 
Ethics Code  0.942 0.953 1.151 1.156 
Audits  1.342 1.357 1.436 1.436 
Self-Reporting  1.098 1.123 1.126 1.137 
Ethics Guide  1.164 1.180 1.283 1.295 
Ethics Distinct  0.832 0.822 0.791 0.787 








Discharge Toxins 0.404*** 0.311*** 0.306*** 0.402*** 0.396*** 
Hazard. Labeling 0.584*** 0.430*** 0.433*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 
Years Experience 0.999 1.005 1.004 1.000 1.000 
Marital Binary 1.553* 1.660** 1.638** 1.696** 1.708** 
Religion 0.989 0.998 0.988 0.991 0.992 
Coinvolved 0.860 0.866 0.856 0.819 0.814 
Personexp_No 1.370 1.185 1.225 1.420 1.447 
Personexp_Yes 0.989 1.045 1.075 1.054 1.078 
Envcommit 1.644* 1.745** 1.755** 1.666* 1.663* 
Sit. Realistic 1.241 1.366 1.400 1.267 1.273 
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 Variable Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Upper Level 0.936 0.977 0.974 0.956 0.950 
Code of Ethics 0.984 0.960 0.983 1.038 1.052 
Mand. Training 0.884 0.958 0.952 0.914 0.916 
Random Audits 0.743 0.665 0.637 0.657 0.651 
Anon. Hotline 0.867 0.857 0.858 0.912 0.9909 
Top Man. Ethics 0.944 0.708* 0.703* 0.878 0.870 
Company Policy 1.463* 1.509** 1.515** 1.438 1.437 
Size 1.003*** 1.002** 1.002** 1.002** 1.002** 
N = 879 (after imputation) 




Table 14 depicts the results of the regression of overcompliance on the individual-
level rational choice variables and controls alone in the first column, the results of the 
hypothesis 2 tests examining all of the corporate-level variables, and then the results for 
the full regression model that includes all of the individual- and corporate-level variables 
of interest.   
A few individual-level variables impact overcompliance behaviors.  Perceived 
career benefits, the thrill of the behavior and the likelihood of feeling good all increase 
the likelihood of overcompliance (by 1.41%, 0.97%, and 9.09%, respectively) while 
perceiving the behavior as generally immoral, culturally and traditionally unacceptable, 
and unethical decreases the likelihood of overcompliance (by 12.66%, 2.36%, 1.20% 
respectively).  Counterintuitively, the likelihood of feeling pride decreases the likelihood 
of overcompliance as well.  It may be that overcompliance is thought to be an altruistic 
behavior, while feelings of “pride” are associated with self-interest.   
When comparing the full model to the model from hypothesis 2, we find support 
for the second part of hypothesis 4.  The impact of firm reputational benefits and 
mandating public information become non-significant and the magnitudes of the other 
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corporate-level variables are reduced. Overall, it seems that hypothesis 4 receives support 
in the overcompliance scenarios.   
 
Table 14: Regression of Overcompliance Intentions on Individual-Level and Firm-
Level Factors (N = 586) 









Ind. Social Certainty 
(OVER) 
-0.018  -0.099 
Ind. Social Rewards 0.073  0.123 
Career 0.141***  0.114*** 
Broad Morality -1.266***  -1.167*** 
Social Contract -0.077  -0.069 
Relativist -0.236*  -0.139 
Ethical -0.120*  -0.101 
Desirable 0.049  0.046 
Thrilling 0.097***  0.100*** 
Feel Good 0.909**  0.856* 











Firm Social Certainty 
(OVER) 
 0.326*** 0.078 
Firm Social Rewards  0.308*** 0.007 
Mandated  -0.415** -0.194 













Foreign Comp.  0.211 0.189 
Econ. Healthy  0.214 0.143 
Strengthens Comp.  0.083 -0.177 
Green Market.  -0.204 -0.159 













Common Firm  0.599** 0.400** 
Common Ind.  0.484* 0.199 
Exceed Standards  -0.089 -0.148 
Met Standards  -0.486** -0.309* 
Voluntary Participant  0.036 -0.020 
Fired  0.150 0.165 
Reprimanded  0.143 0.006 
Hotline  -0.403 -0.141 
Ethics Code  -0.241 -0.194 
Audits  -0.120 0.013 
Self-Reporting  -0.202 0.095 
Ethics Guide  0.220 0.060 
Ethics Distinct  -0.221 -0.123 
Super. Asked  1.458*** 0.905*** 
 Pollution 40% -0.437*** -0.847*** -0.512*** 
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 Variable Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls Years Experience 0.001 -0.008 0.002 
Marital Binary 0.232 0.278 0.200 
Religion 0.023 0.245** 0.060 
Coinvolved -0.067 0.173 -0.029 
Personexp_No -0.319 -0.318 -0.230 
Personexp_Yes -0.496* -0.404 -0.411 
Envcommit 0.016 -0.061 -0.044 
Sit. Realistic 0.408* 0.466* 0.312 
Upper Level 0.023 0.102 0.013 
Code of Ethics 0.093 -0.143 -0.044 
Mand. Training 0.218 0.599* 0.374 
Random Audits 1.200** 1.563*** 1.319*** 
Anon. Hotline -0.805** -1.565*** -0.992*** 
Top Man. Ethics -0.180 -0.144 -0.086 
Company Policy -0.002 0.080 0.064 
Size -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
N = 586 (after imputation) 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
 
d. Hypothesis 5 results 
Hypothesis 5 argued that the predictors of offending will be the same as the predictors of 
overcompliance.  Since I am comparing models that differ in terms of sample size, the 
number of measures in the regression model, and the operationalization of the dependent 
variable, I standardized the regression coefficients.  In the case of scales that had been 
standardized in previous models, I used the original values when calculating the coefficients 
for this table. 
Looking only at statistical significance, Hypothesis 5 appears to receive some support  at 
the individual level (see Table 15); both offending and overcompliance are predicted by 
perceptions of career benefits, perceptions that the behavior is generally immoral, and 
perceptions that the behavior would be thrilling to engage in.  Perceptions of the behavior as 




behavior makes you feel about yourself predict overcompliance but not offending.  However, 
when one examines the magnitudes of the coefficients, the strength of the effects  differ by 
the two behaviors—most of the rational choice variables have a larger influence on 
offending, but the impact of social consequences and the social contract morality scale are 
more important for overcompliance. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the significant firm-level predictors differ for the two types of 
behaviors.  For offending, the certainty of legal sanctions increases the likelihood of 
offending, as does the vignette dimension that the behavior will strengthen the firm’s 
competitive position.  No measures of corporate culture impact offending intentions, but are 
the only relevant variables for overcompliance—when the behavior is depicted as being 
common in the firm, when the firm has previously violated vs. met standards, and when the 
hypothetical manager has been asked to engage in the behavior, overcompliance becomes 
more likely.  Looking at the magnitudes of the coefficients, it is interesting that although the 
corporate culture variables are statistically significant in the overcompliance behaviors their 
magnitudes are actually smaller than the corresponding coefficients in the offending model.  
This implies that corporate culture may not have much of an impact on either behavior when 
individual-level variables are included.  In fact, the strength of the firm-level variables seems 
to be bigger for the offending variables generally. 
The control variables also differ between the two behaviors.  While the specific offense 
depicted predicts both types of behavior, offending is uniquely affected by the marriage 
status of the respondent, the environmental commitment of the respondents’ company, and 




company has random ethics audits or an anonymous hotline (counterintuitively, having a 
hotline decreases the likelihood of overcompliance).    
To see whether the differences between the offending and overcompliance models were 
due to the overcompliance regressions lacking any measures of legal sanctions, I re-ran the 
offending data and dropped all measures of perceived certainty and severity of legal 
sanctions (Model 3 in Table 15).  The results look almost identical to Model 2, with the same 
variables being significant.  Therefore, the similarities and differences between offending and 
overcompliance are not necessarily explained by the omission of legal sanctions. 
 
Table 15: Comparing the Full Regression Models of Offending Intentions and 
Overcompliance Intentions, using Standardized Coefficients 
Offending 
Variables 






-0.086* -0.086* --   
Ind. Legal Severity -0.076 -0.096 --   
Ind. Social 
Certainty 



















Social Contract -0.078 -0.078 -0.079 Social Contract -0.235 
Relativist -0.080 -0.071 -0.072 Relativist -0.047 
Ethical -0.225 -0.208 -0.220 Ethical -0.068 
Desirable 0.656** 0.665** 0.665** Desirable 0.049 
Thrilling 0.624*** 0.624*** 0.641*** Thrilling 0.110*** 
Shame -0.336 -0.316 -0.336 Feel Good 0.115* 
Shame Severity 0.203 0.262 0.245 Pride -0.096** 
Firm Legal 
Certainty 
0.097** 0.099** --   
Firm Legal Severity -0.026 -- --   
Firm Social 
Certainty 




















Public -0.152 -0.158 -0.110 Public -0.033 
Foreign Comp. -0.160 -0.156 -0.120 Foreign Comp. 0.030 
Econ. Healthy -0.174 -0.178 -0.147 Econ. Healthy 0.022 
Strengthen Comp. 0.343* 0.344* 0.350* Strengthens Comp. -0.030 
Green Market. -0.079 -0.081 -0.111 Green Market. -0.027 
Declining Rev. 0.035 0.035 0.016 Declining Rev. 0.015 
Common Firm 0.281 0.281 0.308 Common Firm 0.065** 
Common Ind. 0.125 0.131 0.142 Common Ind. 0.032 
Exceed Standards 0.128 0.131 0.131 Exceed Standards -0.024 
Met Standards -0.177 -0.172 -0.177 Met Standards -0.048* 
Voluntary 
Participant 




Fired 0.096 0.093 0.103 Fired 0.026 
Reprimanded 0.217 0.217 0.243 Reprimanded 0.001 
Hotline 0.250 0.251 0.248 Hotline -0.018 
Ethics Code 0.117 0.121 0.100 Ethics Code -0.027 
Audits 0.303 0.303 0.311 Audits 0.002 
Self-Reporting 0.095 0.104 0.070 Self-Reporting 0.013 
Ethics Guide 0.243 0.252 0.225 Ethics Guide 0.009 
Ethics Distinct -0.225 -0.231 -0.246 Ethics Distinct -0.020 



















Years Experience -0.022 -0.009 0.004 Years Experience 0.007 
Marital Binary 0.451** 0.457** 0.440** Marital Binary 0.027 
Religion -0.022 -0.020 -0.020 Religion 0.024 
Coinvolved -0.205 -0.210 -0.199 Coinvolved -0.005 
Personexp_No 0.349 0.368 0.387 Personexp_No -0.037 
Personexp_Yes 0.054 0.077 0.121 Personexp_Yes -0.069 
Envcommit 0.426* 0.424* 0.436* Envcommit -0.006 
Sit. Realistic 0.171 0.173 0.176 Sit. Realistic 0.044 
Upper Level -0.046 -0.054 -0.056 Upper Level 0.002 
Code of Ethics 0.038 0.051 0.011 Code of Ethics -0.007 
Mand. Training -0.074 -0.074 -0.091 Mand. Training 0.052 
Random Audits -0.148 -0.148 -0.137 Random Audits 0.091*** 
Anon. Hotline -0.064 -0.066 -0.072 Anon. Hotline 
-
0.113*** 
Top Man. Ethics 0.135 -0.143 -0.126 Top Man. Ethics -0.015 
Company Policy 0.351 0.351 0.344 Company Policy 0.010 
Size 0.317** 0.317** 0.475** Size -0.022 
N = 879 (after imputation) for Models 1 – 3, N = 586 (after imputation) for Model 4. 






e. Summary of Results of the Vignette Survey 
Overall, the tests of the vignette data showed some support for the propositions 
put forth in the integrated theory of corporate environmental behavior.  Table 16 
summarizes which hypotheses (and subcomponents) received support.   
The tests of Hypothesis 1 received support in the offending scenarios such that 
increasing the perceived severity of firm legal sanctions and the certainty/severity of firm 
reputational sanctions decreased offending intentions.  The measures of the economic 
license did not impact offending intentions.  In the overcompliance scenarios, Hypothesis 
1 received partial support such that increasing the perceived certainty and benefit of 
enhancing the firm’s reputation increases the likelihood of overcompliance.  However, 
being mandated to report pollution numbers publicly decreases the likelihood of 
overcompliance.  Again, none of the economic license measures are statistically 
significant in these regressions. 
 






1. External Licenses predict DVs Yes Partially 
2. Corporate Culture predict DVs Very little support Mixed 
2b. Corp. Culture makes External 
License measures less salient  
No No 
3. Firm-level measures predict 
Individual-level measures 
Yes Yes 
4. Individual-level measures 
predict DVs 
Yes Yes 
4b. Individual-level measures make 
Firm-level measures less salient 
Partially Yes 








Hypothesis 2, which examined the role of corporate culture, received little support 
in the offending scenarios.  Only being asked by a supervisor predicted increased 
intentions, and adding these variables did not affect the influence of the external licenses 
as expected.  In the overcompliance scenarios, this hypothesis received mixed support; 
four of the culture variables were significant, but instead of decreasing the importance of 
the external license measures the culture variables themselves seemed to become less 
important in the larger model of this regression.   
Hypothesis 3 argued that the firm-level variables would predict individual-level 
cost/benefit perceptions.  This received support in both the offending and overcompliance 
intentions, as each of the individual-level factors was predicted by two or more of the 
firm-level measures.   
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the individual-level variables would impact offending 
and overcompliance intentions and would make the firm-level variables less salient when 
included in the full model.  This hypothesis was supported with both the offending and 
overcompliance data.  Offending intentions increased when career benefits, perceived 
desirability, and perceived thrill of the behavior increased but intentions decreased when 
the behavior was considered generally immoral.  When the individual-level variables are 
included in the regression with firm-level variables, previously significant firm-level 
variables become nonsignificant although the impact of perceived certainty of firm-level 
legal sanctions becomes significant and positive.  In the overcompliance scenarios, 
intentions increased when career benefits, perceived thrill, and the likelihood of the 
action making the respondent feel good increased; the likelihood of overcompliance 




violate traditional/cultural norms, when it was considered unethical, and then the 
respondent expected to feel a sense of pride as a result of engaging in overcompliance. 
Hypothesis 5 argued that the variables predicting offending intentions would be 
similar to those predicting overcompliance intentions. When legal sanctions are included 
in the offending regressions, this hypothesis is fairly well supported for the individual-
level variables when looking at statistically significant findings although the magnitudes 
of the effects appear to differ.  The firm-level factors vary by the type of behavior; 
instrumental variables such as the certainty of legal sanctions and the likelihood of 
increasing the firm’s competitive position predict offending intentions while corporate 
culture variables (the behavior being common in the firm, having previously violated 
standards, and being asked by a supervisor) explain overcompliance intentions.  Note, 
however, that the corporate culture variable effects are smaller in the overcompliance 
regressions than they are in the offending models (despite reaching significance).  
Among the control variables, it is interesting that the specific type of behavior is 
consistently one of the strongest predictors of both offending and overcompliance.  This 
implies that we may need to examine models of behavior that are even more specific than 
the noncompliance/overcompliance dichotomy suggests.   
When reviewing the results it is important to discuss the implications of using, as 
independent variables, randomized vignettes as opposed to survey measures.  
Randomized vignette dimensions provide a cleaner estimate of the relationship of interest 
because randomization ensures that the background characteristics of the respondent are 
not confounding the relationship.  In the above analyses, we see that most of the 




predictors.  Specifically, the legal license, social license, and rational choice variables 
were generally associated with intentions while the corporate culture and economic 
license measures were much less influential overall.  While there may be a true 
relationship, the significance of these tests may also be a methodological artifact 
stemming from a correlational analysis as opposed to a more rigorous analysis.  This also 
has implications for the results of the meta-analysis, as most of the studies used to 
calculate effect sizes use correlational data as well.  It is the results of the meta-analysis 
that I turn to now.  
 
 
III. Results of Meta-analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, I drew on data collected for a systematic review of the 
literature on environmental offending in order to conduct a sensitivity test on Hypothesis 
1.  It is important to note that as I was coding the effect sizes and assigning them to 
license constructs, I found that within each of the 3 external licenses (legal, economic, 
and social) there were variables that seemed to represent different nuances of the licenses.  
As such, I wound up coding the eligible effect sizes as representing one of six different 
constructs: 1) legal license (command-and-control approach), 2) legal license 
(persuasive/cooperative approach), 3) legal license (resources available to regulators), 4) 
economic license (costs of compliance), 5) economic license (firm size/profitability), and 
6) the social license.  Trying to combine all of the legal and economic license variables 
into one effect size would have, in my opinion, overgeneralized the effect of various 




The coding of articles up to 2006 gleaned 124 eligible articles containing 2,012 
variables of relevance to the hypothesis 1 sensitivity analysis.  However, many articles 
did not contain a sufficient amount of data with which to calculate effect sizes.  After 
calculating effect sizes with the available data, I found that I had 1,152 Effect Sizes from 
60 articles.  Since I have multiple “dependent variables,” note that one article may 
provide data for more than one effect size.  In fact, many articles had multiple effect sizes 
available within one domain; in order to avoid bias resulting from some articles having 
more effect sizes than others, I calculated the average effect size from each article 
representing each construct.  After this aggregation, I had the following number of effect 
sizes by license: 
1) Legal license (command-and-control): 7 ES-ds, 33 ES-rs 
2) Legal license (cooperative): 7 ES-ds, 5 ES-s, and 1 ES-OR 
3) Legal license (resources): 8 ES-rs 
4) Economic license (costs of compliance): 1 ES-d, 6 ES-rs, and 1 ES-or 
5) Economic license (size/profit): 14 ES-rs 
6) Social license: 8 ES-ds, 11 ES-rs, and 1 ES-or 
 
It is important to note, however, that these effect sizes often represent different units 
of analysis—some use individual respondents, others look at firm-level behavior, others 
examine environmental outcome by state, etc.  Analyzing the ESs on these different units 
of analyses would confound the results.  Since the hypothesis being tested examines only 
the impact of the external licenses on firm-level behavior, I decide to analyze only those 
effect sizes that are at the firm-level or geographic area-level of analysis.  Also, since 
there is only one ES-or for any construct (and therefore cannot get a sense of the overall 




articles included in the meta-analysis down to 46, with the following number of effect 
sizes by license: 
1) Legal license (command-and-control):  
a. Firm level: 4 ES-ds, 20 ES-rs 
b. Geographic areas: 7 ES-rs 
2) Legal license (cooperative):  
a. Firm level: 5 ES-ds 
b. Geographic areas: 3 ES-rs 
3) Legal license (resources):  
a. Firm level: 4 ES-rs 
b. Geographic areas: 3 ES-rs 
4) Economic license (costs of compliance):  
a. Firm level: 2 ES-rs 
5) Economic license (size/profit):  
a. Firm level: 14 ES-rs 
6) Social license:  
a. Firm level: 6 ES-ds, 8 ES-rs 
b. Geographic areas: 3 ES-rs (from 2 studies) 
 
Tables 17 – 22 provides the list of included articles, broken down into the 6 
constructs.  Within each table, I list the included articles grouped by the type of effect 
size and the unit of analysis (firm or geographic area).  For each study, I provide the 
specific independent variables and outcomes that were included when calculating the 
effect size, the number of effect sizes averaged, and whether the data were cross-sectional 




Table 17: Articles included in Effect Size Calculations for the Legal License (Command and Control) Construct 
FIRM-LEVEL: ES-D    
Authors 
(Date) 
Name of Article Independent Variable 
 











1) KDHE/EPA 1-year 
lagged penalty 
1) level of relative 
emissions for 






EPA (1992) Principles of 
Environmental 
Enforcement 




exposition of "rules 
of conduct" for 
yards until 
permitting could be 




wrecker yards in 
writing about the 
Waste Substances 
Act, the anticipated 
permit 
requirements, and 





Number of Wrecker 
Yards in Violation of 
Below Requirement in 
North Holland: 
1) Battery in wreck 
2) Burning residues 
found 
3) Incorrect battery 
storage 
4) Incorrect disposal of 
used oil/hazardous 
waste 
5) Incorrect LPG tank 
storage 
6) No soil protection 
under battery 
storage 
7) No suitable 
containers 
8) Piles too high 
9) Recent overflow 
10) Wrecks littered 














expected to comply 
regardless of 




11) Number of facilities 
not in compliance 
by 1984 (control) 
vs. not in 









1) inspections of  firms 
to see if they are in 
compliance with 
their license 
2) inspections of 
facilities 
1) Round 1 vs. Round 
2: number of 
shortcomings which 
are the quality of the 
licenses and the 
compliance conduct 
of the licenses 
(p.279) 
2) Round 2 vs. Round 
3: number of 
shortcomings which 
are the quality of the 
licenses and the 
compliance conduct 
of the licenses 
(p.279) 













Green clubs and 
voluntary governances: 
ISO 14001 and Firms' 
regulatory compliance 
1) Stringency of state 
hazardous air 
regulations 
2) Stringency of state 
ambient air 
regulations 
3) state audit 
protections 
1) Proportion of 
months for which a 
facility was out of 





     
Authors 
(Date) 
Name of Article Independent Variable 
 









Quebec’s Pulp and 
Paper Industry 
1) Toxicity inspections 
by the ministry of 
the environment 
1) BOD emissions 
2) TSS emissions 










1) KDHE/EPA 1-year 
lagged penalty 
2) cumulative EPA 
inspections 
3) cumulative KDHE 
inspection 
4) annual EPA 
enforcement 
5) annual KDHE 
enforcement 
6) predicted EPA 
inspection 
7) predicted KDHE 
2) level of relative 
emissions for 





































and financial status 








3) preceding 12-month 
cumulative EPA 
inspections of others 
(general deterrence) 
4) preceding 12-month 
cumulative state 
inspections of others 
(general deterrence) 




6) preceding 12-month 
cumulative civil 
penalties 
1) monthly frequency 
of exceeding 
pollution limits 
2) BOD relative 
emissions 










8) annual civil 
penalties against 
similar companies 






1) Number of 
Prosecutions faced 
by a plant in a given 
year 
1) Compliance rate for 
BOD 
2) Compliance rate for 
TSS 
3) Absolute level of 
TSS emissions 
4) Absolute level of 
BOD emissions 
16 Cross-sectional 
Gibbs (2006) Corporate Citizenship, 
sanctions, and 
environmental crime 
1) Total sanctions 
2) Informal sanctions 
3) Formal sanctions 
1) Average number of 
violations 
2) Quality compliance 
ratio—Conventional 
pollutants 














When and Why do 
Plants Comply?  Paper 
Mills in the 1980s 
1) log # air 
enforcement actions 
against the company 






2) log # air inspections  
against the company 
3) log # OTHER air 
enforcement actions 
against the company 
Hartman et al. 
(1997) 
Why paper mills clean 
up: Determinants of 
pollution abatement in 
four Asian countries 
1) Strength of formal 
regulatory pressures 
affecting the survey 
plant, including 
both national and 
provincial 
regulations 









from the TRI 
1) Inspection rate of 
firms in the state 




1) Log air releases 
2) Log land emissions 
3) Log off-site 
transfers 






and their implications 
for swine operations in 
Illinois 
1) Number of onsite 
visits by EPA staff 
during current 
calendar year 





Corporate boards and 





stringency as a 
proxy for the 
pressures exerted on 
a firm by a state's 
regulatory 
environment 
1) whether company 
was subject to 







emissions of the pulp 
1) Inspections by the 
Quebec Ministry of 
the Environment 
1) Absolute BOD 
emissions 





and paper industry: 
The case of Quebec 
(current month) 
2) Inspections by the 





Mobus (2005) Mandatory 
environmental 

















Green clubs and 
voluntary governances: 
ISO 14001 and Firms' 
regulatory compliance 
1) Stringency of state 
hazardous air 
regulations 
2) Stringency of state 
ambient air 
regulations 
3) state audit 
protections 
4) Number of 
inspections 
5) Number of 
enforcement actions 
6) Dollar amount of 
penalties 
7) State litigiousness 
8) Enforcement 
flexibility 
2) Proportion of 
months for which a 
facility was out of 
compliance in 2000 
- 2001 
5 Cross-sectional 
Quimio (2001) Environmental 
management systems: 
The motivations for 
adoption and the 
implications for toxic 
releases and economic 





1) Off-site toxic 
emissions per dollar 
sales 
2) On-site toxic 
emissions per dollar 






Rassier (2005) Empirical essays in 
environmental and 
labor economics (First 
essay: do trade unions 
affect compliance with 
environmental 
regulation?) 
1) Cumulative federal 
inspections 





4) Cumulative judicial 
enforcement actions 
5) Aggregate federal 
inspections 





8) Aggregate judicial 
enforcement actions 







matter?: Evaluating the 
effects of state air 
pollution control 
programs 
1) EPA Abatements 
(dollar amount) 
2) EPA abatements 
(number of 
abatements) 
3) State Abatements 
(dollar amount) 
4) State abatements 
(number of 
abatements) 















1) Number of informal 
enforcement actions 
against anyone 
2) Number of informal 
1) Whether company 








3) Predicted inspection 
probability 
4) Number of 
inspections 
Stafford (2006) Rational or confused 
polluters?  Evidence 
from Hazardous Waste 
Compliance 
1) 5-year inspection 
history 
2) Company inspection 
history 
3) State inspections in 
1998 
4) State inspection 
intensity in 1998 
1) Whether violated 















signals or smoke 
screens? (Chapter 3: 




1) RCRA inspections 
2) CAA inspections 
1) RCRA violations 










1) Annual CAA 
inspections 






probability of CAA 
1) Clean CAA 
inspection 












"Push" and "pull" 











GEOGRAPHIC AREA: ES-R     
Authors 
(Date) 
Name of Article Independent Variable 
 










Accidents waiting to 
happen: Liability 
policy and toxin 
pollution releases 
1) Number of lawyers 






1) total number of 
persons injured in 
chemical spills per 







Strict liability as a 
deterrent in toxic waste 
management: 
empirical evidence 
from accident and spill 
data 
1) Number of lawyers 






1) number of spills and 
accidents per state 
per year--acids 
2) number of spills and 
accidents per state 
per year—ammonia 
3) number of spills and 





Ivanova (2006) Corruption, rule of law 
and international 
interactions in 
1) Strength of the legal 
system in the 
country (proxy for 
1) Sulpher dioxide 
emissions as a share 






pollution and cbrn 
terrorism (chapter 3: 
corruptible inspectors 
and air pollution in 
Europe) 









Review of impacts of 
illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing on 
developing countries 
1) Total number of 
environmental 
agreements 
2) Number of EU 
environmental 
agreements 
1) % IUU catch 4 Cross-sectional 
Maxwell et al. 
(2000) 
Self-regulation and 
social welfare: The 
political economy of 
corporate 
environmentalism 
1) Lawyers per capita, 
proxy for threat of 
litigation 
1) Change in toxicity 
value of pollution 









1) Degree of coercion 
as a regulatory style 
2) Degree of 
formalism as a 
regulatory style 
3) Effort--percentage 
of farms inspected 
4) Extent of targeting 
for inspections 
5) Scope of 
inspections--range 
of major items 
inspected 
6) Use of sanction--% 
of inspections for 
which injunctions 
1) Inspectors' 









7) Use of sanctions--% 
inspections referred 
to police for action 
O’Toole et al. 
(1997) 
Reducing Toxic 
Chemical Releases and 
Transfers: Explaining 
Outcomes for a 
Voluntary Program 
1) State Stringency 
regarding toxic 
pollutants 
1) Relative Change in 
the release of 17 
chemicals 
2 Cross-sectional 
Wenner (1971) Enforcement of water 
pollution control law 
1) Enforcement 
2) Strictness of law 




The studies by Earnhart listed here are different studies, but use the same dataset.  As such, the effect sizes from each study 
are pulled together to avoid problems with non-independent effect sizes.  
b
The studies by Toffel and Short listed here are different studies, but use the same dataset.  As such, the effect sizes from each 
study are pulled together to avoid problems with non-independent effect sizes.  
c
The studies by Alberini and Austin listed here are different studies, but use the same dataset.  As such, the effect sizes from 
each study are pulled together to avoid problems with non-independent effect sizes.  
 
Table 18: Articles included in Effect Size Calculations for the Legal License (Persuasion/Cooperation) Construct 
FIRM LEVEL ES-DS     
Authors (Date) Name of Article Independent Variable 
 










An investigation of 
environmental, 
health, and safety 
decisions within 
the chemical and 
1) Participation in EPA 
33/50 voluntary 
program 
1) 1993 TRI levels 
2) Normalized 
1993 TRI levels 












steel industries 33/50 chemicals 
6) Amount of spills 





Evaluation of the 
Environmental 
Results Program 




1) % of companies that 









1) Participation in TRI 
33/50 program 
2) Participation in 
Wastewise program 
1) Average number of 
violations (BOD) 
2) Average number of 
violations (TSS) 




4) Average number of 
violations (toxic 
pollutants) 
5) Average number of 
violations (all) 
6) Quality compliance 
ratio—BOD 
7) Quality compliance 
ratio—TSS 
8) Quality compliance 
ratio—Conventional 
pollutants 



























Green clubs and 
voluntary 
governances: ISO 
14001 and Firms' 
regulatory 
compliance 
1) State EMS programs 1) Proportion of 
months for which a 
facility was out of 


















1) Participation in 33/50 
program (when 
program in place) 
2) Participation in 33/50 
program (when 
program no longer in 
place) 





GEOGRAPHIC AREAS: ES-R     
Authors (Date) Name of Article Independent Variable 
 























regulatory quality, rule 
of law, control of 
corruption 
2) % IUU catch 2 Cross-
sectional 








1) Extent of cooperation 
with agricultural 
consultants 
















Outcomes for a 
Voluntary Program 
1) Number of different 
communicative routes 
employed by regional 
offices to implement 
the program 
2) Presence of a 
complementary state 
voluntary program that 
backs up the 33/5- 
program 
3) State information: 
extensiveness of public 
awareness and 
information on toxic 
releases 
1) Relative Change in 















     
Authors (Date) Name of Article Independent Variable 
 

















2) EPA regional budget 
3) EPA overall budget 
1) monthly frequency 
of exceeding 
pollution limits 
2) BOD relative 
emissions 




Grant et al. (2004) Do facilities with 
distant 
headquarters 







1) % of total state 
expenditures on the 
environment 





Ringquist (1993) Does regulation 
matter?: Evaluating 
the effects of state 
air pollution 
control programs 
1) State Air Expenditures: 
average dollar amount 
spent on air pollution 
control 







Stafford (2006) Rational or 
confused polluters?  
1) Gross state product--
proxy for enforcement 
1) Whether violated 








burden that state 
environmental agency 
faces 
2) Environmental budget 
in 1999 
GEOGRAPHIC AREA: ES-R     
Authors (Date) Name of Article Independent Variable 
 





Maxwell et al. 
(2000) 
Self-regulation and 




1) Per capita spending in 
fiscal year 1988 for 
state programs to 
administer clean air 
laws 
1) Change in toxicity 
value of pollution 











1) Amount of resources 
available for 
monitoring, control and 
surveillance 
1) % IUU catch 2 Cross-
sectional 
Wenner (1971) Enforcement of 
Water Pollution 
Law 
1) Resources devoted by 
state to water pollution 
control 





Table 20: Articles included in Effect Size Calculations for the Economic License (Costs of Compliance) Construct 
FIRM-LEVEL: ES-RS     
Authors (Date) Name of Article Independent Variable 
 








When and Why do 
Plants Comply?  
Paper Mills in the 
1980s 
1) Plant’s real value of 
shipment—proxy of 
compliance costs 
2) Plant-level pollution 
abatement expenditure 
1) Whether compliant 
during year 
2) Air pollution actions 









4) Water violations 






When and Why do 
Plants Comply?  
Paper Mills in the 
1980s 
1) Plant’s real value of 
shipment—proxy of 
compliance costs 




1) Whether compliant 
during year 
2) Air pollution actions 
3) TRI air and water 
discharges 
4) Water violations 













1) number of superfund 
sites as a proxy for 
increasing potential 
liabilities under the 
Superfund Act 
2) HAP-33/50 releases 
ratio as a proxy for 
compliance costs under 
NESHAP regulation 
1) 33/50 releases 2 Cross-
sectional 
a
The studies by Gray and Shadbegian listed here are different studies, but use the same dataset.  As such, the effect sizes from 
each study are pulled together to avoid problems with non-independent effect sizes.  
 
Table 21: Articles included in Effect Size Calculations for the Economic License (Firm Size/Profit) Construct 
FIRM-LEVEL: ES-RS     
Authors (Date) Name of Article Independent Variable 
 












role of discharge 













1) flow capacity 
 
1) level of relative 
emissions for 










1) Return on sales 
2) Firm Size 
3) Total company profit 
4) Return on assets 
5) Liquidity 
 













7) Quality compliance 
ratio—Conventional 
pollutants 


















Plants Comply?  
Paper Mills in the 
1980s 
during year 
2) Air pollution actions 
3) TRI air and water 
discharges 
4) Water violations 






When and Why do 
Plants Comply?  
Paper Mills in the 
1980s 
1) Firm’s profit 1) Whether compliant 
during year 
2) Air pollution actions 
3) TRI air and water 
discharges 
4) Water violations 








violations, and their 
implications for 
swine operations in 
Illinois 
1) Current operating 
capacity 













1) Firm performance 
2) Firm growth 
3) Firm size 
4) Capital intensity 
 
1) Relative waste 
production 
2) Whether firm 




Mobus (2005) Mandatory 
environmental 
disclosures in a 
legitimacy theory 
context 
1) Economic performance 
of firm (utility rate) 
2) Economic performance 
of firm (changes in 
utility rate) 














Green clubs and 
voluntary 
governances: ISO 
14001 and Firms' 
regulatory 
compliance 
1) number of employees in 
company 
1) Proportion of 
months for which a 
facility was out of 















1) number of employees in 
company 
1) Toxic emissions 
index 
3 Longitudinal 












1) size of the firm 
(number of facilities)  












1) Plant capacity (size of 
plant)--proxy for costs 
of compliance 
1) Whether company 




Stafford (2006) Rational or 
confused polluters?  
Evidence from 
1) Size of company (using 
waste generated)—
proxy for cost of 
1) Whether violated 









Wisner and Epstein 
(2005) 
"Push" and "pull" 





1) Size of company 






Wolf (2005) Environmental 









1) Whether violation of 
environmental law 
prosecuted in 
criminal or civil 
courts 





The studies by Gray and Shadbegian listed here are different studies, but use the same dataset.  As such, the effect sizes from 
each study are pulled together to avoid problems with non-independent effect sizes.  
 
 
Table 22: Articles included in Effect Size Calculations for the Social License Construct 
FIRM-LEVEL 
ES-D 
     
Authors (Date) Name of Article Independent Variable 
 


























1995 vs. Sep 
1996) 








1995 vs. Dec 
1995) 














2) BOD relative 
emissions 
3) TSS relative 
emissions 
9 Cross-sectional 
Lopez et al. 
(2004) 
























Green clubs and 
voluntary 
governances: ISO 
14001 and Firms' 
regulatory compliance 
1) Participation in 
ISO14001 
 
1) Proportion of 
months for which 
a facility was out 
of compliance in 







from the Electronics 
Industry 









1) Adopted ISO14001 
standards 
1) RCRA violations 










signals or smoke 
screens? (Chapter 2: 
Resolving information 
asymmetries in 
markets: The role of 
certified management 
programs) 
FIRM-LEVEL: ES-RS     
Authors (Date) Name of Article Independent Variable 
 











and financial status 
1) voter turnout (proxy 
for community 
pressures) 















2) BOD relative 
emissions 
3) TSS relative 
emissions 
36 Cross-sectional 






1) Number of 
appearances in a 
given on the 
polluters list under 
the heading "of 
concern" 
2) Number of 
1) Compliance rate 
for BOD 
2) Compliance rate 
for TSS 
3) Absolute level of 
TSS emissions 





appearances in a 
given on the 
polluters list under 
the heading "out of 
compliance" 
BOD emissions 
Grant et al. 
(2004) 
Do facilities with 
distant headquarters 







1) log # of associations 
in a county 
2) log # of churches in a 
county 
3) log # of third places 
in a county 








and their implications 
for swine operations 
in Illinois 
1) swine inventory 
intensity (proxy for 
market competition 
or for community 
reliance on the 
industry) 
2) median household 
income of the 




population in county 
(proxy for 
community pressure) 





Corporate boards and 
outside stakeholders 
as determinants of 
environmental 
1) Environmental 
preferences of the 
community as a 
proxy for informal 
1) whether company 







litigation stakeholder pressures 
2) Voting record of 
each state's 
Congressional 
delegation as a proxy 











Green clubs and 
voluntary 
governances: ISO 
14001 and Firms' 
regulatory compliance 
1) # of members in the 
Sierra Club and the 
National Wildlife 
Federal per 1000 
residents 
2) Proportion of 
months for which 
a facility was out 
of compliance in 








1) County per capita 
income (proxy for 
community pressure) 
2) County 




1) Whether company 
was in violation 
this time period 
8 Cross-sectional 
Stafford (2006) Rational or confused 
polluters?  Evidence 
from Hazardous 
Waste Compliance 
1) Environmental group 
dues 
1) Whether violated 
hazardous waste 
law in 1999 
1 Longitudinal 
GEOGRAPHIC AREA ES-R     
Authors 
(Date) 










Brooks and Sethi 
(1997) 
The distribution of 
pollution: Community 
characteristics and 
1) % people in the 
population voting in 
the presidential 
1) Air pollution 
index (1988) 










exposure to air toxics election: proxy for 
capacity of 
community to engage 
in collective action 
2) initial exposure level 
in the zip code, as a 
proxy for TRI 
publicity 
index (1989) 
3) Air pollution 
index (1990) 
4) Air pollution 
index (1991) 
5) Air pollution 
index (1992) 
6) Change in 
exposure to air 
pollution from 
1990 - 1992 
Longitudinal 
Maxwell et al. 
(2000) 
Self-regulation and 
social welfare: The 





membership as proxy 
for environmental 
pressure 
2) Policy initiatives as a 
proxy for political 
climate with relation 
to environmental 
issues 
1) Change in toxicity 
value of pollution 







Table 23 provides descriptive information on the 46 studies included in the meta-
analysis. Most of the included studies used data collected in the United States.  About 
half of the studies were published in journals, while about half were unpublished 
documents.  Only 12.3% of the studies were quasi-experimental, and none used 
experimental methods.  Most of the data used to calculate effect sizes were regression 
coefficients or correlations.  Most of the studies used firm-level data as opposed to 
comparing geographic areas, used non-random samples, and were cross-sectional in 
nature.  A little bit more than half of the studies used controls in their analyses, and about 
58% of the studies included a discussion about the validity of their data. 
Table 23: Study Characteristics and Study Quality Indicators 
Variable Category Percent of Studies 
Country of Study United States 68.5% 
 Other 31.5% 
Study Source Journal Article 50.7% 
 Dissertation/Thesis 20.5% 
 Conference paper or Working paper 19.2% 
 Government or Regulatory Agency 
Report 
8.2% 
 Corporate Paper 1.4% 
Discipline of 
Publication or Author 
Multiple disciplines or Other (e.g., 
operations management, international 
development) 
47.9% 
 Public Policy 12.3% 
 Economics 9.6% 
 Criminology 6.8% 
 Environmental Science/Biology 5.5% 
 Sociology 6.8% 
 Business/Marketing 5.5% 
 Political Science 5.5% 
Study Type Non-experimental 87.7% 
 Quasi-experimental or Pre-Post 12.3% 
Data Used to Calculate 
ES 
Regression Coefficients 57.5% 
 Correlations 26.0% 
 Pre/Post Comparisons 8.2% 
 F, t, or z-test 2.7% 




Variable Category Percent of Studies 
equations) 
 Means and Standard Deviations 1.4% 
 Proportions 1.4% 
Unit of Analysis Firm 82.2% 
 Geographic Area 17.8% 
Cross-sectional? Yes 79.5% 
 No 20.5% 
Random sample? Yes 5.6% 
 No 83.1% 
 Unclear 11.3% 
Controls included in 
analyses? 
Yes 56.2% 
 No 43.8% 
Discussion of data 
validity? 
Yes 57.5% 
 No 42.5% 
 
Tables 24 – 29 demonstrate the effect size calculations for the respective licenses, 
by unit of analysis and effect size type.  Each table reports the average unbiased effect 
size, the weighted mean effect size, the 95% confidence interval for the weighted mean 
effect size, and the number of studies included in the calculation of the effect size.  
Figures 2 – 13 give the stem and leaf plots depicting each study’s mean effect size and 
the 95% confidence interval.  I noted the presence of outliers (defined as effect sizes 
greater than two standard deviations above or below the average effect size).  Following 
Lipsey and Wilson (2001), I recoded these outliers to have a value at the ± 2 standard 
deviation point as appropriate.  This allows me to retain studies in the analysis without 
allowing for extreme bias.  When calculating the weighted effect sizes, the Q statistics 
were highly significant, indicating that the variability between studies is not just due to 
sampling error.  Therefore, I use the random-effects model for calculating the weighted 




The random effects model relaxes the assumption that all of the studies are measuring the 
same treatment effect; instead, it assumes that the treatment effects vary along a 
distribution with a central value.  Calculating the random effects estimate implies that we 
are interested in exploring the variability of the effects by study characteristics, although 
in the current project I am unable to do this. Also, with a small number of studies, the 
random effects model is not able to account for the large amount of uncertainty that 
comes in calculating between-study variances (Campbell Collaboration, 2012; Johnson, 
2011).     
Along with the caution that the studies included here appear to be measuring 
different treatment effects, it is also important to remember that the calculated effect sizes 
must be interpreted in the context of the methodological quality of the studies from 
whence they come (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001).  Most of the effect sizes calculated here 
come from regression or correlation coefficients, meaning that they are essentially 
correlational relationships and one cannot infer causality.  Furthermore, we know that 
many of the study samples are not drawn randomly, which introduces the potential for 
sampling bias.  The effect sizes given should be interpreted as a synthesis of the research 
findings of studies that are methodologically limited and thus the results should be 
viewed cautiously.  Given the high Q statistic, the ESs provided are to be interpreted as 
the mean of the distribution of effects given in the literature to date—and it is noteworthy 
that the Campbell Collaboration (2012) argues that this should not be the focus of random 
effects models.  Again, I reiterate that a) I am still in the process of collecting data with 
which I will examine how effects differ by study, and b) that this meta-analysis is only 




positives and negatives associated with them, but we can gain confidence when results 
from one approach confirms those found using another.   
Given those caveats, the effect sizes for the legal license (command-and-control) 
construct are given in Table 24 and Figures 2 – 4.  Two out of the three weighted mean 
effect sizes are positive, indicating that command and control interventions do have a 
beneficial effect on environmental offending.  For the firm mean standard difference, the 
confidence interval does not cross zero, indicating that the impact is significant (which 
was verified by z-tests, not shown).   The firm-level standard mean difference effect size 
indicates that this aspect of the legal license has a small-medium effect on environmental 
offending.  The geographic area correlation effect demonstrates a medium positive effect 
as well, but is not statistically significant.  On the other hand, the firm-level weighted 
correlation effect size shows that the command and control version of this license may 
actually encourage offending in a small way.  It may be that the presence of a punitive 
authority or law deters crime, but when you have a continuous measure you may find 
some sort of threshold such that having too much punitive power (e.g., a certain number 
of inspections, laws, etc.) has a defiant effect on firms.   


















Firm ES-d 0.438 0.418 0.162 0.675 4 
 ES-r 0.019 -0.050 -0.073 -0.028 20 
Geographic 
Area 










Figure 2: Box Plot of ESs, Firm-level Legal License (Command and Control)—ES-d 
Study name           
Earnhart (2004)           
EPA (1992)           
Gerardu and Wasserman (1994)           
Potoski and Prakash (2005)           
Weighted Mean Effect Size           




 Favors License 
Effect 
 
Figure 3: Box Plot of ESs, Firm-level Legal License (Command and Control)—ES-r 
Study name           
Barla (2007)           
Earnhart (2004)           
Foulon et al. (2002)           
Gibbs (2006)           
Gray and Shadbegian (2004)           
Hartman et al. (1997)           
Helland and Whitford (2003)           
Huang and Miller (2006)           
Kassinis and Vafeas (2002)           
LaPlante and Rilstone (1996)           
Mobus (2005)           
Potoski and Prakash (2005)           
Quimio (2001)           
Rassier (2005)           
Ringquist (1993)           
Shimshack and Ward (2005)           
Stafford (2006)           
Short and Toffel (2005)           
Toffel (2007)           
Wisner and Epstein (2005)           
Weighted Mean Effect Size           

















Figure 4: Box Plot of ESs, Geographic Area Legal License (Command and 
Control)—ES-r 
Study name           
Alberini and Austin (1999/2002)           
Ivanova (2006)*           
Marine Resources Assessment Group 
Ltd. (2005) 
          
Maxwell et al. (2000)           
May and Winter (1999)           
O'Toole et al. (1997)           
Wenner (1971)           
Weighted Mean Effect Size           




 Favors License 
Effect 
*Original ES was an outlier.  The depicted ES is recoded to be a maximum of 2 standard 
deviations above the average (non-weighted) mean ES. 
 
 
 Table 25 and Figures 5 - 6 provide the effect size calculations for the measures of 
the legal license that are more cooperative or persuasive in nature.  At the firm level, we 
find a small, positive, and statistically significant effect.  For the geographic area units of 
analysis, we find a medium and positive weighted mean effect size.  However, the 
correlation effect size for the geographic area is not statistically significant.    
  


















Firm ES-d 0.317 0.231 0.106 0.356 5 
Geographic 
Area 











Figure 5: Box Plot of ESs, Firm-level Legal License (Persuasion/Cooperation)—ES-
d 
Study name           
Chinander (1997)*           
Massachusetts Dept. of Env. 
Protection (1997) 
          
Gibbs (2006)           
Potoski and Prakash (2005)           
Sam et al. (2006)           
Weighted Mean Effect Size           




 Favors License 
Effect 
*Original ES was an outlier.  The depicted ES is recoded to be a maximum of 2 standard 
deviations below the average (non-weighted) mean ES. 
 
Figure 6: Box Plot of ESs, Geographic Area Legal License 
(Persuasion/Cooperation)—ES-r 
Study name            
Marine Resources Assessment 
Group, Ltd. (2005) 
           
May and Winter (1999)            
O'Toole et al. (1997)            
Weighted Mean Effect Size            




 Favors License Effect 
 
Table 26 and Figures 7 - 8 provide correlation effect sizes for the amount of 
resources available to regulators, which I classified under the legal license.  The firm-
level effect is small but has a statistically significant benefit for environmental behavior 
(more resources leads to better environmental performance by firms), while the 
geographic area effect size is medium in size but is not statistically significant.  


















Firm ES-r 0.094 0.134 0.102 0.166 4 
Geographic 
Area 





Figure 7: Box Plot of ESs, Firm-level Legal License (Regulatory Resources)—ES-r 
Study name           
Earnhart (2004)           
Grant et al. (2005)           
Ringquist (1993)           
Stafford (2006)           
Weighted Mean Effect Size           




 Favors License 
Effect 
 
Figure 8: Box Plot of ESs, Geographic Area Legal License (Regulatory Resources)—
ES-r 
Study name           
Marine Resources Assessment 
Group, Ltd. (2005) 
          
Maxwell et al. (2000)           
Wenner (1971)           
Weighted Mean Effect Size           




 Favors License 
Effect 
 
Table 27 and Figure 9 provide the correlation effect size for the economic license 
(costs of compliance) construct.  This effect size is coded such that the impact of costs of 
compliance on offending is positive if as the costs of compliance go up, the likelihood of 
offending increases as well.  The weighted mean ES demonstrates a small, statistically 
significant relationship in this direction.  





























Figure 9: Box Plot of ESs, Firm-level Economic License (Cost of Compliance)—ES-r 
Study name           
Gray and Shadbegian (2005)           
Khanna and Damon (1999)           
Weighted Mean Effect Size            
 -1.00 -0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 
 







 Table 28 and Figure 10 provide the results for another aspect of the economic 
license, the size of the firm or the profits of the firm.  These variables were generally 
included as control variables in regressions and therefore I wanted to keep them separate 
from measures more directly assessing the costs of compliance.  The effect size is coded 
such that a positive effect size means that smaller firms are more likely to be in 
compliance.   The overall effect size indicates the exact opposite—that smaller firms are 
more likely to offend.  This may be driven by Shimshack and Ward (2005), despite the 
ES from that study being recoded to two standard deviations below the average.  If you 
remove the outlier from the data, the effect size becomes positive and is statistically 
significant with a small effect (not shown).  






























Figure 10: Box Plot of ESs, Firm-level Economic License (Firm Size/Profit)—ES-r, 
without outliers 
Study name            
Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz 
(2006) 
           
Earnhart (2004)            
Gibbs (2006)            
Gray and Shadbegian (2004/2005)            
Huang and Miller (2006)            
Kock and Santalo (2005)            
Mobus (2005)            
Potoski and Prakash (2005)            
Russo and Harrison (2005)            
Sam et al. (2006)       `     
Shimshack and Ward (2005)*            
Stafford (2006)            
Wisner and Epstein (2005)            
Wolf (2005)            
Weighted Mean Effect Size             
  -1.00 -0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 
 
License has iatrogenic 
impact 
 Favors License 
Effect 
*Original ES was an outlier.  The depicted ES is recoded to be a maximum of 2 standard 
deviations below the average (non-weighted) mean ES. 
 
Table 29 and Figures 11 – 13 show the results for the overall impact of the social 
license on offending.  The firm standard mean ES and the geographic area correlation ES 
show that the social license has a small but statistically significant effect on 
environmental offending.  However, the firm-level weighted correlation effect size shows 
a negative impact of the social license that is not statistically significant.  Similar to the 
command-and-control legal license, it may be that when you measure the social license 




























Firm ES-d 0.223 0.114 0.031 0.196 6 
 ES-r -0.005 -0.00006 -0.096 0.096 8 
Geographic 
Area 
ES-r 0.057 0.066 0.055 0.076 2 (3 ES) 
 
Figure 11: Box Plot of ESs, Firm-level Social License—ES-d 
Study name           
Afsah et al. (1997)*           
Earnhart (2004)           
Lopez et al. (2004)           
Potoski and Prakash (2005)           
Russo and Harrison (2005)           
Toffel (2005)           
Weighted Mean Effect Size           




 Favors License 
Effect 
*Original ES was an outlier.  The depicted ES is recoded to be a maximum of 2 standard 
deviations above the average (non-weighted) mean ES. 
 
Figure 12: Box Plot of ESs, Firm-level Social License—ES-r 
Study name           
Earnhart (2004)           
Foulon et al. (2002)           
Grant et al. (2004)           
Huang and Miller (2006)           
Kassinis and Vafeas (2002)           
Potoski and Prakash (2005)           
Shimshack and Ward (2005)           
Stafford (2006)           
Weighted Mean Effect Size           

















Figure 13: Box Plot of ESs, Geographic Area Social License—ES-r 
Study name           
Brooks and Sethi (1997)—cross-
sectional 
          
Brooks and Sethi (1997)—
longitudinal 
          
Maxwell et al. (2000)           
Weighted Mean Effect Size           




 Favors License 
Effect 
 
 Taken as a whole, the results demonstrate some additional support for hypothesis 
1, although the impact of the licenses differs somewhat according to how they are 
measured.  Out of 12 different calculations, nine effect sizes demonstrate a beneficial 
effect on offending.  Of those nine, six of the effect sizes are statistically significant.   
The bulk of the evidence implies that external licenses do have some impact on corporate 
environmental offending behavior.   
 When explicitly comparing the results of the meta-analysis to the regression 
results of the Hypothesis 1 test on the offending scenarios, we find some confirmation 
that the command-and-control approach can impact offending.  The persuasive approach 
was not tested in the vignette, but warrants further study given its qualified support in the 
meta-analysis.  There was also some confirmation as to the impact that the social license 
can have.  Although the costs of compliance (representing the economic license) were 
only marginally significant in the full regression model, we see that reducing such costs 
can impact offending when actual behavioral outcomes are used.  Finally, although the 
size of the respondent’s company mattered in the regression models such that people in 
larger companies were more likely to offend, the results of the meta-analysis imply that 




of an outlier).  When comparing the magnitude of the effect sizes to one another, the legal 
license seems to have the strongest impact on offending. 
 Taking both methods into account, we find qualified support for the role of the 
external licenses on corporate crime.  The vignette surveys indicate that individual-level 
factors are important to consider in future theoretical and policy developments.  Chapter 










Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
A looming question in regulation is whether formal and punitive sanctions 
effectively reduce noncompliance.  Although much research indicates that legal and 
administrative sanctions can play a role in promoting environmentally sound practices 
among corporations, it seems that as many studies find that the deterrent impact of 
punishment is not realized.  Research suggests that, due to the small likelihood of being 
caught or the lack of “teeth” behind sanctions, corporations may be influenced more by 
societal/community pressures or market pressures.  Over the past 25 years or so, many 
regulatory programs have attempted to incorporate extra-legal pressures into programs 
that motivate compliance or overcompliance.  The research on such programs has 
similarly been inconsistent in terms of their effectiveness.    
Prior research efforts provide inconsistent results because they fail to examine 
how legal, social, and economic pressures all constrain corporate behavior, often 
interactively.  For example, certain (likely larger, more well-known, and powerful) 
companies are heavily involved in deciding what regulations should be put in place or 
can afford good lawyers to get them out of legal trouble.  To these firms, the potential 
damage to one’s reputation and/or profit may be a more important determinant of 
corporate policy.  On the other hand, the threat of legal action may deter small, less 
publicly-known corporations who cannot afford to pay a large fine or will be shut down if 
the company is prosecuted.  It is imperative that empirical research examines whether and 
how formal and informal controls work together. 
The first effort to holistically explain the environmental performance of firms 




(2002, 2003, 2004; Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; Thornton et al. 2007, 
2008, 2009).  They argue that legal, social, and economic factors influence corporate 
decisions; the salience of one domain often depends on the size of the company, the 
industry it is located in, and its geographic location.  They argue, however, that the 
culture within the corporation is the most important predictor of behavior—even if two 
firms face the same external pressures, they may react in very different ways due to 
internal processes and priorities.   
Although the license framework was a giant leap in synthesizing the previous 
literature into a cohesive explanation of corporate behavior, it has three main limitations.  
First, the “framework” provided a very general conceptualization of how external factors 
and internal policies affected behavior; the authors never drew detailed, testable 
propositions from their case studies.  This is likely a large reason that the framework has 
not been subjected to rigorous or multivariate statistical tests.  Second, the authors didn’t 
compare how relevant predictors may differ between offending and overcompliance.  
Finally, the framework obfuscates the influence of corporate context on individual 
decisions as well as how individual decisions drive corporate behavior.  In fact, many 
theories of corporate crime fail to differentiate between corporate- and individual-level 
behaviors and how they are inter-related.    
To rectify these limitations I have put forth an integrated theory of corporate 
environmental behavior, derived testable hypotheses from it, and tested it using 
quantitative data.  In doing so, I have provided a theory of corporate behavior that is 
broader in scope than most that have come before it, yet fairly parsimonious and clear.  




theory and policy implications, and will conclude with limitations of the current study as 
well as ideas for future research. 
 
 
I. Summary of the theory 
To explain corporate regulatory compliance, both firm- and individual-level 
factors should be considered.  To that end, I engaged in an end-to-end integration of two 
theories: the “license framework” put forth by Gunningham et al. (2002, 2003, 2004; 
Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; Thornton et al. 2007, 2008, 2009) and the 
rational choice theory of corporate crime put forth by Paternoster and Simpson (1993, 
1996).  The “license framework” argues that legal, economic, and social factors external 
to the corporation impact whether the firm offends or overcomplies with regulations, as 
do internal indicators of corporate culture.  The rational choice theory argues that 
corporate managers make decisions based on the costs and benefits of the potential 
behavior.  These two theories are integrated such that measures of the external licenses 
and firm-level culture can explain outcomes measured at the firm level.  At the individual 
level, the firm-level licenses and culture influence a manager’s perceptions of potential 
sanctions, benefits, and norms regarding the behavior.  These individual-level 
perceptions, in turn, influence whether the individual manager will decide to offend or 
overcomply.   Although this theory is applied specifically to environmental regulations in 
the present study, I believe that it has the potential to be applied to other forms of 






II. Summary of the methods and results 
To test this integrated theory, I primarily use data from a web-based vignette 
study of environmental decision-makers from a variety of organizations and industries in 
the United States.  The results of the vignette survey generally support the propositions 
gleaned from the integrated theory, but not all expectations are statistically supported.   
My first hypothesis predicted that measures of the legal, economic, and social 
licenses would be significantly associated with offending and overcompliance behaviors.  
This hypothesis received partial support—the legal and social licenses proved salient in 
regressions including only firm-level measures, although the economic license variables 
were generally unimportant (although one does become marginally significant in the 
offending regression that includes individual-level measures).    
The second hypothesis argued that measures of corporate culture would be 
important in explaining offending and overcompliance decisions, and would render the 
measures of the external licenses nonsignificant.  The influence of corporate culture was 
generally not supported using the offending data and was moderately supported using the 
overcompliance data.  Furthermore, including the corporate culture measures did not 
reduce the impact of the external licenses as expected.   
The hypotheses that focused on the individual-level measures received more 
support.  Hypothesis 3 predicted that the firm-level variables would predict or be 
associated with the individual-level variables, while hypothesis 4 predicted that the 
individual-level variables would be associated with offending and overcompliance.  I also 




rational choice measures.  For both types of scenarios, firm-level measures were 
associated with individual-level cost/benefit perceptions.  Furthermore, these individual-
level perceptions were important in predicting offending and overcompliance decisions, 
and the impact of firm-level factors was reduced in the full model.  
Hypothesis 5, which predicted that the factors significantly associated with 
offending would be the same as those significantly associated with overcompliance, was 
partially supported such that similar individual-level considerations predicted both 
offending and overcompliance.  However, the firm-level factors differed.  Specifically, 
instrumental variables such as the certainty of legal sanctions and the likelihood of 
increasing the firm’s competitive position predicted offending intentions, while measures 
of corporate culture explained overcompliance intentions.   
 I also conducted a sensitivity analysis of the impact of the external licenses on 
corporate offending, using data from a meta-analysis of articles through 2006.  This 
analysis showed that, at the firm or geographic area levels of analysis, there is some 
support for the impact of external pressures on corporate environmental offending.  Nine 
out of 12 effect size calculations demonstrated that the licenses impacted corporate 
offending, of which six ESs were significant.  Although the effects were modest, it seems 
that using punitive sanctions, adopting a persuasive legal approach, increasing resources 
available to regulators, reducing compliance costs, and increasing social pressures may 







III. Theoretical Implications 
I believe that this dissertation makes its biggest contribution to the corporate crime 
literature theoretically.  Criminologists who study corporate crime all too often fail to go 
beyond assessing whether theories of traditional street crime are supported when using a 
sample of white-collar or corporate criminals (Farrell and Swigert, 1985).   What is 
needed is a theory that accounts for both the organizational environment of the 
corporation as well as the factors weighed by individuals nested in that environment.  
Prior corporate crime research has also been limited by a lack of quantitative data that 
would allow for us to test theories statistically.  I have addressed both conceptual and 
methodological limitations of prior research by developing testable propositions from 
Gunningham et al.’s (2002, 2003, 2004; Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; 
Thornton et al. 2007, 2008, 2009) license framework, clarifying its scope, and integrating 
it with a rational choice perspective on corporate crime.  This integrated theory clearly 
delineates the processes occurring at the corporate and individual levels and, as such, can 
be empirically tested with corporate- or individual-level data.  
 The results of the vignette survey indicate that the social license generally affects 
corporate behavior when individual-level factors are not accounted for.  This jibes with 
Gunningham et al.’s (2002, 2003, 2004; Gunningham et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2003; 
Thornton et al. 2007, 2008, 2009) finding that social pressures on the corporation often 
play a role in shaping corporate behavior; the potential damage or benefits to one’s 
corporate reputation due to certain behaviors influences the decisions of managers.  
However, the legal license is also salient—when not accounting for individual-level 




to expectations, the perceived certainty of legal sanctions against the corporation 
becomes salient in the full model and increases intentions to offend.  The only external 
license not receiving much support among our sample is the economic license; only when 
individual-level factors are included does the potential for improving the firm’s 
competitiveness become important.  Overall, then, the first multivariate statistical test of 
the license framework yields mixed support.  
 There has been much discussion in the literature about the need for a strong 
corporate culture to prevent offending (Schell-Busey, 2009).  However, in the present 
study, only one of the measures of corporate culture predicted offending—being asked by 
a supervisor (vs. asking an employee) increases the likelihood of offending.  On the other 
hand, corporate culture seems to be more important in explaining overcompliance 
decisions.  It appears that offending and overcompliance behaviors are therefore driven 
by different firm-level factors. 
 I did find support that firm-level factors are correlated with or predict individual-
level calculations about the costs and benefits of engaging in the behavior, as predicted.  I 
thought it was particularly interesting that firm reputation impacted all of the rational 
choice measures in the overcompliance scenarios.  If the firm is not seen as deriving 
reputational benefits from overcompliance, individuals may not see themselves as 
benefiting from such behaviors.  
In turn, multiple individual-level factors influence the likelihood of offending and 
overcomplying (and render some of the firm-level factors insignificant).  Of particular 
import for both types of scenarios are potential benefits to one’s career, the perceived 




Generally, I think that the rational choice theory of corporate crime (Paternoster and 
Simpson, 1993, 1996) is supported in this study.  What is interesting is that the 
individual-level measures of legal sanctions and social sanctions/benefits are not strongly 
related to offending or overcompliance decisions.  It may be that when one accounts for 
the potential monetary rewards and normative approbation of the behavior, individuals 
are fairly unconcerned about such factors or may think that they are able to easily pass 
blame to others in the organization.   
I also examined the impact of external pressures using a meta-analysis that 
included only studies on actual environmental offending behavior by firms.  This meta-
analysis offers some support for the impact of punitive legal measures, the use of 
persuasive legal measures, reducing the costs of the compliance, and increasing social 
pressures.  The support for external pressures was not overwhelming and seemed to 
depend on whether the independent variables were dichotomous or continuous in some 
cases, but the bulk of the evidence indicated that the licenses can promote compliance 
(especially the legal license).  Theories of corporate crime should account for external 
pressures and seek to empirically test their importance. 
        
 
IV. Policy Implications 
In determining what factors are associated with offending and overcompliance, this 
dissertation also informs practical efforts to control corporate environmental behavior.  It 
is important to understand what influences corporations as well as individuals in order to 




The vignette survey implies that to reduce corporate offending using external 
pressures, we can take advantage of legal and social pressures by making legal sanctions 
more severe or making sure that such sanctions are publicized widely.  The positive side 
of the social license also seemed to enhance the likelihood of overcompliance; again, 
publicizing good citizenship may be important to driving corporate decisions.  In this 
study, it seems that market forces are not as important to predicting behavior.  That said, 
other literature suggests that taking steps to make sure that noncompliance does not 
create a competitive advantage is important in ensuring continued compliance among  
non-offenders (see Thornton et al., 2008). 
Internal corporate mechanisms tend to impact overcompliance more than offending, 
but when the scenario depicts an employee being asked by a supervisor to offend this 
does predict intentions in most models.  As such, educating employees about 
whistleblower programs and laws may be an important method by which offending can 
be prevented.  What is interesting is that overcompliance is predicted by previous 
corporate behaviors—when the behavior has been common in the firm, when the 
company has previously been in violation of regulations, or when a supervisor asks an 
employee to do so, overcompliance becomes more likely.  This suggests that current 
programs seeking to incentivize overcompliance may not be necessary.
33
  If the particular 
type of behavior is already occurring on a regular basis in the organization, or if 
overcompliance is used to get back in the “good graces” of regulators after a violation 
(Short and Toffel, 2008), then attempting to encourage such behaviors through 
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 For example, the EPA’s 33/50 program was completely voluntary; companies were not legally bound to 
reduce emissions.  Therefore, participation is considered to be a form of overcompliance.  Incentives to 
participate included: public recognition and awards given by the EPA for exceptional programs, technical 
assistance and participation in a technological information exchange program, and preferential treatment by 




information provision or awards programs may be redundant.  It may be that the 
government’s limited resources would be better spent on finding out how to bring 
offenders back into compliance.  In the present study, the finding that instrumental 
considerations are more important than cultural considerations for offending is 
interesting; again, using funds to increase the certainty of formal or reputational sanctions 
may be more important than funding voluntary compliance programs.  However, it is 
important to remember that in the full models, the certainty of legal sanctions actually 
promoted noncompliance, a finding driven by the measure of civil suits.  It may be that 
lawsuits are not perceived as sufficiently severe and managers may see them as a cost of 
doing business that, once paid, allows them to offend with impunity (Manweller, 2003; 
Scott and Bryant, 1992).   
Although it may seem easier to develop policies geared towards corporations rather 
than individuals, the fact that rational choice measures are as important to decision-
making in this study warrants a discussion about what may possibly be accomplished 
through formal/informal regulatory and business structures.  First and foremost, both 
types of behaviors are driven by perceived career benefits.  This indicates that 
corporations who incentivize environmentally-friendly behaviors by their employees will 
be more likely to be in compliance or to overcomply.  It may be that, instead of offering 
leniency to programs who self-report violations, regulatory agencies could provide 
incentives for corporations who incorporate regulatory compliance into their promotion 
or salary enhancement criteria.  In addition, the results indicate that individuals who 
perceive both noncompliance and overcompliance as morally wrong are less likely to 




overcompliance is normatively desirable may be beneficial; perhaps regulatory agencies 
could develop some form of “character education” program or training that emphasizes 
the normative value of being a good environmental citizen.      
The results of the meta-analysis indicate that the legal license does impact offending 
behavior, and that both persuasion and punitive approaches may be needed.  This accords 
with Ayres and Braithwaite’s (1992) strategy of “responsive regulation” in which 
regulators take a cooperative approach to initial instances of noncompliance but become 
more punitive as offending continues.  The meta-analysis also implies that finding ways 
to reduce the expense of coming into compliance may be helpful—perhaps through tax 
subsidies or educating business owners about how environmentally-friendly technology 
may actually help profits.  The presence of social pressures also seemed to encourage 
compliance; educating citizens or exposing offenders in a more public forum may be 
important for promoting compliance with environmental regulations.   
 
 
V. Limitations and Future Research  
Although this study makes many contributions to the corporate crime literature, it 
should be viewed as merely the starting point of an ambitious research agenda that will 
build on the limitations of the current study and will expand research questions as the 
evidence suggests.  In terms of limitations, there is much documentation about concerns 
around randomized vignette survey methodology.  Although it has many advantages, 
respondents are not reporting actual behavior, they are reporting intended behavior.  




behavior committed in real life (Pogarsky, 2004), others have not (Exum et al., 2012).  
Also, some scholars are concerned about whether the scenarios are seen as realistic and 
whether that may impact one’s responses to the vignette.  I control for scenario realism in 
my study, but some evidence suggests that the type of behavior depicted impacts 
perceptions of realism and that these perceptions do have a significant impact on 
intentions (Rorie, 2012).  To address this, I conducted a sensitivity analysis using a very 
different method, which provided additional support for the impact of external pressures.  
In addition to issues of realism and intentions, it is important to realize that many aspects 
of the analyses using the vignette were cross-sectional in nature and it seems that many of 
the significant results came from the less rigorous analyses.  More research should be 
conducted to tease out these concerns and methodological considerations, and the results 
of this dissertation should be seen as one part of a larger approach to answering this 
research question.  Clearly, this research should be conducted using different methods 
and measures to build knowledge around the topic.  
Another cause for concern in the current study is the low response rate of the web 
survey.  Attempting to access businesspeople is difficult in and of itself, and the lack of 
response to web-based surveys has been demonstrated in other studies (Porter and 
Whitcomb, 2003; Ranchhod and Zhou, 2001).  Furthermore, it appears that my sample is 
made up of individuals from small organizations.  Although I argue that they are head of 
their organizations and therefore able to put themselves in the place of the hypothetical 




people located in a large corporation.
34
  I believe that this is an important sample to 
target—and an oft-neglected one.  As Vandenbergh (2004) notes, many large 
corporations have improved their environmental outcomes due to the pressures placed on 
them, yet small businesses and individuals have not been subject to similar demands and 
remain a large source of day-to-day pollution releases. Even so, the theory presented is 
one predicting “corporate” crime.  Future research should use different methods and 
strategies to improve the response rate and better assess the representativeness of the 
sample to the target population.  In future research, we should also objectively assess 
whether the respondents or their firms have experienced environmental offending (e.g., 
by gathering more information on their organizations and conducting a reverse records 
check).    
I already discussed how the methods used here should be seen as just one way to 
examine this question; future research should explore this question using more statistical 
sophistication and more rigorous methods.  Supplementing the research with meta-
analytic review data as was done here is helpful, although the current results should be 
interpreted with caution, in light of the methodological limitations of the studies used.  
It’s relevant that the correlational measures in the vignette surveys and the meta-analysis 
studies result in more significant findings than those analyses using the “cleaner” 
randomized vignette dimensions. It is obvious that these questions should be tested using 
other methods, such as: designing experimental studies with actual corporations (e.g., see 
Ariel, 2012), conducting surveys of multiple people nested within multiple corporations 
that are actually offending or overcomplying with regulations and conducting a multi-
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 However, see Simpson et al. (2013), in which we combined responses from the current sample and 
responses from people located in large corporations.  The location of the respondent was not significant in 




level analysis, using propensity-score matching techniques, designing programs based on 
the theoretical propositions here and conducting program evaluations, or time-series data 
to examine the impact of specific programs or newsworthy events linked to informal 
social controls.  The potential for empirical research on the integrated theory is endless. 
It is also important to note that the meta-analysis results provided here are subject to 
change as I continue to include studies into the sample.  My plan is to complete coding of 
articles published through 2011 and then update the results.  With more studies included, 
it’s likely that some of the findings may change.  Given that the Q statistic was fairly 
high, I will be conducting moderator analyses to determine how the characteristics of the 
studies (see Table 23) impact the results.  
There were also a couple of important components to the license framework that 
could not be examined in this study due to a lack of measures.  For example, our 
measures of the legal license did not translate to the overcompliance scenarios.  Although 
overcompliance is (by definition) going above and beyond what is required by law, there 
is some indication in the literature that legal mechanisms may promote a desire to do 
more than what is asked.  For example, Shimshack and Ward (2008) found that 
corporations who are already exceeding requirements will reduce emissions even further 
when other organizations are fined, while offenders may respond to sanctions by 
reducing emissions beyond what is required by law.  Another important factor not 
measured in the vignette is the pressure exerted by non-profit, non-governmental 
environmental organizations such as Greenpeace.  Chapter 2 described how such 
pressures impacted pulp and paper corporations in Canada (Raizada, 1998), and the 




Given that such organizations are so important in the conceptualization of the license 
framework, it is important to include such relationships in future tests of this theory.   
In addition, the interactions between various components of the theory were not 
tested.  The license framework is very complex and clearly articulates how the various 
external pressures may be more/less salient in the presence or absence of the other 
licenses, so this is a very important question to be addressed.  With the addition of 
individual-level considerations, there are many potential interactions that can be 
investigated.       
Another consideration is that the literature often (but not always) discusses 
overcompliance and offending behaviors as existing on a continuum (e.g., a corporation 
moves from violating emissions standards to exceeding them), but when examined these 
behaviors are generally tested as if they are completely different.  I think that scholars 
need to think about the appropriate way to measure and compare offending and 
overcompliance.  For example, it may be that there is a temporal component to these 
behaviors, whereby a corporation can move from being an overcomplier at one point and 
then merely a complier at a later point because it successfully lobbied for more stringent 
standards. A longitudinal within-firm analyses on the life course of a corporation 
(preferably incorporating a qualitative component) would be an important contribution. 
Relatedly, the impact of the licenses and internal factors can be thought of as a 
process that entails path dependencies.  In other words, a corporation makes decisions 
based on events that have come before (e.g., see Finney and Lesieur, 1982).  For 
example, corporation A may not respond to public pressures until a lawsuit (the legal 




that the firm is “responsive” to public pressures although that was not their original 
intent.   The associated economic benefits that result from these changes may lead 
corporation A to explore more environmentally-friendly methods of production that also 
increase efficiency.  A detailed case study that examines corporations over time (along 
the lines of Raizada, 1998) could help tease out the process by which licenses and 
managerial considerations impact corporate offending.  
Examining whether overcompliance is driven by instrumental or normative 
considerations is important to tease out as well.  Although the current study suggests that 
instrumental values are less salient in explaining overcompliance at the firm level, 
scholars should examine this more closely.  For example, it may be possible to see if 
overcompliers in one period negotiate for more stringent regulations to put competitors at 
a disadvantage, and then what their outcomes look like after new regulations are 
implemented.  Do they continue to overcomply?  It would also be interesting to conduct 
case studies on violators who become overcompliers, either after being sanctioned for 
violations or being informally pressured to do so.  This would allow us to look into the 
“black box” of corporate motivations.     
Finally, given that this is the first multivariate study of the license framework and the 
first empirical study of the integrated theory, it is important to replicate these findings 
with different samples to assess the generalizability of the study.  For example, the 
pressures faced by different industries may lead to different findings.  Targeting 
individuals in different management positions would provide more insight into unique 
cost/benefit calculations at the individual level.  It may be that different regulatory 




theory is specific to environmental behavior, I think it is general enough to apply to a 
variety of other corporate crimes; testing these propositions on different crime outcomes 
is important.  Research should continue to test the theory to determine its scope, its 
success, and its failures.    
At the end of the day, I hope to contribute to knowledge about corporate decision-
making to mitigate the amount of future noncompliance and its consequent impact on 
wildlife and human life.  Although the empirical results here should be considered in 
light of the methodological limitations, creating a comprehensive (but clear) theoretical 
framework that looks beyond the legal domain  can guide tests of multiple factors and 
multiple levels of analysis and  provide a framework to examine relevant interactions.  
Only by studying the pressures on corporations, the pressures on individuals, and how 



























What is the chance that you would 
act as the manager (Lee) did under 
these circumstances? 
0 = No 
chance 
1 = 10% 
or more 
chance 
879 0.38 0.49 - 




Scale combining responses on the 
certainty of firm legal sanctions 
(being prosecuted, being investigated 
by regulatory agency, being sued) 




Scale combining responses on the 
severity of firm legal sanctions (being 
prosecuted, being investigated by 
regulatory agency, being sued) 
0 - 30 855 25.14 5.64 0.94 
Social 
License 




What is the chance that your actions 
would tarnish the reputation of the 
firm? 




























How much of a problem would it be 
if you tarnished the reputation of the 
firm for doing what the manager did? 
0 = No 
problem 
at all 
10 = A 
very big 
problem 
852 7.91 2.29 - 
Mandate (VD) Firm 
The firm has been mandated to 
release public information regarding 
the type and amount of toxic 
substances released by its facilities 
0 = not 
part of 
vignette 
1 = part 
of 
vignette 
879 0.48 0.500 - 
No Info (VD) Firm 
No indication that the firm has been 
mandated to release public 
information regarding the type and 
amount of toxic substances released 
by its facilities (Reference Category) 
0 = not 
part of 
vignette 
1 = part 
of 
vignette 
879 0.52 0.500 - 
Economic 
License 
       
Economic 
Constraints 
       
Foreign 
Comp. (VD) 
Firm Losing ground to foreign competitors 
0=No 
1=Yes 
879 0.35 0.48 - 
Econ. Healthy 
(VD) 
Firm Economically healthy 
0=No 
1=Yes 













































Weaken the firm’s competitive 
position (reference category) 
0=No 
1=Yes 
879 0.53 0.50 - 
Environment
al Marketing 




















       
Increasing 
Rev. (VD) 
Firm Increasing sales and revenues 
0=No 
1=Yes 
879 0.47 0.50 - 
Declining 
Rev. (VD) 
Firm Declining sales and revenues 
0=No 
1=Yes 
879 0.53 0.50 - 
Corporate Culture       
Common Firm 
(VD) 
Firm This practice is common in the firm 
0=No 
1=Yes 





























































Firm routinely has violated EPA 













Volunteered to participate in an EPA 








Was contacted by the EPA to 
participate in a voluntary pollution 
reduction program but declined to do 
so (Reference category) 
0=No 
1=Yes 








The firm severely reprimanded an 
employee who was discovered 
violating environmental regulations 
0=No 
1=Yes 




















Fired (VD) Firm 
The firm fired an employee who was 








The firm took no action against an 
employee who was discovered 








       
Hotline (VD) Firm 
A hotline in which violation of 




879 0.18 0.39 - 
Audits (VD) Firm 
Internal random environmental audits 
in which violations of compliance 
can be uncovered 
0=No 
1=Yes 




Mandatory self-reporting to the EPA 
of monthly release data 
0=No 
1=Yes 
879 0.19 0.39 - 
Mandatory 
Training (VD) 
Firm Mandatory ethics training 
0=No 
1=Yes 
879 0.21 0.40 - 
Ethics Code Firm An ethics code (Reference category) 
0=No 
1=Yes 
879 0.21 0.40 - 
Management 
demands 





Is asked by a higher level manager 
0=No 
1=Yes 


































Ethical considerations guide top 
management hiring decisions, 








Ethical considerations are considered 








Ethical considerations are considered 
mostly irrelevant to business 
decisions (Reference category) 
0=No 
1=Yes 
879 0.35 0.48 - 
Rational Choice 
Variables 





Scale combining responses on the 
certainty of individual legal sanctions 
(being arrested, being investigated by 
regulatory agency, being sued) 





Scale combining responses on the 
severity of individual legal sanctions 
(being arrested, being sued) 





Scale combining responses on the 
certainty of individual social 
sanctions (losing respect of business 
associates, being dismissed from 
company, losing respect of good 
friends, jeopardizing future job 
prospects) 
























Scale combining responses on the 
severity of individual social sanctions 
(losing respect of business associates, 
being dismissed from company, 
losing respect of good friends, 
jeopardizing future job prospects) 




How much would it advance your 
career if you did what the manager 
did under these circumstances? 
0 = Not 
at all – 
10 = A 
great 
deal 




Scale combining four items 
pertaining to justice (the behavior 
was fair, the behavior was just), 
deontology (behavior was morally 
right), and relativism (behavior is 
acceptable to my family) 





Scale combining two items testing 
whether the behavior violates an 
unspoken promise or an unwritten 
contract 




Scale combining two items about 
whether the behavior is traditionally 
acceptable or culturally acceptable 




What this manager is doing is: Very 
unethical—No at all unethical 




























How exciting or thrilling would it be 
for you if you did what the manager 
did under the circumstances? 









Please rate this behavior according to 
its desirability 





873 0.73 1.57 - 
Control 
Variables 




The scenario depicted the behavior as 
“discharging toxins into a local 
waterway” 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 




The scenario depicted the behavior as 
“mislabeling hazardous waste” 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
879 0.31 0.46 - 
Ignore Comp. Scenario 
Reference Category: The scenario 
depicted the behavior as “ignoring an 
EPA compliance order” 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
























































Within your organization, how 















If you have ever worked in publicly 
or privately-owned business, have 
you personally experienced situations 
similar to those described in the 
scenarios? = NO 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
























If you have ever worked in publicly 
or privately-owned business, have 
you personally experienced situations 
similar to those described in the 
scenarios? = YES 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 




If you have ever worked in publicly 
or privately-owned business, have 
you personally experienced situations 
similar to those described in the 
scenarios?  = NOT APPLICABLE 
(Reference category) 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
816 0.11 0.31 - 
Envcommit Firm 
Describe the environmental 












Regardless of what you would do, is 
the situation described in this 
scenario believable or realistic? 
0=No 
1=Yes 





An upper-level manager 
0=No 
1=Yes 













Does your current employer have a 
code of ethics? 
0=No 
1=Yes 




Does your current employer have 
mandatory ethics training? 
0=No 
1=Yes 























Does your current employer have 
random ethics audits? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
826 0.02 0.15 - 
Anon. hotline Firm 
Does your current employer have an 








Does your current employer have top 
management that treats ethics and 
ethics violations seriously? 
0=No 
1=Yes 




Does your current employer have 
company policy regarding 
environmental compliance 




826 0.32 0.47 - 
Size Firm 
Number of employees in 
respondent’s firm 
0 - 1267 877 12.10 76.88 - 
NOTE: The number of observations and descriptives provided here reflect the original data, not the imputed data.  The post-
imputation means and standard deviations can be found in Appendices B and C. Note, however, that the scale alphas here 




























What is the chance that you 
would act as the manager (Lee) 
did under these circumstances? 
0 = 0% 
chance – 
10 = 100% 
chance 
586 7.66 2.95 - 





What is the chance that your 
actions would enhance the 
reputation of the firm? 
0 = 0% 
chance – 
10 = 100% 
chance 




How beneficial would it be if 
your actions enhanced the 
reputation of the firm? 





570 6.84 2.61 - 
Mandate (VD) Firm 
The firm has been mandated to 
release public information 
regarding the type and amount 
of toxic substances released by 
its facilities 
0 = not part 
of vignette 
1 = part of 
vignette 
586 0.45 0.49 - 
No Info (VD) Firm 
No indication that the firm has 
been mandated to release 
public information regarding 
the type and amount of toxic 
substances released by its 
facilities (Reference Category) 
0 = not part 
of vignette 
1 = part of 
vignette 
586 0.55 0.50 - 
Economic 
License 
       
Economic 
Constraints 






















Firm Economically healthy 
0=No 
1=Yes 


























Weaken the firm’s competitive 
position (reference category) 
0=No 
1=Yes 
586 0.48 0.50 - 
Environmental 
Marketing 








586 0.52 0.50 - 
No Market. (VD) Firm 




586 0.49 0.50 - 
Firm Economic 
Status 
       
Increasing Rev. 
(VD) 
Firm Increasing sales and revenues 
0=No 
1=Yes 
586 0.54 0.50 - 
Declining Rev. 
(VD) 
Firm Declining sales and revenues 
0=No 
1=Yes 
586 0.46 0.50 - 
Corporate 
Culture 




























No Culture (VD) Firm 




























Firm routinely has violated 




586 0.35 0.48 - 
Firm EPA 
Volunteer Status 




Volunteered to participate in an 








Was contacted by the EPA to 
participate in a voluntary 
pollution reduction program 








       
Reprimand (VD) Firm 
The firm severely reprimanded 

















Fired (VD) Firm 
The firm fired an employee 




586 0.33 0.47 - 
No action (VD) Firm 
The firm took no action against 










       
Hotline (VD) Firm 
A hotline in which violation of 




586 0.18 0.38 - 
Audits (VD) Firm 
Internal random environmental 
audits in which violations of 
compliance can be uncovered 
0=No 
1=Yes 




Mandatory self-reporting to the 
EPA of monthly release data 
0=No 
1=Yes 
586 0.20 0.40 - 
Mandatory 
Training (VD) 
Firm Mandatory ethics training 
0=No 
1=Yes 
586 0.21 0.41 - 
Ethics Code Firm 




586 0.21 0.40 - 
Management 
demands 








586 0.50 0.50 - 
Asks (VD) Individual 




586 0.50 0.50 - 
Managerial 
Ethics 















Ethical considerations guide 
top management hiring 
decisions, performance 
evaluations, and promotions 
0=No 
1=Yes 




Ethical considerations are 
considered important, but 








Ethical considerations are 
considered mostly irrelevant to 




586 0.36 0.48 - 




Scale combining responses on 
the certainty of individual 
social rewards (gaining respect 
of business associates, being 
promoted in the company, 
gaining respect of good friends, 
advancing future job prospects) 




Scale combining responses on 
the benefits of individual social 
rewards (gaining respect of 
business associates, being 
promoted in the company, 
gaining respect of good friends, 
advancing future job prospects) 
0 – 40  566 26.26 10.25 0.95 
Career Individual 
How much would it advance 
your career if you did what the 
manager did under these 
circumstances? 
0 = Not at all 
10 = A great 
deal 












Broad Moral Individual 
Scale combining four items 
pertaining to justice (the 
behavior was fair, the behavior 
was just), deontology (behavior 
was morally right), and 
relativism (behavior is 
acceptable to my family) 
4 - 28 560 9.52 6.64 0.95 
Social Contract Individual 
Scale combining two items 
testing whether the behavior 
violates an unspoken promise 
or an unwritten contract 
2 - 14 568 4.86 3.35 0.91 
Relativist Individual 
Scale combining two items 
about whether the behavior is 
traditionally acceptable or 
culturally acceptable 
2 - 14 570 5.32 3.13 0.73 
Ethical Individual 
What this manager is doing is: 
Very unethical—No at all 
unethical 




578 2.48 2.00 - 
Thrilling Individual 
How exciting or thrilling would 
it be for you if you did what the 
manager did under the 
circumstances? 
0 = Not 
exciting 
10 = Very 
exciting 
583 4.16 3.24 - 
Desirable Individual 
Please rate this behavior 
according to its desirability 
















Feel Good Individual 
Assume that you did what the 
manager did and it did not 
become known within or 
outside of the company.  
Would you feel good for acting 
as the manager did? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
567 0.81 0.39 - 
Pride Individual 
Would you feel a sense of pride 
if others knew that you had 
done this? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
563 0.74 0.44 - 
Control 
Variables 
       
Pollution 40 Scenario 
Behavior depicted in scenario 
is “reduces pollution 40% 
below required levels” 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
586 0.49 0.50 - 
Security Scenario 
Behavior depicted in scenario 
is “enhances security around 
toxic storage sites” (reference 
categories) 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
586 0.51 0.50 - 
Years Experience Individual Years of work experience 2 - 60 536 29.67 10.14 - 




533 0.80 0.40 - 
Religion Individual 
How important is religion in 





















Within your organization, how 









531 1.83 0.45 - 
Personexp_no Individual 
If you have ever worked in 
publicly or privately-owned 
business, have you personally 
experienced situations similar 
to those described in the 
scenarios? = NO 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
539 0.35 0.48 - 
Personexp_yes Individual 
If you have ever worked in 
publicly or privately-owned 
business, have you personally 
experienced situations similar 
to those described in the 
scenarios? = YES 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
539 0.55 0.50 - 
Personexp_na Individual 
If you have ever worked in 
publicly or privately-owned 
business, have you personally 
experienced situations similar 
to those described in the 
scenarios?  = NOT 
APPLICABLE (Reference 
category) 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
539 0.10 0.30 - 
Envcommit Firm 
Describe the environmental 


















Sit. Realistic Individual 
Regardless of what you would 
do, is the situation described in 




585 0.77 0.42 - 
Upper level (VD) Individual An upper-level manager 
0=No 
1=Yes 
586 0.50 0.50 - 
Mid-level (VD) Individual 




586 0.45 0.50 - 
Code of Ethics Firm 
Does your current employer 
have a code of ethics? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
543 0.58 0.49 - 
Mand. Training Firm 
Does your current employer 




543 0.20 0.40 - 
Random Audits Firm 
Does your current employer 
have random ethics audits? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
543 0.04 0.18 - 
Anon. hotline Firm 
Does your current employer 





543 0.12 0.33 - 
Top man. Ethics Firm 
Does your current employer 
have top management that 




543 0.54 0.50 - 
Company Policy Firm 
Does your current employer 
have company policy regarding 
environmental compliance 
management systems in 
relevant business sites 
0=No 
1=Yes 
543 0.35 0.48 - 
Size Firm 
Number of employees in 
respondent’s firm 




NOTE: The number of observations and descriptives provided here reflect the original data, not the imputed data.  The post-
imputation means and standard deviations can be found in Appendices B and C. Note, however, that the scale alphas here 
reflect the scales created with imputed data. 
  



















































0 = No chance 
1 = 10% or 
more chance 
879 0 (0%) 0.38 (0.485) 9669 0.38 (0.485) 
Legal License       
   Firm Legal Certainty 0 – 30 845 34 (3.9%) 16.88 (7.960) 9635 16.77 (7.961) 
   Firm Legal Severity 0 - 30 855 24 (2.7%) 25.14 (5.637) 9645 25.06 (5.839) 
Social License       
   Firm Social 
Certainty 
0 = No chance 
10 = 100% 
chance 
864 15 (1.7%) 6.75 (2.533) 9654 6.74 (2.544) 
   Firm Social Severity 
0 = No 
problem at all 
10 = A very 
big problem 
852 27 (3.1%) 7.91 (2.288) 9642 7.86 (2.371) 
Public Awareness       
   Mandated (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.48 (0.500) 9669 0.48 (0.5000) 
Economic License       
Economic Constraints       
   Foreign Comp. (VD) 
0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.35 (0.477) 9669 0.35 (0.477) 
   Econ. Healthy (VD) 
0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.31 (0.464) 9669 0.31 (0.464) 





879 -- 0.34 (0.473) 9669 0.34 (0.473) 


























879 -- 0.47 (0.500) 9669 0.47 (0.499) 
   Weak Comp. (VD) 
0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.53 (0.500) 9669 0.53 (0.499) 
Firm Environmental 
Marketing       








      
   Declining Rev. (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.53 (0.499) 9669 0.53 (0.499) 




879 -- 0.47 (0.499) 9669 0.47 (0.499) 
Firm Ownership       
   Public (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.51 (0.500) 9669 0.51 (0.500) 
   Private (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.49 (0.500) 9669 0.49 (0.500) 
Corporate Culture       
   Common Firm (VD) 0=No  
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.33 (0.470) 9669 0.33 (0.470) 
   Common Ind. (VD) 0=No  
1=Yes 





















   No Culture (VD)  879 -- 0.33 (0.469) 9669 0.33 (0.469) 
Firm Environmental 
Record       
   Exceed Stand. (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.34 (0.473) 9669 0.34 (0.473) 
   Met Stand. (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.33 (0.472) 9669 0.33 (0.472) 
   Violate Stand. (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.33 (0.470) 9669 0.33 (0.469) 
Firm EPA Volunteer 
Status       




879 -- 0.49 (0.500) 9669 0.49 (0.500) 




879 -- 0.51 (0.500) 9669 0.51 (0.500) 
Internal Compliance 
Operation       
   No Action (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.29 (0.455) 9669 0.29 (0.454) 
   Reprimanded (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.34 (0.475) 9669 0.34 (0.475) 
   Fired (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.37 (0.482) 9669 0.37 (0.482) 
Internal Compliance 
Structure       
   Hotline (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 





















   Audits (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.21 (0.406) 9669 0.21 (0.406) 
   Self Reporting (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.19 (0.391) 9669 0.19 (0.391) 
   Ethics Code (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.22 (0.413) 9669 0.22 (0.412) 




879 -- 0.20 (0.404) 9669 0.20 (0.404) 
Managerial Ethics       
   Ethics Guide (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.34 (0.473) 9669 0.34 (0.473) 
   Ethics Distinct (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.32 (0.466) 9669 0.32 (0.466) 




879 -- 0.34 (0.476) 9669 0.34 (0.475) 
Super. Asked (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.50 (0.500) 9669 0.50 (0.500) 
Asks (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.50 (0.500) 9669 0.50 (0.500) 
Rational Choice 
variables       
Ind. Legal Certainty 0 - 30 842 37 (4.21%) 13.94 (8.062) 9632 13.90 (8.026) 
Ind. Legal Severity 0 - 20 864 15 (1.71%) 18.93 (2.399) 9654 18.85 (2.692) 
Ind. Social Certainty 0 – 40 851 28 (3.19%) 27.73 (8.554) 9641 27.59 (8.655) 
Ind. Social Severity 6 – 40  837 42 (4.8%) 36.11 (5.311) 9635 26.79 (4.633) 





















10 = A great 
deal  
Broad Moral 4 - 28 852 27 (3.07%) 26.12 (3.161) 9642 26.11 (3.191) 
Social Contract 2 – 14 854 25 (2.84%) 11.59 (3.114) 9644 11.60 (3.118) 
Relativist 2 – 14 865 14 (1.59%) 9.88 (3.270) 9655 9.89 (3.267) 
Ethical 
1 = not at all 
unethical  
- 7 = greatly 
unethical 
870 9 (1.02%) 5.92 (1.981) 9660 5.92 (1.980) 
Desirable 




879 0 (0.0%) 0.77 (1.643) 9669 0.75 (1.596) 
Thrilling 
0 = Not 
exciting 
10 = Very 
exciting 
874 5 (0.60%) 0.61 (1.615) 9664 0.61 (1.611) 
Shame 0 = Yes 
1 = No 
841 38 (4.32%) 0.04 (0.203) 9631 0.05 (0.212) 
Shame Severity 
0 = No 
problem at all 
10 = A very 
big problem 
861 18 (2.05%) 8.85 (1.947) 9651 8.78 (2.083) 
Control Variables       
Discharge Toxins 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 0 (0.0%) 0.35 (0.476) 9669 0.34 (0.475) 
Hazard Labeling 0=No 
1=Yes 





















Ignore Compliance 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 0 (0.0%) 0.34 (0.475) 9669 0.34 (0.475) 
Years Experience Specify 815 64 (7.3%) 29.97 (10.502) 9605 29.99 (10.596) 
Marital Binary 0=not married 
1=married 























Not Applicable  
1=Has not had 
personal 
experience 
816 63 (7.2%) 0.37 (0.482) 9606 0.37 (0.482) 
Personexp_yes 







































816 63 (7.2%) 0.11 (0.312) 8976 0.11 (0.311) 
Envcommit
 
0 = Excessive 
1 = About 
right 
2 = Use work 
3 = Poor 
806 73 (8.3%) 0.92 (0.396) 9596 0.93 (0.404) 
Sit. Realistic 0 =No  
1 =Yes 
876 3 (0.3%) 0.86 (0.349) 9666 0.86 (0.349) 
Mid-level (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.52 (0.500) 9669 0.52 (0.500) 
Upper-level (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
879 -- 0.48 (0.500) 9669 0.48 (0.500) 
Code of Ethics 0=No 
1=Yes 
826 53 (6.0%) 0.57 (0.495) 9616 0.58 (0.494) 
Mand. Training 0=No  
1=Yes 
826 53 (6.0%) 0.19 (0.390) 9616 0.20 (0.399) 
Random Audits 0=No  
1=Yes 





















Anon. Hotline 0=No  
1=Yes 







826 53 (6.0%) 0.55 (0.498) 9616 0.55 (0.498) 
Company Policy 0=No  
1=Yes 
826 53 (6.0%) 0.32 (0.467) 9616 0.33 (0.469) 
Size 0 – 1267 877 2 (0.2%) 12.10 (76.875) 9667 12.16 (76.797) 
a
 These means do not add up to 1 because these dummy variables were created from the original envcommit variable, in which 
there were 73 missing values (out of 879 possible). 
b
This is the number of offending scenarios after dropping unit nonresponders and those with missing information on the 
























0 = No chance 
10 = 100% 
chance 
586 0 (0%) 7.66 (2.951) 6446 7.66 (2.949) 
Social License       
Firm Social Certainty 
(OVER) 
0 = No chance 
10 = 100% 
chance 
570 16 (2.7%) 6.35 (2.659) 6430 6.33 (2.671) 
Firm Social Rewards  




570 16 (2.7%) 6.84 (2.613) 6430 6.79 (2.662) 
Public Awareness       
   Mandated (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.45 (0.498) 6446 0.45 (0.498) 
Economic License       
Economic Constraints       




586 -- 0.34 (0.474) 6446 0.34 (0.474) 
   Econ. Healthy (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.29 (0.456) 6446 0.29 (0.455) 




586 -- 0.37 (0.482) 6446 0.37 (0.482) 
Firm Competitive 
Position       
   Strengthen Comp. 
0=No 
1=Yes 


























586 -- 0.48 (0.500) 6446 0.48 (0.500) 
Firm Environmental 
Marketing       








      




586 -- 0.46 (0.499) 6446 0.46 (0.499) 




586 -- 0.54 (0.499) 6446 0.54 (0.499) 
Firm Ownership       
   Public (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.51 (0.500) 6446 0.51 (0.500) 
   Private (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.49 (0.500) 6446 0.49 (0.500) 
Corporate Culture       




586 -- 0.36 (0.481) 6446 0.36 (0.481) 
   Common Ind. (VD) 0=No  
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.32 (0.467) 6446 0.32 (0.467) 






















Record       
   Exceed Stand. (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.36 (0.480) 6446 0.36 (0.480) 
   Met Stand. (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.30 (0.457) 6446 0.30 (0.460) 




586 -- 0.34 (0.476) 6446 0.34 (0.475) 
Firm EPA Volunteer 
Status       




586 -- 0.49 (0.500) 6446 0.49 (0.500) 




586 -- 0.51 (0.500) 6446 0.51 (0.500) 
Internal Compliance 
Operation       
   No Action (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.32 (0.465) 6446 0.32 (0.465) 
   Reprimanded (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.36 (0.480) 6446 0.36 (0.480) 
   Fired (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.33 (0.469) 6446 0.33 (0.469) 
Internal Compliance 
Structure       
   Hotline(VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 





















   Audits (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.21 (0.405) 6446 0.21 (0.405) 




586 -- 0.20 (0.403) 6446 0.20 (0.402) 
   Ethics code (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.20 (0.404) 6446 0.20 (0.404) 




586 -- 0.21 (0.408) 6446 0.21 (0.407) 
Managerial Ethics       
   Ethics Guide (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.30 (0.460) 6446 0.30 (0.460) 




586 -- 0.34 (0.473) 6446 0.34 (0.472) 




586 -- 0.36 (0.480) 6446 0.36 (0.480) 
Super. Asked (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.50 (0.500) 6446 0.50 (0.500) 
Asks (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.50 (0.500) 6446 0.50 (0.500) 
Rational Choice 
variables       
Ind. Legal Certainty 
(OVER) 0 - 40 566 20 (3.41%) 22.47 (8.985) 6426 22.33 (9.050) 
Ind. Legal Rewards 0 - 40 566 20 (3.41%) 26.26 (10.247) 6426 26.11 (10.399) 
Career 0 = Not at all 
10 = A great 






















Broad Moral 4 – 28 560 26 (4.44%) 9.52 (6.636) 6420 9.57 (6.705) 
Social Contract 2 - 14 568 18 (3.07%) 4.86 (3.354) 6428 4.86 (3.377) 
Relativist 2 - 14 570 16 (2.73%) 5.32 (3.131) 6430 5.35 (3.150) 
Ethical 
1 = not at all 
unethical  
- 7 = greatly 
unethical 
578 8 (1.37%) 2.48 (1.995) 6438 2.49 (2.003) 
Desirable 




586 0 (0.0%) 7.06 (3.120) 6446 7.05 (3.157) 
Thrilling 
0 = Not 
exciting 
10 = Very 
exciting 
583 3 (0.5%) 4.16 (3.238) 6443 4.16 (3.236) 
Feel Good 0 = No 
1 = Yes 
567 19 (3.24%) 0.81 (0.393) 6427 0.81 (0.395) 
Pride 0 = No 
1 = Yes 
563 23 (3.92%) 0.74 (0.438) 6423 0.73 (0.442) 
Control Variables       
Pollution 40 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.49 (0.500) 6446 0.49 (0.500) 
Security 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.51 (0.500) 6446 0.51 (0.500) 
Years Experience
b
 Specify 536 50 (8.5%) 29.67 (10.139) 6396 29.69 (10.161) 
Marital_Binary 0=not married 
1=married 











































Not Applicable  
1=Has not had 
personal 
experience 
539 47 (8.0%) 0.35 (0.478) 6399 0.35 (0.478) 
Personexp_yes 










































0 = Excessive 
1 = About 
right 
2 = Use work 
3 = Poor 
533 53 (9.04%) 0.94 (0.393) 6393 0.95 (0.396) 
Sit. Realistic 0=Yes 
1=No 
585 1 (0.2%) 0.77 (0.421) 6445 0.77 (0.420) 
Code of Ethics 0=No 
1=Yes 
543 43 (7.3%) 0.58 (0.494) 6403 0.59 (0.492) 
Mand. Training 0=No  
1=Yes 
543 43 (7.3%) 0.20 (0.404) 6403 0.22 (0.411) 
Random Audits 0=No  
1=Yes 
543 43 (7.3%) 0.03 (0.184) 6403 0.04 (0.203) 
Anon. Hotline 0=No  
1=Yes 
543 43 (7.3%) 0.12 (0.327) 6403 0.13 (0.337) 
Top Man. Ethics
b
 0=No  
1=Yes 
543 43 (7.3%) 0.54 (0.499) 6403 0.54 (0.498) 
Company Policy 0=No  
1=Yes 
543 43 (7.3%) 0.35 (0.476) 6403 0.35 (0.477) 
Mid-level (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 
586 -- 0.45 (0.498) 6446 0.45 (0.498) 
Upper-level (VD) 0=No 
1=Yes 





















Size 0 - 370 585 1 (0.2%) 9.14 (32.216) 6445 9.13 (32.168) 
a
 These means do not add up to 1 because these dummy variables were created from the original envcommit variable, in which 
there were 84 missing values (out of 617 possible). 
b
This is the number of overcompliance scenarios after dropping unit nonresponders and those with missing information on the 





Appendix D: Vignette Measures Correlation Matrices 
 
 
Table D. 1. Correlation Matrix, Offending Scenario 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Offend 1 





























































      



























































































































































































































































































































































0.028 0.051 -0.004 -0.025 -0.006 -0.035 0.023 -0.027 0.011 0.001 
2
0 
























0.021 -0.003 0.03 0.005 0.047 0.036 
0.061
* 

















































-0.031 -0.029 0.031 -0.014 0.053 -0.007 0.051 
3
1 




0.011 -0.023 0.019 -0.01 
3
2 





























































































































































































































































-0.006 -0.016 0.025 
5
0 



























































































































Table D. 1. Correlation Matrix, Offending Scenario (cont.) 
  























        
1
6 









































     
1
9 
Mandated 0.02 -0.003 
0.082*
* 
0.021 0.053 0.015 1 
    
2
0 
Public -0.041 0.026 0.01 
0.0642
* 
0.01 0.036 -0.03 1 
   




























-0.05 0.048 0.011 0.014 -0.024 0.02 0.005 -0.016 0.001 0.044 1 
2
4 
Green Market. -0.012 
0.088*
** 





Declining Rev. -0.015 -0.006 -0.047 -0.008 -0.043 -0.015 0.007 -0.014 0.024 -0.037 0.007 
2
6 
Common Firm 0.015 -0.04 -0.023 -0.037 -0.023 -0.028 
-
0.019 















Met Stand. 0.013 0.003 0.004 -0.023 -0.02 -0.006 
-
0.038 
0.01 -0.056* 0.052 0.043 
3
0 









Fired 0.023 -0.01 -0.023 -0.01 -0.022 -0.009 0.006 0.006 -0.022 0.023 0.048 
3
2 




























0.066* -0.036 0.065* 
-
0.029 











Self Reporting 0.005 0.033 -0.048 0.005 -0.04 0.024 
-
0.014 





Ethics Guide -0.024 0.02 -0.028 -0.005 0.034 0.036 
-
0.047 
-0.004 0.032 -0.014 0.024 
3
8 




























































































Coinvolve 0.004 -0.028 
0.085*
* 
0.003 -0.01 -0.021 
-
0.006 









0.022 0.011 -0.013 
-
0.002 































-0.032 0 0.004 -0.003 -0.024 0.056 
5
0 
Upper Level 0.008 -0.03 -0.01 -0.035 -0.019 -0.04 
-
0.016 
0.057* 0.013 -0.026 0.047 
5
1 

































Anon. Hotline 0.053 -0.01 0.02 0.017 0.041 0.014 
-
0.031 































Size 0.011 0.013 0.044 0.016 0.05 0.032 0.028 0.027 0.052 -0.01 0.022 
 
 
Table D. 1.  Correlation Matrix, Offending Scenario (cont.) 
  
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
2
4 
Green Market. 1 
          
2 Declining Rev. 0.021 1 









Common Firm -0.01 0.037 1 













       
2
8 
Exceed Stand. 0.03 
-
0.025 
-0.01 0.003 1 
      
2
9 





     
3
0 
Voluntary Part. 0.011 0.018 -0.003 0.005 0 -0.027 1 
    
3
1 
Fired 0.036 0.01 0.031 
-
0.018 
0.033 -0.027 -0.004 1 
   
3
2 
Reprimanded 0.013 0.006 -0.008 
-
0.016 












































Self Reporting 0.032 
-
0.028 

















Ethics Distinct -0.038 -0.03 0.014 0.013 0.033 -0.014 0.021 -0.011 -0.001 -0.019 0.059* 
3
9 
Super. Asked 0.001 0.003 -0.02 0.006 -0.047 
-
0.059* 
















0.014 0.008 0.043 0.032 0 0.042 -0.065 0.003 -0.023 -0.007 -0.026 
4
2 
Years Exp. 0.024 
-
0.018 



















































0.004 0.031 -0.022 0.004 -0.038 -0.006 -0.01 -0.029 0.042 
4
8 
Envcommit -0.03 0.022 -0.027 
-
0.042 









24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
4
9 
Sit. Realistic 0.013 0.025 -0.029 0.02 -0.042 0.051 0.038 -0.018 -0.018 0.03 -0.02 
5
0 
Upper Level -0.016 0.015 -0.027 
0.058
* 
-0.019 0.022 -0.024 0.007 0.022 -0.056* 0.044 
5
1 








-0.018 0.016 0.043 0.013 0.038 -0.033 0.009 0.047 0.045 
5
3 
Random Audits 0.007 0.038 -0.043 0.051 
0.072*
* 
















































Table D. 1.  Correlation Matrix, Offending Scenario (cont.) 
  












         
3
7 
Ethics Guide 0.032 0.015 1 
        
3
8 









































    
4
2 







   
4
3 


















































































-0.007 -0.019 0.002 0.002 
0.02
9 













0.001 0.003 -0.008 0.025 





35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 
0 0.028 8 
5
1 

















































Anon. Hotline -0.046 -0.003 -0.052 0.055 0.023 0.015 
0.02
4 





0.013 -0.014 -0.068* -0.005 0.049 -0.038 
0.02
9 































Table D. 1.  Correlation Matrix, Offending Scenario (cont.) 
  












         
4
8 
Envcommit -0.02 -0.037 1 
        
4 Sit. Realistic -0.046 0.075* -0.052 1 







Upper Level -0.009 -0.002 0.014 0 1 
      
5
1 



















    
5
3 






   
5
4 











































































*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table D. 2.  Correlation Matrix, Overcompliance Scenario  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Overcomply 1 
          
2 




























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 














      


















































































































































































































































0.063 0.013 -0.039 -0.003 -0.052 
1
7 
Foreign Comp. -0.021 
-
0.0585 







Econ. Healthy 0.043 
0.0813
* 


























Green Market. -0.036 
-
0.0025 
-0.011 -0.012 0.009 0 -0.007 0.039 -0.008 -0.026 0.007 
2
1 
Declining Rev. -0.014 0.0015 0.01 
-
0.069* 
-0.007 0.023 0.057 0.008 0.014 0.006 -0.022 
2
2 
Common firm 0.069* 0.01 -0.031 -0.02 -0.034 -0.026 
-
0.079* 
-0.056 0.048 -0.059 0.03 
2
3 





-0.064 -0.06 -0.069 -0.038 0.031 0.066 0.053 
2
4 




































-0.041 0.037 0.032 0.018 
2
7 




-0.056 -0.005 0.032 -0.026 0.027 









Hotline -0.05 0.009 -0.015 -0.005 0.046 0.022 0.023 0.012 -0.049 -0.033 -0.049 
3
0 















Audits -0.011 -0.039 0.03 0.036 0.048 -0.018 0.04 -0.007 0.017 -0.015 -0.065 
3
2 
Self Reporting -0.019 0.029 0.01 -0.041 0.022 0.032 0.006 
0.092*
* 














0.065 0.051 0.037 
3
4 















































Years Exp. -0.029 0.036 
-
0.081* 







Marital Binary 0.021 -0.02 -0.01 -0.012 0.027 -0.012 -0.012 0.024 0.044 -0.059 0.005 
3
9 



























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
4
1 





















-0.039 -0.054 0.019 0.045 
0.108*
* 


























Upper Level 0.023 0.054 -0.009 0.021 -0.017 -0.02 -0.006 0.018 0.054 0.028 0.017 
4
6 




0.018 0.048 0.044 0.039 -0.001 -0.057 -0.001 -0.03 
4
7 
Mand. Training -0.004 0.005 -0.068 -0.021 0.018 0.042 0.007 -0.052 -0.047 -0.045 -0.004 
4
8 























0.024 -0.044 -0.029 -0.066 
5
0 
Top Man. Ethics -0.031 0.032 0.059 0.029 0.011 -0.023 0.015 0.022 -0.012 0.013 0.007 
5
1 
Company Policy -0.013 0.077* 0 
0.092*
* 
-0.001 0.006 -0.052 0.054 0.005 -0.006 -0.039 
5
2 
Size -0.02 -0.045 0.038 
-
0.101*





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
* 
 
Table D. 2. Correlation Matrix, Overcompliance Scenario (cont.) 
  




         
1
3 





        
1
4 






       
1
5 
Mandated -0.031 0.064 0.056 1 














     
1
7 




0.015 0.056 1 
    
1
8 








   
1
9 









Green Market. -0.037 0.005 -0.041 
-
0.018 




Declining Rev. 0.018 -0.028 -0.023 0.028 0.036 0.034 -0.029 -0.014 -0.001 1 
2
2 










12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
3 0.037 * 
2
4 




-0.01 -0.044 -0.04 -0.023 0.011 
2
5 





0.031 0.027 0.066 
0.076
* 
-0.016 0.009 0.048 0.063 -0.006 0.06 
2
7 
Fired -0.036 0.058 0.019 0.012 0.007 -0.06 0.016 0.031 -0.054 -0.078* 
2
8 
Reprimand 0.064 -0.01 0.01 
-
0.043 
0.022 -0.01 0.058 0.045 0.034 0.032 
2
9 
Hotline 0.005 -0.002 -0.042 0.004 0.028 -0.047 0.027 -0.007 0.071* 0.0377 
3
0 




0.048 -0.012 -0.018 
3
1 
Audits -0.059 -0.041 -0.005 0.011 0.016 -0.001 0.042 -0.01 -0.02 -0.078* 
3
2 
Self Reporting 0.019 0.011 0.033 
-
0.024 
0.016 0.068 -0.009 -0.018 -0.003 0.049 
3
3 
Ethics Guide 0.087** 0.04 0.065 0.056 -0.077* -0.011 -0.002 -0.044 0.076* -0.012 
3
4 
Ethics Distinct -0.029 0.063 0.034 0.021 0.028 -0.053 0.057 0.037 0.003 -0.039 
3
5 






0.058 -0.02 0.034 0.048 0.028 -0.042 
3
6 
Pollution 40 -0.014 
0.082*
* 
0.033 0.063 0.052 -0.013 0.025 -0.067 -0.006 0.005 
3
7 
Years Exp. -0.085* -0.008 -0.024 
-
0.063 














Marital Binary -0.03 -0.024 0.01 
-
0.016 
-0.042 0.01 -0.012 -0.024 -0.054 0.026 
3
9 
Religion 0.079* 0.032 0.015 0.014 0.007 -0.013 0.034 0.036 0.054 0.064 
4
0 
coinvolve 0.087** 0.043 0.016 -0.07 0.073* -0.021 -0.051 0.024 -0.024 -0.028 
4
1 





-0.001 0.022 0.004 0.017 0.048 0.061 
4
2 
personexp_yes 0.048 0.081* 
0.091*
* 
0.029 0.006 -0.03 -0.004 -0.052 -0.018 -0.057 
4
3 

















Upper Level 0.044 0.044 0.003 0.04 0.015 -0.065 0.074* 0.03 -0.003 -0.041 
4
6 




















0.002 -0.034 -0.037 
4
9 






0.007 -0.03 0.016 
5
0 









Company Policy -0.051 0.065 0.019 
-
0.018 
-0.015 0.011 -0.037 0.054 -0.046 -0.041 





12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
2 0.035 0.092** 
 
Table D. 2. Correlation Matrix, Overcompliance Scenario (cont.) 
  
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
2
2 
Common firm 1 








        
2
4 
Exceed Stand. -0.025 -0.056 1 
       
2
5 










-0.018 0.055 0.049 -0.02 1 
     
2
7 





    
2
8 















Ethics Code 0.055 
0.140*
** 


































Ethics Guide 0.01 -0.049 0.04 
-
0.072* 
0.04 -0.032 0.071* 0.036 -0.012 -0.062 
3
4 
Ethics Distinct 0.033 0.045 -0.005 0.004 0.001 0.037 -0.012 -0.034 0.024 0.003 
3
5 
Super. Asked -0.02 
0.100*
* 
-0.009 0.004 0.031 0.001 
0.098*
* 
0.017 0.05 -0.035 
3
6 
Pollution 40 0.01 -0.018 0.049 0.01 0.03 -0.028 -0.015 -0.001 -0.04 0.001 
3
7 
Years Exp. -0.05 -0.01 0.018 
-
0.073* 






Marital Binary -0.024 0.066 0.056 -0.039 0.02 0.062 -0.039 -0.026 0.049 0.090** 
3
9 
Religion -0.041 -0.025 -0.041 0.001 -0.061 0.005 -0.009 -0.003 -0.008 -0.067 
4
0 
coinvolve 0.017 -0.012 -0.003 0.014 0.016 -0.065 0.002 0.003 -0.035 0.037 
4
1 
personexp_no -0.028 0.034 -0.021 0.015 -0.043 -0.02 0.055 -0.002 0.048 -0.027 
4
2 
personexp_yes -0.016 -0.012 0.044 -0.041 0.035 0.014 0.002 -0.021 -0.047 0.029 
4
3 
Envcommit -0.062 0.048 0.099** -0.067 0.016 -0.01 0.038 -0.021 -0.077* 0.048 
4
4 
Sit. Realistic 0.007 0.018 
-
0.092** 
0.023 0.041 0.059 -0.067 -0.015 0.042 -0.005 
4
5 








0.054 -0.065 -0.013 -0.003 0.032 
4
6 





22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
4
7 
Mand. Training -0.006 -0.037 -0.016 0.029 -0.029 0.048 0.003 0.079* 0.028 0.051 
4
8 
Random Audits 0.046 -0.003 0.022 -0.011 -0.066 0.014 0.025 -0.061 0.098** 0.054 
4
9 
Anon. Hotline 0.017 
0.093*
* 
-0.037 0.049 -0.036 0.012 0.064 -0.053 0.069 -0.033 
5
0 
Top Man. Ethics -0.003 0.007 -0.009 0.022 0 -0.05 -0.011 0.014 -0.013 0.03 
5
1 
Company Policy 0.023 0.012 -0.055 0.031 0.002 -0.006 -0.009 0.032 -0.046 -0.001 
5
2 
Size 0.011 0.021 0.014 0.001 -0.039 -0.064 
0.122*
** 
-0.032 -0.007 0.075* 
 
Table D. 2. CorrelationMatrix, Overcompliance Scenario (cont.) 
  
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
3
2 
Self Reporting 1 
         
3
3 
Ethics Guide 0.008 1 
        
3
4 

















      
3
6 
Pollution 40 0.044 -0.004 0.03 -0.024 1 
     
3
7 
Years Exp. -0.024 -0.011 
0.073
* 
-0.032 0.003 1 





-0.07 -0.002 0.032 0.014 0.007 0.06 1 





32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
3
9 











































0.022 -0.04 -0.029 0.071 -0.017 
4
5 
Upper Level 0.016 0.019 -0.057 0.004 -0.042 0.047 0.003 -0.069 -0.037 0.077* 
4
6 































Anon. Hotline -0.007 0.021 0.058 -0.025 0.02 0.074* 
0.010*
* 





0.025 -0.038 0.056 
-
0.111**

























Size -0.014 0.022 0.059 -0.033 0.007 0.013 0.05 -0.014 0.02 0.120** 
 
Table D. 2. CorrelationMatrix, Overcompliance Scenario (cont.) 
  






          
4
3 
Envcommit -0.061 1 
         
4
4 
Sit. Realistic 0.084** -0.075* 1 
        
4
5 
Upper Level -0.002 -0.072* -0.006 1 
       
4
6 
Code of Ethics 0.094** -0.012 -0.006 0.012 1 
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Appendix E: Search Terms used in Finding Meta-analysis Articles 
 
Legal license   
Law AND Environmental Crime 
Law AND Environmental Compliance 
Law AND Environmental Misconduct  
Law AND Enviornmental Violations 
Law AND Corporate  Crime 
Law AND Corporate Compliance 
Law AND Corporate Misconduct 
Law AND Corporate Violations 
Law AND Business  Crime 
Law AND Business Compliance 
Law AND Business Misconduct 
Law AND Business Violations 
Law AND Organizational Crime 
Law AND Organizational Compliance 
Law AND Organizational Misconduct 
Law AND Organizational Violations 
Regulation AND Environmental Crime 
Regulation AND Environmental 
Compliance 
Regulation AND Environmental 
Misconduct  
Regulation AND Enviornmental 
Violations 
Regulation AND Corporate  Crime 
Regulation AND Corporate Compliance 
Regulation AND Corporate Misconduct 
Regulation AND Corporate Violations 
Regulation AND Business  Crime 
Regulation AND Business Compliance 
Regulation AND Business Misconduct 
Regulation AND Business Violations 
Regulation AND Organizational Crime 
Regulation AND Organizational 
Compliance 
Regulation AND Organizational 
Misconduct 
Regulation AND Organizational 
Violations 
Inspections AND Environmental Crime 
Inspections AND Environmental 
Compliance 
Inspections AND Environmental 
Misconduct  
Inspections AND Enviornmental 
Violations 
Inspections AND Corporate  Crime 
Inspections AND Corporate 
Compliance 
Inspections AND Corporate Misconduct 
Inspections AND Corporate Violations 
Inspections AND Business Crime 
Inspections AND Business Compliance 
Inspections AND Business Misconduct 
Inspections AND Business Violations 
Inspections AND Organizational Crime 
Inspections AND Organizational 
Compliance 
Inspections AND Organizational 
Misconduct 
Inspections AND Organizational 
Violations 
Police AND Environmental Crime 
Police AND Environmental Compliance 
Police AND Environmental Misconduct  
Police AND Enviornmental Violations 
Police AND Corporate  Crime 
Police AND Corporate Compliance 
Police AND Corporate Misconduct 
Police AND Corporate Violations 
Police AND Business Crime 
Police AND Business Compliance 
Police AND Business Misconduct 
Police AND Business Violations 
Police AND Organizational Crime 
Police AND Organizational Compliance 
Police AND Organizational Misconduct 
Police AND Organizational Violations 
Sanctions AND Environmental Crime 
Sanctions AND Environmental 
Compliance 
Sanctions AND Environmental 
Misconduct  





Sanctions AND Corporate Crime 
Sanctions AND Corporate Compliance 
Sanctions AND Corporate Misconduct 
Sanctions AND Corporate Violations 
Sanctions AND Business Crime 
Sanctions AND Business Compliance 
Sanctions AND Business Misconduct 
Sanctions AND Business Violations 
Sanctions AND Organizational Crime 
Sanctions AND Organizational 
Compliance 
Sanctions AND Organizational 
Misconduct 
Sanctions AND Organizational 
Violations 
Fines AND Environmental Crime 
Fines AND Environmental Compliance 
Fines AND Environmental Misconduct  
Fines AND Environmental Violations 
Fines AND Corporate Crime 
Fines AND Corporate Compliance 
Fines AND Corporate Misconduct 
Fines AND Corporate Violations 
Fines AND Business Crime 
Fines AND Business Compliance 
Fines AND Business Misconduct 
Fines AND Business Violations 
Fines AND Organizational Crime 
Fines AND Organizational Compliance 
Fines AND Organizational Misconduct 
Fines AND Organizational Violations 
lawsuits AND Environmental Crime 
lawsuits AND Environmental 
Compliance 
lawsuits AND Environmental 
Misconduct  
lawsuits AND Environmental Violations 
lawsuits AND Corporate  Crime 
lawsuits AND Corporate Compliance 
lawsuits AND Corporate Misconduct 
lawsuits AND Corporate Violations 
lawsuits AND Business Crime 
lawsuits AND Business Compliance 
lawsuits AND Business Misconduct 
lawsuits AND Business Violations 
lawsuits AND Organizational Crime 
lawsuits AND Organizational 
Compliance 
lawsuits AND Organizational 
Misconduct 
lawsuits AND Organizational Violations 
 
Social License  
Community AND Environmental Crime 
Community AND Environmental 
Compliance 
Community AND Environmental 
Misconduct  
Community AND Environmental 
Violations 
Community AND Corporate Crime 
Community AND Corporate 
Compliance 
Community AND Corporate 
Misconduct 
Community AND Corporate Violations 
Community AND Business Crime 
Community AND Business Compliance 
Community AND Business Misconduct 
Community AND Business Violations 
Community AND Organizational Crime 
Community AND Organizational 
Compliance 
Community AND Organizational 
Misconduct 
Community AND Organizational 
Violations 
Non-profit AND Environmental Crime 
Non-profit AND Environmental 
Compliance 
Non-profit AND Environmental 
Misconduct  
Non-profit AND Environmental 
Violations 
Non-profit AND Corporate Crime 
Non-profit AND Corporate Compliance 
Non-profit AND Corporate Misconduct 
Non-profit AND Corporate Violations 
Non-profit AND Business Crime 
Non-profit AND Business Compliance 
Non-profit AND Business Misconduct 




Non-profit AND Organizational Crime 
Non-profit AND Organizational 
Compliance 
Non-profit AND Organizational 
Misconduct 
Non-profit AND Organizational 
Violations 
Publicity AND Environmental Crime 
Publicity AND Environmental 
Compliance 
Publicity AND Environmental 
Misconduct  
Publicity AND Environmental 
Violations 
Publicity AND Corporate Crime 
Publicity AND Corporate Compliance 
Publicity AND Corporate Misconduct 
Publicity AND Corporate Violations 
Publicity AND Business Crime 
Publicity AND Business Compliance 
Publicity AND Business Misconduct 
Publicity AND Business Violations 
Publicity AND Organizational Crime 
Publicity AND Organizational 
Compliance 
Publicity AND Organizational 
Misconduct 
Publicity AND Organizational 
Violations 
Boycotts AND Environmental Crime 
Boycotts AND Environmental 
Compliance 
Boycotts AND Environmental 
Misconduct  
Boycotts AND Environmental 
Violations 
Boycotts AND Corporate Crime 
Boycotts AND Corporate Compliance 
Boycotts AND Corporate Misconduct 
Boycotts AND Corporate Violations 
Boycotts AND Business Crime 
Boycotts AND Business Compliance 
Boycotts AND Business Misconduct 
Boycotts AND Business Violations 
Boycotts AND Organizational Crime 
Boycotts AND Organizational 
Compliance 
Boycotts AND Organizational 
Misconduct 
Boycotts AND Organizational 
Violations 
 
Economic License  
Stocks AND Environmental Crime 
Stocks AND Environmental Compliance 
Stocks AND Environmental Misconduct  
Stocks AND Environmental Violations 
Stocks AND Corporate Crime 
Stocks AND Corporate Compliance 
Stocks AND Corporate Misconduct 
Stocks AND Corporate Violations 
Stocks AND Business Crime 
Stocks AND Business Compliance 
Stocks AND Business Misconduct 
Stocks AND Business Violations 
Stocks AND Organizational Crime 
Stocks AND Organizational Compliance 
Stocks AND Organizational Misconduct 
Stocks AND Organizational Violations 
Profits AND Environmental Crime 
Profits AND Environmental 
Compliance 
Profits AND Environmental Misconduct  
Profits AND Environmental Violations 
Profits AND Corporate Crime 
Profits AND Corporate Compliance 
Profits AND Corporate Misconduct 
Profits AND Corporate Violations 
Profits AND Business Crime 
Profits AND Business Compliance 
Profits AND Business Misconduct 
Profits AND Business Violations 
Profits AND Organizational Crime 
Profits AND Organizational 
Compliance 
Profits AND Organizational Misconduct 
Profits AND Organizational Violations 
Profitability AND Environmental 
Crime 





Profitability AND Environmental 
Misconduct  
Profitability AND Environmental 
Violations 
Profitability AND Corporate  Crime 
Profitability AND Corporate 
Compliance 
Profitability AND Corporate 
Misconduct 
Profitability AND Corporate Violations 
Profitability AND Business Crime 
Profitability AND Business 
Compliance 
Profitability AND Business Misconduct 
Profitability AND Business Violations 
Profitability AND Organizational 
Crime 
Profitability AND Organizational 
Compliance 
Profitability AND Organizational 
Misconduct 
Profitability AND Organizational 
Violations 
Earnings AND Environmental Crime 
Earnings AND Environmental 
Compliance 
Earnings AND Environmental 
Misconduct  
Earnings AND Environmental 
Violations 
Earnings AND Corporate  Crime 
Earnings AND Corporate Compliance 
Earnings AND Corporate Misconduct 
Earnings AND Corporate Violations 
Earnings AND Business Crime 
Earnings AND Business Compliance 
Earnings AND Business Misconduct 
Earnings AND Business Violations 
Earnings AND Organizational Crime 
Earnings AND Organizational 
Compliance 
Earnings AND Organizational 
Misconduct 







Appendix F: Coding Sheet for Entering MA Data 
 
CC Meta Analysis Coding Sheets: Study-Level Coding Protocol 
 
Bibliographic Reference (APA 
format):_______________________________________________  
 
I. Source Descriptors 
Variable Name Code Item 
ID  
1) Study ID number:  
- First 3 letters of first author’s last name followed by 
year 
- If duplicates, add an “A” or “B” based on alphabetical 
order of titles 
PUBTYPE  
2) Type of Publication: 
1. Book 2. Book chapter 
3. Journal article 4. Thesis or dissertation 
5. Government report 
(state/local) 
6. Government report 
(federal) 
7. Working paper 8. Conference paper 
9. Regulatory Agency 
report 
10. Corporate Report 
11. Other (specify)  
 
PUBTYPE_OTH  
2b) Type of Publication—specify other publication type:  
 









4. Political Science 
5. Environmental Science/Biology 
6. Psychology 
7. Public Policy 
8. Economics 
9. Other 
10. Multiple disciplines (list under DISC_OTH) 
DISC_OTH  




5) Source of funding for the research: 
0. No funding/None reported  
1. Government agency 
2. University 
3. NGO/Non-profit 
4. Private business 
5. Other (specify) 
FUND_OTH  
5b) Source of funding for the research—specify other: 
 
 
NAT_PUB  6) Country of Publication 
DATE  7) Date coded 





II. Study Characteristics 
                                                          
DECISION RULES AND NOTES ABOUT VARIABLES 
35





1) Type of study: 
1. Randomized experiment (in-basket or lab; e.g., 
conditions are randomized at the individual level or 
everyone receives the same survey) 
2. Randomized experiment (vignette survey; e.g., 
conditions within scenarios are randomized) 
 3. Nonequivalent control group (quasi-experimental)—has 
a comparison group that is not randomly assigned (e.g.,  matched 
pairs comparison or propensity score matching) 
 4. Time-series/pre-post test (no control group) 
 5. Time-series/pre-post test (with control group) 
6. Non-experimental (i.e., multiple regression or 
correlation) 
 7. Other (specify) 
STTYPE_OTH  
1b) Type of study—specify Other:  
 
STARTDATE  2) Date Range of Research: First year of data 
ENDDATE  3) Date Range of Research: Last year of data 
NAT_STUD  
4) Country where study conducted: 
 
NUMOUT  5) Number of crime/misconduct outcomes reported in study36 
UOA  
6) What is the unit of analysis in this study (i.e., the type of 
outcome)? 
1. Individual decision-making/behavior 
2. Company decision-making/behavior 
3. Geographic area (e.g., state, country) 
4. Other (specify) 
                                                          
36
 For our purposes, we will include studies that examine criminal and regulatory violations by corporations or their 
employees.  The majority of corporate offenses are handled be regulatory agencies, like the EPA & OSHA.  Thus, a 
focus on strictly criminal behaviors would limit this study and miss a great deal of corporate misconduct.  According 
to Clinard and Yeager (1980), corporate crime is “any act committed by corporations that is punished by the state, 
regardless of whether it is punished under administrative, civil, or criminal law” (p. 16).  This offense-based 
definition encompasses a wide range of behaviors such as antitrust offenses, intentionally polluting the 





6b) What is the unit of analysis in this study?  Specify other:  
 
DATARLBTY  
7) Did the researcher empirically assess the reliability of the data 
collected? 
 1. Yes 
 0. No 
DATAVLDY  
8) Did the researcher assess the validity of the data collected (e.g., 
discussed whether measures used accurately represented the 
construct of interest)? 
 1. Yes 
 0. No 
 
DATACONC  
9) Did the researcher express any concern over the quality of the 
data or data collection procedures?  (Even if the author thinks 
he/she addressed them adequately, include as a concern and 
describe solution in 9b) 
 1. Yes 
 0. No 
DATAPROB  
9b) If yes, what was the nature of the concern? 
 
 
III. Sample Descriptors 
SAMPLEN  1) Sample size 
SAMP_INDCOR  
2) Does the sample consist of individuals or corporations? 
 1. Individuals 
 2. Corporations 
 3. Other (specify; e.g., court cases) 
SAMP_OTHER  
2b) Does the sample consist of individuals or corporations? 
Specify other:  
 
SAMP_MIX  






If the sample consists of individuals, answer the following questions.  Otherwise, skip to 
question #9: 
AGE  
4) Mean Age of Sample (if mean age cannot be determined, enter 
888) 
RACE  
5) Predominant Race of sample 
 1. Mostly white 
 2. Mostly black 
 3. Mostly hispanic 
 4. Mostly asian 
 5. Mixed, none more than 50% 
 6. Mixed, cannot estimate proportion 
 888. Unknown/Not reported 
SEX  
6) Predominant Sex of sample 
 1. 60% or more male 
 2. 60% or more female 
3. Even mix of male and female 
 888. Unknown/Not reported 
MGMT  
7) Predominant management level of sample: 
 1.  60% or more non-managerial employee 
 2.  60% or more middle managers or supervisors 
3. 60% or more CEO/Executives (or highest-level 
employees such as law firm partners) 
4.  Even mix of multiple levels 
5. Other (Specify) 
 888.  Unknown/Not reported 
MGMT2  
7b) Management level of sample—specify other: 
 
PRTCPNT  
8) Who were the participants of the study? 
1. Unemployed students 
2. Working students 
3. Both unemployed and working students 
4. Professionals 





9) Predominant education level of sample 
1. 60% or more: High school degree or less 
2. 60% or more : Some college education (or currently in 
college) 
3. 60% or more: College graduates 
4. 60% or more: Some graduate education (or currently in 
graduate program) 
5. 60% or more: Completed graduate degree 
6: Even mix of multiple education levels 
888. Unknown/Not reported 
EMPLENGTH  
10) Length of employment of the target population:________ 
 1. No work experience 
 2. Less than 5 years 
 3. Between 5 – 10 years 
 5. More than 10 years 
6. Multiple levels of experience included in sample 
888. Unknown/Not reported 
INDUSTRY  
11) From what industry was the sample drawn? (choose all that 
apply) 
1. Agriculture 2. Accounting 
3. Advertising 4. Airline 
5. Banking 6. Biotechnology 
7. Computer/Technology 8. Consumer products 
9. Defense 10. Education 
11. Energy 12. Food, beverage, or 
tobacco 
13. Health care 14. Investment banking 
15. Legal 16. Manufacturing 
17. Marketing/Business 18. Pharmaceuticals 
19. Real Estate 20. Retail 
21. Securities and 
Commodities 
22. Service 
23. Telecommunications 24. Transportation 
888. Unknown/Not 
reported 
25. Other (specify) 






11b) From what industry was the sample drawn? Specify other: 
 
If the sample consists of corporations, please answer the following questions: 
COMPSIZE  
12) Average number of employees in sample companies (if UOA is 
firm and information is not given, record 888) 
COMPPROF  13) Average profit of companies in sample (not given = 888) 
COMPSALES  14) Average annual sales of companies in sample (not given = 888) 
IV. Methods and Procedures 
RANDOM  
1) Was the sample randomly selected? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
888. Unclear or not reported 
SAMPPROC  
2) Sampling procedures 
1. Random probability sample 
2. Stratified random sample 
3. Matched-pairs 
4. Snowball sampling 
5. Convenience sample (drawn from individuals to which 
researchers have easy access) 
6. Secondary data analysis (without specification of 
sampling procedures) 
7. Other (specify)  
SAMPPR_OTH  
2b) Sampling procedures—specify other: 
 
SURVEY  
3) Survey design  
1. Mail 
2. Phone 
3. Face-to-face Interview 
4. Other (specify) 





3b) Survey design—specify other: 
 
CROSSSEC  





5) Did the authors assess the differences between survey 




777. Not applicable (not a survey) 
BIAS_YES  
5b) If yes, were significant differences found between responders’ 
and nonresponders’ background characteristics? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
777. Not applicable 
BIAS_ADD  
5c) If yes, what did the authors do to address these differences? 
 
RESPRATE  6) Response rate to survey (777 if not a survey) 
ATTRITION  
7) If longitudinal, rate of attrition (put 777 if not a longitudinal 
panel survey) 
SIGLEVEL  8) Level of statistical significance used (usually .05) 
CONTROL  
9) Nature of control group 
1. Randomly assigned—no treatment 
2. Randomly assigned—alternative treatment 
3. Natural—no treatment 
4. Natural—alternative treatment 
5. Time-series—pre/post 
6. Propensity-score matching/Matched pairs 
























1) What form did the treatment take?37 
1. Class/training on compliance with standards or 
procedures 
 2. Law (including case law) 
 3. Official sanction/Fine (e.g., conviction, prosecution, 
prison) OR punishment avoidance (e.g., acquittal) 
4. Regulatory Policy (e.g., inspections, agency resources, 
deregulation) 
5. Corporate policy (e.g., procedures, employee  
participation)  
6. Corporate structure (e.g., corporate governance 
initiative,  
percent outside members on board) 
7. Compliance program (e.g., internal monitoring, 
voluntary organizational programs involving more than 
education) 
 8. Membership in external professional organization 
9. Consultant participation (e.g., accounting firm or 
others) 
10. Unionization/Employee Committees 
11. Workers’ benefits (e.g., workers’ compensation) 
12. Organizational climate (e.g., supervisory support or 
punishment by the company) 
13.  Informal sanctions (e.g., bad publicity) 
14. Other (specify) 
15. Multiple treatments involved 
                                                          
37
 We are looking for variables that measure: 
- Extralegal or legal interventions and that are policy-relevant (i.e., can be the subject of an intervention).   
o “General organizational climate” is not relevant unless this includes specific policies in the 
organization that affect compliance.   
o We are NOT interested in personality characteristics (e.g., morality) or a person’s approval of the 
law, job, policy, etc.  
- Things we ARE interested in include  
o Civil or criminal laws or sanctions (including civil cases) 
o Ethical or safety policies within the company 
o Internal compliance/monitoring programs 
o Market devices such as shaming (e.g., bad publicity) 
o Membership in external professional organizations that can sanction members 
o Internal/external audits 
o Corporate structure, including 
 Insider vs. outsider members on the board of directors (including gray and independent 
directors) 
 Public vs. private ownership 
 Whether CEO is head of the board of directors 
o People’s perceptions of risks (e.g., of getting caught or being sanctioned either formally or 
informally) 
- We are mainly interested in the presence vs. absence of such variables, not descriptions about these IVs or 
gradations/dosage of the treatment (e.g., we are not interested in the size of the auditing company). 
o If the independent variable is related to corporate compliance programs or something that seems to 
be of interest, include it only if you can dichotomize it and if there is not already a dichotomous 
variable of interest (e.g., company expenditures on compliance—could be dichotomized if 
companies report $0 versus non-zero values).    
- When an intervention includes multiple components but only has one data point, just record one case and 





1b) Brief description of treatment:  
 
TREAT_BIN  








3) What “authority” implemented the treatment/ was perceived 
to be implementing the treatment??  
1. Researcher 
 2. Manager/Company policy 
 3. Regulatory Agency 
 4. External professional organization 
5. Consultants (e.g., accounting firms) 
6. Police/FBI (or other law enforcement agency) 
7. Co-workers 
8. Self-imposed 
9. Not applicable (Non-experimental) 
10. Other (specify) 
11. Multiple authorities involved (specify under  
      AUTH_OTH) 
AUTH_OTH  




4) What data sources were used to measure the independent 
variables? (Select all that apply) 
1. Official data 
2. Self-report data (e.g., surveys or interviews) 
3. Observations/site visits of places or environments 
4. Other (specify) 
IVSRCE_OTH  
4b) What data sources were used to measure the independent 






5) Did the authors control for potentially spurious variables? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
VI. Dependent Variable Descriptors 
OUTCM_ACT  
1) Did the outcome describe actual behavior (e.g., arrests) or 
intentions (e.g., hypothetical situations)? 
1. Actual behavior 
2. Intentions/Opinions about behavior 
3. Both 
OUTCM_DSC  




2) What type of data was used to measure the outcome 
covered on this coding sheet? 
1. Official data 
2. Self-report data (e.g., surveys or interviews) 
3. Observations/site visits of places or environments 
4. Other (specify) 
OUTDTA_OTH  
2b) What type of data was used to measure the outcome 
covered on this coding sheet?  Specify other: 
 
OUTMSRE  
3)How was the DV measured? 
1. Scale—1 item 
2. Composite 
3. Raw number of violations (or rates: #/unit of 
opportunity) 
4. Dichotomous measure 
5. Other (specify)—e.g., dollar amounts 
                                                          
38
 Regarding measures of the dependent variable, we are not looking at overcompliance in and of itself.   
- If overcompliance is measured, it can be used if compared to noncompliance (and should be combined with 
compliance if applicable).   
- We ARE interested in severity measures (e.g., the amount of money lost, number of injuries) as well as 









4)Description of continuous outcome measure: 
 
ILL_UNETH  
5) Is the DV measured using illegal or unethical behavior?39 
1. Illegal (e.g., can be sanctioned by law enforcement or 
regulatory sanctions, or is subject to auditing) 
2. Unethical (morally ambiguous but not subject to 
sanctions) 
3. Both 
4. Other (specify):  (Unclear whether sanctionable/only 
related to company policies) 
888. Unknown/Not reported 
ILLUNETH_OTH  




6)Does the behavior affect the company or society, according 
to Akers’ (1977) list? 
1. Company 
2. Society  
3. Both 
4. Not specified on Aker’s list/Other (specify) 
COMP_SOC_OTH  
6b)Does the behavior affect the company or society, according 
to Akers’ (1977) list? Specify other: 
VII. Effect Size Data40 
                                                          
39
 An illegal act is one that has been formalized as a law or regulatory statute—i.e., you can be sued, cited, or 
arrested for it. 
- Unethical practices are those that are not punishable under the law but are morally questionable. 
40
 Decision rules on including ESs: 
- If two or more tables/models are presented on the same IV and same operationalization of the DV, include 
all unique measures of the variables of interest. 
- Prioritizing the table/model that 1) includes more IVs of interest and 2) has the full (more final) model.  
- If alternative modeling strategies (e.g., OLS as well as Poisson) are used and there is no significant 





1) Was attrition a problem for this outcome? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
777. Not Applicable (not a panel survey) 
888. Not reported/unknown 
ATT_CASES  2) If attrition was a problem, how many cases were lost? 
ATT_REAS  




4) Raw difference favors (i.e. shows more success for): 
 1. Treatment group (or post period) 
 2. Control group (or pre period) 
 3. Neither (exactly equal) 
 888. Unknown 
777. Not applicable 
SIGDIFF  
5) Did a test of statistical significance indicate statistically 
significant differences between either the control and 
treatment groups or the pre and post tested treatment group? 
 1. Yes 
 0. No 
 888. Unknown 
 777. Not applicable 
STANDES  
6) Was a standardized effect size reported? 
 1. Yes 
 0. No 
ES  7) If yes, what was the effect size 
ES_PAGE  8) If yes, page number where effect size data is found 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
- After including all of the variables of interest from the final model, include any other (not already included) 





9) If no, is there data available to calculate an effect size? 
 1. Yes 
 0. No 
NOES_DATA  
10) Type of data effect size can be calculated from:41 
 1. Means and standard deviations 
 2. t-value or z-value 
3. F-value 
 4. Chi-square (df=1) 
 5. Frequencies or proportions (dichotomous) 
 6. Frequencies or proportions (polychotomous) 
 7. Pre and post  
 8. Standardized regression coefficients 
9. Unstandardized regression coefficients 
10. Correlations (Pearson’s r) 
11. Other (specify) 
NOES_OTH  
10b) Type of data effect size can be calculated from—specify 
other:   
 
NOES_REG  
10c) If the data presented is an unstandardized regression 





5. Other (specify) 
6. Ordered logit 
                                                          
41 Anytime an article has more than one model, NOES_DTA should only have one value and there needs to be 
another case.  There needs to be a new case anytime you have a new independent variable, dependent variable, 
or model (e.g., anytime you have data coming from a different place). 
- When both unstandardized and standardized coefficients, just record that you have standardized 
coefficients in NOES_DTA but record both in their appropriate places 
- When both means and t-tests, just record that you have a t-test in NOES_DTA but record both in their 
appropriate places 
- If you have a regression coefficient and descriptive statistics (means, SD), just record the regression in 





10d) If the data presented is an unstandardized regression 
coefficient, what type of regression was used? Specify other: 
 
TX_N  11) Treatment group sample size42 
CON_N  11b) Control group sample size 
TX_propN  12) Proportion of sample in treatment group (Tx/Tx+Control) 
CON_propN  12b) Proportion of sample in control group (Con/Tx+Control) 
TXMEAN  12) Treatment group mean (dependent variable) 
CONMEAN  12b) Control group mean (dependent variable) 
TXSD  
13) Treatment group standard deviation (dependent variable) 
CONSD  
14) Control group standard deviation (dependent variable) 
SUCCTX_N_a  
15a)  n of treatment group with successful outcome 
SUCCCON_N_c  
15b)  n of control group with successful outcome 
FAILTX_N_b  
16a)  n of treatment group with unsuccessful outcome 
FAILTX_N_d  
16b)  n of control group with unsuccessful outcome 
PROPTX_SUCCa  
17) Proportion of treatment group with successful outcome 
PROPCON_SUCCc  
18) Proportion of control group with successful outcome 
                                                          







19) t-value (for independent/dependent-samples means 
comparisons only) 
TVALUE_P  








21b) F-test p value 
CHISQ  
22) Chi-square value (df=1) 
CHISQ_P  
22b) Chi-square p value 
SD_X  23) Standard deviation of the independent variable 
SD_Y  
24) Standard Deviation of the dependent variable (note: for 
dichotomous dependent variables, this can be calculated using 
the formula √p(1-p)) 
UNSTNDRGS  
25) Unstandardized regression coefficient 
STNDRGSS  
26) Standardized regression coefficient 
PRSONR  27) Pearson’s r 
OTHDATA  





VIII. Conclusions made by the author 
CNCLS_IMM  
1) Did the assessment find evidence for the effectiveness of the 
treatment? (e.g., significant statistical test in the hypothesized 
direction) 
 0. No 
1. Yes 
 2. Not tested 
CNCLS_REL  
2) Did the author(s) conclude there a relationship between the 
corporate crime prevention technique and a reduction in illegal 
corporate activities/violations, regardless of significant finding? 
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